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P R E FA C E
The preface harbors a lie.
G AY AT R I S P I VA K ,

Preface to Of Grammatology

A preface precedes a book that likely has been written prior to it,
thus making it a discursive move doomed to fail from the start.
That is in part the lie it harbors. But as Spivak reminds us, this lie
a preface harbors is more than an accepted, amusing ﬁction
readers live with; the presence of a preface also upsets a book’s
desire to stand alone, self-made, an object that is its own
explanation. It fractures that desired autonomy by reminding us
that a writer and text are never alone; they are deferred, always
preceded and surrounded by and always building on and adding
to other writers and texts. In her own translator’s preface to
Derrida’s preface to Of Grammatology, Spivak writes that “the text
has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end. Each act of
reading the ‘text’ is a preface to the next” (1976, x). A preface is
thus an act of repetition that unhinges and defers the thing it
repeats at the same time as it inaugurates and promotes it.
I read this relationship between a book and its preface as
somewhat analogous to the project this book attempts to undertake. In examining the dynamic relationship between writers
and the texts they produce, I am interested in how writers both
preface a text and are prefaced by other texts, namely genres, in
relation to which they write. As such, the act of writing becomes
a complex site for the enactment of prefaces, in which writers
and texts preface each other, constantly inaugurating and
deferring their own beginnings. In this book, I identify genres
as such sites of interaction in which, to paraphrase Louis
Althusser (1984), writers act as they are acted upon. In its examination of this process of articulation, I hope the book can contribute something of importance and of use to the study and
teaching of invention and writing in composition studies.
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Situated at the intersection between acting and being acted
upon, I would like here to take the opportunity the preface
allows to identify and thank those who, through their support,
expertise, direction, and generosity, have acted upon me to
make this book possible.
It was my teacher and mentor and more recently my coauthor
and friend at the University of Kansas, Amy J. Devitt, who ﬁrst
introduced me to genre eight years ago and who helped me
formulate the questions I continue to ask to this day. This book is
the gift of expert knowledge, wise direction, and unwavering
support and patience she has given me over the years, and in
whatever are its strengths, this book is the gift I give back to her.
At the University of Kansas, I also beneﬁted in countless and
lasting ways from the wisdom and knowledge of my teachers:
Peter Casagrande, who shared and guided my curiosity into why
and how texts are produced; James Hartman, through whose
careful and thoughtful questions I learned to think more carefully and thoughtfully; and Sidney I. Dobrin, whose expertise,
vision, and energy inform my work to this day. For his early
mentorship while I was an undergraduate, I thank Gale K. Larson.
In addition to the scholarship that has shaped my thinking
before and during the writing of this book, my work has proﬁted
in countless ways over the years from interactions with and the
support of friends and colleagues. Among those, I would like
especially to thank Mary Jo Reiff, who continues to enrich my
work through her insight and unfailing collaboration. Thank
you also to Andrea Lunsford, who read portions of the manuscript and whose timely and sage advice turned out to be a turning point in my revisions. At the University of Washington, I am
particularly grateful to Anne Curzan for reading and offering
valuable feedback on the manuscript as well as for her camaraderie and support; to Chandan Reddy for his extraordinary
attentiveness and generous contribution when I was working
through key questions and ideas; to my colleagues in language
and rhetoric: George Dillon, Joan Graham, Juan Guerra, Sandra
Silberstein, Gail Stygall, and John Webster for their knowledge
and guidance; to Marshall Brown for reading and commenting
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on portions of the manuscript; to Kimberly Emmons, Steven
Johnson, Catherine McDonald, Terri Major, and Spencer
Schaffner for sharing materials, ideas, and questions from their
writing courses and research; and to Ann Wennerstrom as well
as the students in my graduate seminars on genre theory in
Winter 2000 and Winter 2002, whose elegant questions and
thoughtful inquiry encouraged me to ask new questions and to
think more deeply about genre. At the University of
Washington, I am grateful for the support of a research quarter
in Spring 2002 and summer research support in Summer 2002
as part of the Junior Faculty Development Program, both of
which enabled me to complete this book.
Michael Spooner, director of Utah State University Press, has
made the revising of this book a gratifying and rewarding experience. Thanks also to Charles Bazerman and the anonymous
reviewers at USUP for their constructive and encouraging comments. At USUP, the manuscript has been fortunate to receive
the expert copyediting of Tyler Leary and typesetting of Ian
Hatch. For granting permission to reprint portions of previously published material in chapters 2 and 4, I thank the publishers of College English (NCTE) and the edited book collection
Ecocomposition: Theoretical and Pedagogical Approaches (SUNY).
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their
love, understanding, good humor, and constant support. With
love and admiration, I thank Amy Feldman, who read and
offered valuable feedback on several drafts of the manuscript,
and who, along the way, handled my doubts and questions with
extraordinary loving-kindness. Her presence gives me a place to
be outside of this book, and I am grateful to her for that. And,
to the beginnings, to my mother and father, whose sacriﬁce and
courage have taught me most of all how to be thankful. I act in
ways they have acted on me.

1
INTRODUCTION
A Meditation on Beginnings
A beginning is that which does not itself follow
anything by causal necessity, but after which something
naturally is or comes to be.
A R I S T O T L E , Poetics
My way is to begin with the beginning.
LORD BYRON,

Don Juan

The speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with
virgin and still unnamed objects, giving them names
for the ﬁrst time.
M . M . B A K H T I N , Speech Genres
Writers are . . . different from the subjects of the
composing processes we often describe, for they do not
generate, transcribe, and ﬁx meanings independently
from the systems of language and cultural history that
equally participate in these processes.
S U S A N M I L L E R , Rescuing the Subject

Perhaps the most appropriate way to begin this book is by asking
what it means to begin, because in many ways this book is about
beginnings, about why and how writers begin to write, and about
the ways we in composition studies imagine, study, and teach how,
why, and where writing begins—the subject of invention. It
attempts to locate and describe where invention takes place and
what happens to writers when they begin to write. In so doing, this
book extends the question, “what do writers do when they write?”
by asking, “what happens to writers that motivates them to do what
they do?” Framed in this way, the question invites us to examine
invention not only as a site for the writer’s articulation of desire,
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but also as a site for the writer’s acquisition of desire. Recent
scholarship in genre theory can contribute a great deal to such an
understanding of invention, and in the chapters that follow, I will
describe that contribution and explore what is at stake for the
study and teaching of writing to imagine invention in this way.
But how can we begin to write about beginnings? Where do we
begin? We could, as Byron suggests, begin with the beginning, the
scene of origin that, according to Aristotle, “does not itself follow
anything by causal necessity.” Rejecting the in medias res (the “into
the midst of things”) strategy with which traditional epic poems
begin, Byron announces that he will begin his epic poem, Don
Juan, at the beginning, with the birth of his hero. Don Juan was
born in Seville, Byron tells us; his father “traced his
source/Through the most Gothic gentlemen of Spain,” while his
mother’s “memory was a mine.” Yet the fact that Don Juan is born
in Seville, the fact of his father’s lineage and his mother’s
memory—all these preclude any sense of a beginning
unpreceded by “causal necessity.” As soon as Byron announces his
intention to begin with the beginning, he (perhaps unwittingly
but more likely satirically) reveals the impossibility of beginning
as such. The beginning of Don Juan is, in a very real sense, already
in medias res, already taking place in the midst of things.
Such is the ironic nature of beginnings, performing at once an
act of initiation and an act of continuation. This introduction—
this beginning of the book—is a case in point. It initiates the book
that follows, but it is also what Edward Said calls an “effort on
behalf of discursive continuity” (1975, 69). That is, it sets up what
is to follow at the same time as it situates what follows in the midst
of what already exists, the “systems of language and cultural history” represented in part by the texts of Aristotle, Byron, Bakhtin,
Miller, and the countless other texts that precede, ﬂank, and
make possible my own text. Beginnings are acts of departure, but
always departures from something, in relation to something, so
that, as Bakhtin reminds us, every beginning is a response to a
prior beginning (1986). Along with Bakhtin, Said describes beginnings as gestures of continuation, nuanced repetitions, which

A Meditation on Beginnings

3

emerge not linearly but in adjacency to other texts, such that a
“text stands to the side of, next to or between the bulk of all other
works—not in a line with them, not in a line of descent from
them” (1975, 10). Beginnings take place in the midst of things.
To describe beginnings as situated and textured is to describe
them in what Said calls secular terms, terms that oppose a view of
beginnings as divine or magical acts of unpreceded origination.
Such a secular view of beginnings upsets a powerful desire for
ultimate origins, what David Bartholomae calls the “desire for an
open space, free from the past . . . deployed throughout the discourses of modern life, including the discourses of education”
(1995, 64). This desire is particularly strong in the discourses of
writing instruction, in which the blank page or computer screen
stands symbolic of the open space, the frontier space, from which
writers begin. The blank page is mythologized as an unmarked
space waiting to be marked, its physical blankness masking the
fact of its speciﬁcation in discursive and ideological conventions,
including genres, which already situate it, already mark it.
By and large, the way we imagine invention in writing reﬂects
and enacts this desire for unpreceded beginnings. This desire
ﬁnds expression in the dozens of self-help writing guides currently lining bookstore shelves that assume the writer as the point
of origin for writing, and that purport to teach the aspiring writer
how to unleash his or her ideas, voice, and untapped creativity.
This desire also ﬁnds expression in the countless composition
textbooks scattered around writing program ofﬁces, some of
which are not unlike Marjorie Ford and Jon Ford’s Dreams and
Inward Journeys: A Rhetoric and Reader for Writers (a textbook in its
third edition by 1998). In it, the authors tell students that writing
is an inward journey, a “process of discovering what resides within
your mind and your spirit” (8). They go on to write:
Many people ﬁnd it difﬁcult to begin, wondering, perhaps, how
they will be able to untangle all of their thoughts and feelings, how
they will ﬁnally decide on the most accurate words and sentence
patterns to make their statements clear and compelling. You may
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feel overwhelmed by the possibilities of all that is waiting to be discovered within you, and at the same time you may feel a sense of
wonder and excitement, anticipating pleasures and rewards of
uncovering and expressing new parts of your mind, imagination,
and spirit. (8)

This is, without question, an extreme version of the articulation of this desire, and to say this view reﬂects current representations of invention in composition textbooks would be unfair and
not altogether accurate.1 Still, despite the enormous contribution
work on collaboration, intertextuality, and situated cognition has
made to our understanding of the thoroughly social nature of
writing, it is not uncommon for composition textbooks, even
those not designated as “expressivist,” routinely to posit invention
as “prewriting,” as a practice within the writer that occurs before
and outside the textured midst of things. Indeed, as Rebecca
Moore Howard has recently noted, “one might even go so far as to
say that expressionism is the prevailing model of writing in our
culture” (1999, 47). Invention heuristics such as freewriting,
brainstorming, clustering, and mapping locate the writer as the
primary site and agent of invention.
Various factors account for this “normative model of the
inspired, autonomous author [that] pervades contemporary
pedagogy” (Howard 1999, 57), some of which I will examine in
more detail in chapter 3. Brieﬂy, the pervasive sense that invention, like beginnings, is a scene of origination helps contribute to
the perception that invention is pre-social. This perception holds
that only after something has originated does it become socialized. The scene of origination—the beginnings of a text—that we
popularly designate as invention ostensibly resides before and
somehow remains immune from the social, collaborative, and
discursive conditions that later affect the text’s production, circulation, and reception.2 Likewise, an investment in what Nikolas
Rose has called the “regime of the self” also contributes to this
perception. In Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and
Personhood, Rose examines how psychology as well as other “psy”
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ﬁelds have invented the intellectual technologies for describing,
regulating, and perpetuating the modern Western concept of the
person as a locus of self. Such a self is “coherent, bounded, individualized, intentional, the locus of thought, action, and belief,
the origin of its own actions, the beneﬁciary of a unique biography” (1996, 3). In such a fashioning of the self, the writer
becomes the identiﬁable and self-possessed locus of invention,
the origin of his or her own desires to act, even, as I will describe
in chapter 5, when that desire is obviously prompted by a
teacher’s writing assignment. Not only is this account of agency
politically frustrating; it is also pedagogically limiting when it
comes to explaining how and why writers invent.
The “social turn” that has marked much of the scholarship
and pedagogy in composition studies over the last twenty years
has thoroughly challenged this view of the writer and writing.
This social turn recognizes that there is more at work on the
text than the writer’s seemingly autonomous cognition; there
are also various social forces that constitute the scene of production within which the writer’s cognition as well as his or her
text are situated and shaped. Within composition studies, this
scene of writing is commonly (and, some would add, problematically) identiﬁed as a discourse community—the social and
rhetorical environment within which cognitive habits, goals,
assumptions, and values are shared by participants who employ
common discourse strategies for communicating and practicing
these cognitive habits, goals, assumptions, and values. Guided
by an understanding of writing as a social activity, composition
scholarship has become less concerned with inquiring into generalizable cognitive processes and more concerned with inquiring into the localized, textured conditions in which cognition
and social activities are organized.
As Charles Bazerman explains, such inquiry recognizes writing practices not only as forms of social participation, but also as
“integral to . . . complex forms of social organization” (2000, 6).
Writing practices situate writers in these forms of participation
and organization, so that writers are never alone, even when they
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are physically alone, and even during invention. In fact, as
Richard Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike demonstrated
in their inﬂuential book Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (1970),
invention involves a process of orientation rather than origination. Young, Becker, and Pike’s tagmemic rhetoric and their elegant and complex heuristic of particle, wave, and ﬁeld presents a
set of questions that enable writers to examine a rhetorical situation from various perspectives. Their heuristic framework orients
writers in the midst of a rhetorical situation, and the eventual
problems writers formulate and analyze as well as the eventual
choices that writers make in relation to these problems emerge
out of this orientation. Young, Becker, and Pike’s tagmemic
rhetoric, along with Richard Young’s (1978; 1986; 1994) and
Janice Lauer’s (1967; 1970; 1984) inﬂuential work on invention,
teaches us that invention is less an inspired, mysterious activity
and more a location and mode of inquiry, a way of positioning
oneself in relation to a problem and a way of working through it.
Karen Burke LeFevre’s Invention as a Social Act (1987), building on and adding to the work of Young and Lauer, turns to
research in linguistics, creativity theory, sociology, philosophy,
and psychology to examine the thoroughly social and interpersonal nature of invention. Toward the end of the book, LeFevre
calls for continued social-based research into invention, research
that examines “a larger locus of inventive activity, a social matrix
rather than an isolated writer and text” (1987, 125). She writes:
“we should study the ecology of invention—the ways ideas arise
and are nurtured or hindered by interaction with social context
and culture” (126). A number of scholars, to varying degrees and
with different agendas, have since taken up this study of invention and authorship, including Brodkey (1987), Bleich (1988), S.
Miller (1989), Cooper and Holzman (1989), Crowley (1990),
Ede and Lunsford (1990), Faigley (1992), Flower (1994), Berlin
(1996), Howard (1999), and Halasek (1999). In this book, I build
on and add to these studies by responding in particular to
LeFevre’s call for inquiry into the ecology of invention, which
calls for “re-placing” invention in a social and rhetorical scene
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that shapes and is shaped by it. Turning to recent scholarship in
genre theory, I examine invention as the site in which writers act
within and are acted upon by the social and rhetorical conditions
that we call genres—the site in which writers acquire, negotiate,
and articulate the desires to write. Genres, which Carolyn Miller
(1984) has deﬁned as typiﬁed rhetorical ways of acting in recurring situations, position and condition discursive behavior in
such a way as to preclude a sense of beginnings as unpreceded,
unmediated, unmarked scenes of origin. If beginnings take place
in the textured midst of things, as the aforementioned scholarship on invention argues, then genres are part of this midst of
things, rhetorically sustaining and enabling the ways communicants recognize and act in various situations. Writers invent
within genres and are themselves invented by genres. In arguing
that genres are places in which invention (and writers) take
place, I hope to contribute to and enrich our understanding of
invention in composition studies.
When I began my research for this book a few years ago, my
father asked me what I was studying. I told him, “Genre.”
Looking puzzled, he said, “Jon-ra?” I said, “Yes, jon-ra.” Then, in
an attempted French accent, he said, “Oh you mean genrrrr,”
rolling the r at the end. My brother, who was listening nearby,
asked, “What is genre?” In all seriousness and without hesitating,
my father replied, “Nothing; genre is nothing. You are writing a
book about nothing?” Academics’ sensitivity to the charge that
we study “nothing” notwithstanding, my father’s claim about
genre was not unfounded. After all, the word genre, borrowed
from French, means “sort” or “kind,” and to study sorts or kinds
of things (inherently an abstract notion) is not as substantial as,
say, studying the things themselves. Certainly, genre appears to
be nothing when it is deﬁned as a way of innocently classifying
or sorting kinds of texts. But in the past two decades, scholarship
in genre theory has come a long way in dispelling the notion
that genres are merely artiﬁcial and arbitrary systems of classiﬁcation, positing instead that genres are dynamic discursive formations in which ideology is naturalized and realized in speciﬁc
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social actions, relations, and subjectivities. Indeed, genre is not
nothing.
Genre is not nothing in the same way that beginnings are not
preceded by nothing, a way of moving from nothing to something. A genre is not simply a classiﬁcation, a way of describing
something that is produced before or outside of its rhetorical
and conceptual framework. As I will describe in chapter 2, genres function on their writers, readers, and contexts. Indeed, one
of the roots of the word genre, by way of its related word gender,
can be traced to the Latin cognate gener, meaning to generate.
This etymology suggests that genre both sorts and generates. As
such, what makes genre signiﬁcant to a study of invention is not
so much that it functions as a site in which the thing invented
gets placed in order to be identiﬁed, but that genre functions as
a site in which invention itself takes place. In this formulation,
genre becomes akin to what Pierre Bourdieu calls “habitus,”
which he deﬁnes as “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations” (1990, 53). Like
habitus, genre both organizes and generates the conditions of
social and rhetorical production. The function of a genre only
seems like nothing when we, through practice and socialization,
have internalized its ideology in the form of rhetorical conventions to such an extent that our invention of a text seems to
emanate independently and introspectively, even almost intuitively, from us. Indeed, as we will examine later, the power of
genre resides, in part, in this ideological sleight of hand, in
which social obligation to act becomes internalized as self-generated desire to act in certain rhetorical ways.
Insofar as genres are structuring as well as structured structures, they can be metaphorically described as rhetorical ecosystems. There are several reasons why I ﬁnd this metaphor useful
and why I take it up in later chapters. For one thing, it suggests
that generic boundaries are not simply classiﬁcatory constraints
within which writers and speakers function; rather, these boundaries are social and rhetorical conditions which make possible
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certain commitments, relations, and actions. Just as natural
ecosystems sustain certain forms of life, so genres maintain
rhetorical conditions that sustain certain forms of life—ways of
discursively and materially organizing, knowing, experiencing,
acting, and relating in the world. More signiﬁcantly, the
metaphor also captures the dynamic relationship between
rhetorical habits and social habitats that genres maintain. It suggests that, rather than being static backdrops against which
speakers and writers act, social and rhetorical conditions are constantly being reproduced and transformed as speakers and writers act within them. By way of genres, speakers and writers
maintain the habitual social and rhetorical interactions and practices that sustain the social and rhetorical conditions that in turn
compel such habitual interactions and practices. Just as ecosystems maintain a symbiotic relationship between organisms and
their habitats, with habitats being sustained by the very organisms
that they sustain, so too genres are sustained by the very writers
that they sustain. As such, genres organize the conditions of production as well as generate the rhetorical articulation of these
conditions, reciprocally. Which is another way of saying that genres maintain the desires that they help writers fulﬁll.
Genres are places of articulation. They are ideological conﬁgurations that are realized in their articulation, as they are
used by writers (and readers). Genres also place writers in positions of articulation. Here we discern the dynamic, seemingly
paradoxical, relationship between writers and genres, one that
we will examine more closely in chapter 4. Genres exist because
writers produce them, but writers produce them because genres
already exist. In this formulation, the notion of agency becomes
more complicated, requiring us to examine more closely how
and why we are motivated to act. Kenneth Burke, in A Grammar
of Motives, describes how this paradoxical relationship is at the
heart of his attempt to explain the drama of motive:
We may discern a dramatistic pun, involving a merger of active and
passive in the expression, “the motivation to act.” Strictly speaking,
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the act of an agent would be the movement not of one moved but of a
mover (a mover of the self or of something else by the self). For an
act is by deﬁnition active, whereas to be moved (or motivated) is by
deﬁnition passive. Thus, if we quizzically scrutinize the expression,
“the motivation to act,” we note that it implicitly contains the paradox of substance . . . to consider an act in terms of its grounds is to
consider it in terms of what it is not, namely, in terms of motives that,
in acting upon the active, would make it a kind of passive. We could
state the paradox another way by saying that the concept of activation implies a kind of passive-behind-the-passive; for an agent who is
“motivated by his passions” would be “moved by his being-movedness,” or “acted upon by his state of being acted upon.” (1969a, 40)

For Burke, then, the motivation to act captures the paradox
of articulation, namely that writers articulate genres as they are
articulated by genres. This scene of articulation takes place
within genres, and has a great deal to offer to the way we study
and teach invention in composition studies.
There is, of course, a chicken-and-egg dilemma at work in all
this, but attempting to address it is beyond the scope of this
book. Ultimately, I am less interested in the “time before
genre”—that time no longer exists—and more interested in
what happens once genres are in circulation, because it is there
that the dynamic relation between writers and genres always
already exists and affects future actions. In particular, I am
interested in how and why already existing genres not only
enable individuals to shape social and rhetorical practices, but
also to transform them, so that new genres emerge out of contact with those already in use, and evolve as they reﬂect changing values and assumptions (see for instance Popken’s 1999
research into the evolution of the resume and Bazerman’s 1988
research into the evolution of the experimental article). As
such, I am interested in the synchronic relationship between
genres and writers, especially the ways this relationship gets
enacted during the scene of invention, where genre knowledge
becomes a form of what Berkenkotter and Huckin call “situated
cognition” (1993, 485).
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To think of genre knowledge as situated, textured cognition
is to implicate genre in the formation and negotiation of subjectivity and desire (Fuller and Lee 2002, 211), which is what
makes genre such a useful site for investigating invention. In
arguing that invention begins and takes place within the social
and rhetorical conditions constituted by genres, however, I do
not presume that genres are the only sites in which writers
invent, nor do I suggest that genres are entirely deterministic.
Genres themselves take place within what Bakhtin calls larger
“spheres of culture” (1986), what Freadman calls “ceremonials”
(1988), and what Russell, borrowing from activity theory, calls
“activity systems” (1997). Within these larger spheres of language and activity, writers negotiate multiple, sometimes conﬂicting genres, relations, and subjectivities, so that there is
always the potential, in some genres and in some situations
more than others, for generic resistance and hybridization.
Indeed, as I will discuss in chapter 4, the articulation of genre is
also the possibility of its transformation. In addition, various
other forces are also at work shaping how and why writers
invent, including economic conditions; power relations; racial,
ethnic, class, and gender formations; material and geographic
conditions; libidinal attachments; not to mention biological
and other x-factors. I cannot and do not claim, then, that genres account entirely for how and why writers invent. What I do
claim is that genres reveal and help us map part of what
LeFevre calls the “ecology of invention,” hence allowing us to
locate a writer’s motives to act within typiﬁed rhetorical and
social conditions. In giving us access to the ecology of invention, genres can provide a richer account of agency as well as a
more useful means for describing and teaching invention.
In later chapters, I will consider in more detail how different
genres constitute writers into different subject formations, and
what these formations reveal about how and why writers invent.
Along the way, I will examine the position of the writer as someone who not only writes, but who is also “written” or produced
by the genres that he or she writes. I am curious about what
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happens to writers as they write—what positions they are asked
to assume, how and why they represent their activities, themselves, and others rhetorically, how they act as they are acted
upon, what tensions exist between a writer’s intentions and a
genre’s social motives, and how these tensions get played out as
social and rhetorical practices. Such questions appear increasingly relevant to the work of composition theory and pedagogy.
These questions challenge scholars and teachers of writing to
examine not only the complex processes involved in the production of the text and its consequences (what writers do when they
write and its effects), but also the complex processes involved in
the production of the writer and its consequences (what is done to
writers when they write and its effects). We cannot, I argue, fully
understand or answer the question “what do writers do when
they write?” without understanding and answering the question
“what happens to writers when they write?” In genre theory, I
see a way to bring these questions together, to account not only
for how writers articulate motives or desires, but also for how
writers obtain motives or desires to write—how, that is, writers
both invent and are invented by the genres that they write.
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of genre, tracing its development through literary studies up to its more recent reconceptualizations in applied linguistics, communication studies,
rhetoric, and composition. Bringing together deﬁnitions of
genre from various disciplines, this chapter presents what I will
be calling the “genre function,” a term borrowed from Foucault’s
concept of the author-function to describe genres as constitutive
(that is, both regulative and generative) of social and rhetorical
actions, relations, and identities. Such a view of genre will serve
as a framework for examining invention and the writer in later
chapters.
In chapter 3, I will consider the various views of the writer that
have dominated the study and teaching of writing since the late
eighteenth century, especially how these views of the writer continue to be reﬂected in what Sharon Crowley and Karen Burke
LeFevre have described as composition studies’ introspective
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theories of invention. In particular, I will investigate the role that
the “process movement” has played in shaping our views of the
writer as “author” over the last forty years, views that have contributed to a privatization of invention from a social and rhetorical act to an individual and introspective act. By and large, writing
instruction continues to treat the writer as its point of departure,
and this chapter will consider what such a treatment has meant
for the ways we deﬁne writing and its instruction, and what it
would mean to rethink the writer and invention as a result.
Analyzing the relationship between genre and subject formation, I locate invention at the intersection between the acquisition and articulation of desire—the site at which writers obtain,
negotiate, and enact speciﬁc social commitments, orientations,
and relations within what Bazerman has recently called
“genred” discursive spaces (2002, 15). Chapter 4 locates the ﬁgure of the writer within these genred discursive spaces, demonstrating in theory and with examples how and why writers are
produced by the genres they write. Drawing on the work of the
sociologist Anthony Giddens, chapter 4 describes the role that
genres play in reproducing the situational motives that writers
internalize as intentions and actualize as socio-rhetorical
actions and identities in such varied examples as the Patient
Medical History Form, the state of the union address, social
work assessment reports, and greeting cards.
In chapter 5, I will consider genres as situated topoi within
which invention takes place, habits as well as habitats for acting in
language. I will describe and analyze the ﬁrst-year writing (FYW)
classroom as an activity system shaped and enabled by various
genres, each of which constitutes its own topoi within which
teachers and students assume and enact a complex set of social
actions, relations, and positions. In particular, I will analyze the
syllabus, the writing prompt, and, its uptake, the student essay, in
order to counter misconceptions that the FYW classroom is an
artiﬁcial environment within which writing takes place. Actually,
like any other environment, the FYW classroom is a multilayered,
multitextured site of social and material action and identity
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formation, a site that is reproduced as it is rhetorically enacted by
its participants within the various classroom genres available to
them. By studying the relationship between the writing prompt
and the student essay, for example, we can observe the complex
relations and repositioning that students must negotiate as they
transition from one genred discursive space to another.
Invention takes place at the nexus where prompt and essay meet,
and in chapter 5, I examine how students negotiate this discursive transaction by recontextualizing the desires embedded in the
writing prompt as their own self-sponsored desires in their essays.
Analyzing the syllabus, writing prompt, and student essay as sites
of invention gives us insight into how students and teachers
(re)position themselves as social actors within at the same time as
they enact the activity system we call FYW.
Writing takes place. It takes place socially and rhetorically. To
write is to position oneself within genres—to assume and enact
certain situated commitments, identities, relations, and practices. In the ﬁnal chapter, I will consider the implications of making this positioning visible and accessible to students,
implications which invite us to rethink not only our teaching
practices in writing courses, including the ways we teach invention, but also our goals for writing instruction. I offer genre
analysis as a way for students to access, position themselves
within, and participate critically in genred discursive spaces and
the commitments, relations, identities, and activities embedded
within them. Along the way, I will argue that this approach challenges us to teach writing not so much as “composition” but as
rhetoric—as a way of being and acting in the world, socially and
rhetorically, within genres—and then I will speculate on what it
would mean, especially for writing in the disciplines (WID) initiatives, to teach FYW in this way.
Today, perhaps more than ever, the place of composition is
contested. Among those who study and teach composition in
the university, some justify the place of composition within
English departments while others argue that composition
needs to forge its own interdisciplinary identity—its own
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place—either as its own department outside of English or as
part of WID programs. These are pressing and signiﬁcant
debates about the institutional place of composition, and they
will continue to shape the teaching and professional identity of
composition studies in the U.S. Yet these debates about the
institutional place of composition, debates which have motivated a
great deal of scholarly work in composition studies and contributed in large part to the ﬁeld’s self-deﬁnition, can also be
fruitfully read in relation to where composition takes place, particularly the beginnings of composition, the locus of invention. At
the end of the book, I will address the place of composition
within the university (the institutional place of writing); in the
rest of the book, I will deﬁne “the place of composition” to
mean the genred scenes in which writers invent and write. By
examining these scenes for what they can tell us about how
agency operates, we stand to gain a richer and I hope a more
pedagogically useful understanding of invention, the writer,
and their place of composition.

2
THE GENRE FUNCTION
[W]hat we learn when we learn a genre is not just a
pattern of forms or even a method of achieving our
own ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we
may have. . . . As a recurrent, signiﬁcant action, a
genre embodies an aspect of cultural rationality.
C A R O L Y N M I L L E R , “Genre as Social Action”
We are written only as we write, by the agency within us
which always already keeps watch over perception, be it
internal or external. The “subject” of writing does not
exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the
author. The subject of writing is a system of relations
between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the
world. Within that scene, on that stage, the punctual
simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found.
J A C Q U E S D E R R I D A , “Freud and the Scene of Writing”

At the beginning of A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke wonders: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and
why they are doing it?” (1969a, xv). Burke describes and locates
this question of motive in a dramatistic pentad made up of scene
(where an action takes place), act (what is taking place), agent
(who is performing the action), agency (how, through what
means, is the action carried out), and purpose (why is the action
being carried out). Motive, he explains, does not reside in the
agent alone, a romantic concept, but in the relationships
between all ﬁve terms of the pentad, all of which conspire to
deﬁne and enact the drama of motive. Within the scope of this
book, I essentially ask the same question as it applies to the study
and teaching of invention in composition studies: what is
involved when we say what writers are doing and why they are
doing it? In response, I answer that genre is involved. Genres are
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discursive sites that coordinate the acquisition and production
of motives by maintaining speciﬁc relations between scene, act,
agent, agency, and purpose. And when writers begin to write in
different genres, they participate within these different sets of
relations, relations that motivate them, consciously or unconsciously, to invent both their texts and themselves. In this way,
genre functions as what Miller calls “an aspect of cultural rationality” (C. Miller 1984, 165), a “stabilized-for-now or stabilizedenough site of social and ideological action” (Schryer 1994, 107)
in which writers acquire and articulate motives to write. In this
chapter I turn to scholarship in literary theory, applied linguistics, and rhetoric and composition to describe genres as such
sites of action.1 Then in later chapters I will examine how writers
get positioned within and negotiate these sites of action, and will
consider the ways this positioning can inform our understanding of invention as well as our study and teaching of writing.
The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic reconceptualization of genre and its role in the production and interpretation of texts and culture. Led in large part by scholars in
applied linguistics (Bhatia, Freedman, Halliday, Kress, Martin,
Medway, Swales), communication studies (Yates and
Orlikowski), education (Christie, Dias, Paré), and rhetoric and
composition studies (Bazerman, Berkenkotter, Campbell, Coe,
Devitt, Giltrow, Jamieson, C. Miller, Russell, Schryer), this movement has helped transform genre study from a descriptive to an
explanatory activity, one that investigates not only text-types
and classiﬁcation systems, but also the linguistic, sociological,
and psychological assumptions underlying and shaping these
text-types. No longer mainly used to structure and classify a literary textual universe as Northrop Frye (1957) and others in literary studies have traditionally offered, genres have come to be
deﬁned as typiﬁed rhetorical strategies communicants use to
recognize, organize, and act in all kinds of situations, literary
and nonliterary. As such, there is a growing sense among those
who study genre that genres do not just help us deﬁne and
organize kinds of texts; they also help us deﬁne and organize
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kinds of situations and social actions, situations and actions that
the genres, through their use, rhetorically make possible. This
notion of genre as a dynamic site for the production and regulation of textured, ideological activities (a site in which habitual
language practices enact and reproduce situated relations, commitments, and actions) has a great deal to offer to the study and
teaching of invention in composition studies. For instance, by
maintaining the desires they help to fulﬁll, genres provide a way
for us to interrogate analytically how writers get positioned
within these textured desires to act at the same time as they
enable writers to articulate and fulﬁll these desires as recognizable, meaningful, consequential actions. It is the overall argument of this book that we can and should make these “genred”
discursive spaces (Bazerman 2002, 17) visible to students, not
only for the sake of fostering in students a critical awareness of
what genres help us do and not do, but also for the sake of
enabling students to participate in these spaces more meaningfully and critically.
To make such a claim for genre, to argue that genres are sites
for literate, ideological action, is to endow genre with a status
that will surely make some readers uneasy. After all, in literary
studies, genre has traditionally occupied a subservient role to
the writer and the text he or she produces, at best used as a classiﬁcatory device or an a posteriori interpretive tool in relation
to already existing texts and motives, and at worst censured as
formulaic writing. Sufﬁce it to say, genre has not enjoyed very
good standing in literary studies, particularly since the late
eighteenth century when interest in literary “kinds” gave way to
a concern for literary “texts” and their writers, a shift that can
be characterized as moving from “poetics” to the poem and the
poet. So it is not surprising that the work done to reconceptualize genre over the last twenty years has come predominantly
from scholars working outside of literary studies, scholars who
are interested in how and why typiﬁed texts reﬂect and organize
everyday social occasions and practices.2 It is their work, with its
basis in applied linguistics and sociology, that informs a great
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deal of the theoretical underpinnings for this book. This chapter will examine some of these underpinnings. But breaking
with what has become common practice in nonliterary reconceptualizations of genre—or what is becoming referred to as
“rhetorical genre studies”—I do not want to ignore literary considerations of genre or, for that matter, to argue that literary
theories of genre are inimical to rhetorical theories of genre.
Instead, by reviewing more recent studies of genre by literary
scholars alongside studies of genre by scholars in rhetoric, composition, and applied linguistics, I hope to demonstrate how
much literary and rhetorical theories of genre have to contribute to one another, indeed, how when we build on the
knowledge of both, we can measure the extent to which genres
are constitutive both of literary and nonliterary contexts as well
as of literary and nonliterary writers. Putting literary and
rhetorical theories of genre in dialogue with one another will
allow us to see how all genres, far from being transparent lenses
for identifying and organizing texts, indeed function as sites in
which communicants use language to make certain situated
activities possible. Since genres locate all writers within such situated language practices, ideologies, and activities, they enable
us to examine more fully the “social organization of cognition”
(Bazerman 1997a, 305)—the conditions and assumptions that
shape the choices writers make when they begin to write, conditions and assumptions that, as I will explore in later chapters,
will shed more light on the study and teaching of invention.
FROM AUTHOR FUNCTION TO GENRE FUNCTION

In describing genres as sites of action, I build on what Michel
Foucault calls the “author-function” in order to describe how the
same principles that govern literary activity, when expanded
from the author to the genre function, are at work governing a
wider range of socio-discursive activity. In “What Is an Author?”
Foucault attempts to locate and articulate the “space left empty
by the author’s disappearance” (1994, 345) in structuralist and
poststructuralist literary theory. If the author can no longer be
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said to constitute a work, Foucault wonders, then what does?
What is it that delimits discourse so that it becomes recognized
as a work which has certain value and status? Sans the author, in
short, what is it that plays “the role of the regulator of the ﬁctive”
(353)? For Foucault, the answer is the “author-function.” The
author-function does not refer to the “real” writer, the individual
with the proper name who precedes and exists independently of
the work. Instead, it refers to the author’s name, which, in addition to being a proper name, is also a literary name, a name that
exists only in relation to the work associated with it. The authorfunction, then, endows a work with a certain cultural status and
value. At the same time, the author-function also endows the
idea of “author” with a certain cultural status and value. So the
author-function not only constitutes the work as having a certain
cultural capital; it also constitutes the producer of that work into
the privileged role of “author” as opposed to the real writer with
“just a proper name like the rest” (345).
The author-function delimits what works we recognize as valuable and how we interpret them at the same time as it accords the
status of author to certain writers: “these aspects of an individual
which we designate as making him an author are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that
we force texts to undergo . . .” (Foucault 347). The role of author,
therefore, becomes akin to a subject position regulated, as much
as the work itself, by the author-function. Constituted by the
author-function, the “real writer” becomes positioned as an
“author,” “a variable and complex function of discourse” (352).
In this position, “the author does not precede the works[;] he is a
certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits,
excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free
circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of ﬁction” (352–53).
Symbolically as well as materially, the author-function helps
delimit what Foucault calls a “certain discursive construct” (346)
within which a work and its author function, so that the way we
recognize a certain text and its author as deserving of a
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privileged status—a text worthy of our study, say, rather than
“simply” to be “used”—is regulated by the author-function. Not
only does the author-function, then, play a classiﬁcatory role,
helping us organize and deﬁne texts (346); more signiﬁcantly,
Foucault argues, it marks off “the edges of the text, revealing, or
at least characterizing, its mode of being. The author’s name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the
status of this discourse within a society and a culture” (346; my
emphasis). Insofar as the author-function characterizes a text’s
“mode of being,” it constitutes it and its author, providing a text
and its author with a cultural identity and signiﬁcance not
accorded to texts that exist outside of its purview. As Foucault
explains, “The author-function is . . . characteristic of the mode
of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses
within a society” (346; my emphasis). For example, he identiﬁes
such texts as private letters and contracts, even though they are
written by someone, as not having “authors,” and, as such, as not
constituted by the author-function, ostensibly meaning that
their mode of being is regulated not by an author’s name but by
some other function.
In English studies, we use the author-function to designate
certain works we call “literary,” works most often recognized,
valued, and interpreted in relation to their authors’ names,
which become cultural values we ascribe to these works. So, for
example, a traditional literary scholar might state, “I study D. H.
Lawrence” or “I am reading a lot of Virginia Woolf these days,”
whereas a scholar in rhetoric and composition, say, might more
likely state, “I am studying the research article.” Not only does
the author-function privilege the author to the exclusion of
genre, but in using it to characterize and clarify only certain
discourses’ modes of existence, we also stand to ignore a great
many other discourses and their existence, in particular, how
and why nonliterary discourses assume certain cultural values
and regulate their users’ social positions, relations, and identities in certain ways. Foucault describes, for instance, how the
author-function, endowing a certain text with an author-value,

22

GENRE AND THE INVENTION OF THE WRITER

“shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that
merely comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in
a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status” (346). But what about the “everyday speech that
merely comes and goes?” Since it does not exist within the realm of
the author-function, what is it that regulates such discourse? We
need a concept that can account not only for how certain privileged discourses function, but for how all discourses function,
an overarching concept that can explain the social roles we
assign to various discourses and those who enact and are
enacted by them. Genre is such a concept. Within each genre,
discourse is “received in a certain mode” and “must receive a
certain status,” including even discourse endowed with an
author-function. In fact, it is quite possible that the author-function is itself a function of literary genres, which create the ideological conditions that produce this subject we call an “author.”
And so, I propose to subsume what Foucault calls the authorfunction within what I am calling the genre function, which constitutes all discourses’ and all writers’ modes of existence,
circulation, and functioning within a society, whether the writer
is William Shakespeare or a social worker and whether the text
is a sonnet or an assessment report.
Just as the author-function delimits how individuals conceptually value and materially use certain discourses, I argue that the
genre function also delimits discursive action both conceptually
and materially. As a site of action, genre is both a concept and its
material articulation and exchange. On one level, genre functions as part of what Berkenkotter and Huckin call individuals’
“situated cognition” (1993, 485). A genre conceptually frames
what its users generally imagine as possible within a given situation, predisposing them to act in certain ways by rhetorically framing how they come to know and respond to certain situations.
Genres help endow situations with a “logic” or “common sense.”
But genres do not only function conceptually. It is in their material manifestations—their modus operandi—that genres exist.
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Genres function in the social practices that they help generate
and organize, in the unfolding of material, everyday exchanges of
language practices, activities, and relations by and between individuals in speciﬁc settings. It is in such actual uses of language,
uses endowed with material consequences and meaning within
different genres, that genres appear and operate. The genre function, then, comes to be and structures social action through its
use, through the way its users play its language game. In such a
sense is genre both and at once a concept and a material practice,
framing our dispositions to act as well as enabling us to articulate
and exchange these dispositions as language practices.3
The genre function, thus, constitutes how individuals come to
conceptualize and act within different situations, framing not
only what Foucault calls a discourse’s mode of being, but also
the mode of being of those who participate in the discourse.
Such inquiry into the social mode of being of discourse and its
participants has driven much of the work in genre studies, especially since Carolyn Miller’s ground-breaking article, “Genre as
Social Action,” ﬁrst appeared in 1984. Based in part on Miller’s
work and the work of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen M.
Jamieson (1978), Kenneth Burke (1969b), Lloyd F. Bitzer
(1968), and M. A. K. Halliday (1978) whose work Miller extends,
genre theorists have begun to question traditional views of genres as simply innocent, artiﬁcial, and even arbitrary forms that
contain ideas. This container view of genre, which assumes that
genres are only transparent and innocent conduits that individuals use to package their communicative goals, overlooks the
socio-rhetorical function of genres—the extent to which genres
shape and help us generate our communicative goals, including
why these goals exist, what and whose purposes they serve, and
how best to achieve them. Carolyn Miller, for example, deﬁnes
genres as “typiﬁed rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations” (1984, 159; my emphasis). In so doing, Miller shifts the
focus of genre study from shared features to shared actions, so
that genres come to be deﬁned not just by their typiﬁed features
but also by the typiﬁed actions they make happen. She argues
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that genres are not only typiﬁed rhetorical responses to recurrent situations; they also help shape and maintain the ways we
rhetorically know and act within these situations. In other words,
as individuals’ rhetorical responses to recurrent situations
become typiﬁed as genres, the genres in turn help structure the
way individuals conceptualize and experience these situations,
predicting their notions of what constitutes appropriate and possible responses and actions. This is why genres are both functional and epistemological—they help us function within
particular situations at the same time as they help shape the ways
we come to know and organize these situations.
To argue that genres help reproduce the very recurring situations to which they respond (Devitt 1993) is to identify them as
constitutive rather than as merely regulative, which is also what
Foucault was claiming for the author-function. John Searle distinguishes between regulative and constitutive rules as follows:
“Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose
existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules
constitute (and also regulate) an activity, the existence of which is
logically dependent on the rules” (1969, 34). Those scholars who
deﬁne genre as regulative perceive it, at best, as being a communicative or interpretive tool, a lens for framing and identifying an
already existing communicative activity (see, for example, Hirsch
1967 and Rosmarin 1985 in literary studies; Bhatia 1993 and
Swales 1990 in linguistics), and, at worst, an artiﬁcial, restrictive
“law” that interferes with or tries to trap communicative activity
(Blanchot 1959, Croce 1968, Derrida 1980, to name just a few).
As Devitt and Miller argue, however, and as I will demonstrate in
later examples, genre does not simply regulate a pre-existing social
activity; instead, it constitutes the activity by making it possible by
way of its ideological and discursive conventions. In fact, genre
reproduces the activity by providing individuals with the conventions for enacting it. We perform an activity in terms of how we
recognize it—that is, how we identify and come to know it. And
one of the ways we recognize an activity is by way of the genres
that constitute it. Genres help organize and generate our social
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actions by rhetorically constituting the way we recognize the situations within which we function. In short, genres maintain the
desires they help fulﬁll.
Charles Bazerman, in his recent “The Life of Genre, the Life
in the Classroom,” articulates a similar view of genres as sites of
action. He writes:
Genres are not just forms. Genres are forms of life, ways of being.
They are frames for social action. They are environments for learning. They are locations within which meaning is constructed.
Genres shape the thoughts we form and the communications by
which we interact. Genres are the familiar places we go to create
intelligible communicative action with each other and the guideposts we use to explore the unfamiliar. (1997b, 19)

Indeed, genres play a role in helping us organize, experience,
and potentially change the situations within which we communicate by functioning at the intersection between the acquisition and articulation of desires to act. Genres shape us as we
give shape to them, which is why they constitute our activities
and regulate how and why we perform them. In this way, we can
attribute to the genre function many of the claims Foucault
makes for the author-function, except that the genre function
accounts for all discursive activities, not just those endowed with
a certain name or author-value. The genre function, as such,
allows us to expand our ﬁeld of inquiry to include the constitution of all discourses and the social commitments, practices,
relations, identities, and silences implicated within them. Such
an expanded view of genre will enable those who study and
teach writing to account more fully for what writers do when
they write, why they do it, and what happens to them as a result.
In order to make the case for how genres function as sites of
action, I will ﬁrst turn to literary studies to examine how the
genre function is at work organizing and generating literary
practices and relations in a way that will later serve as a basis for
examining how, in much the same manner, genres function to
organize and generate everyday social practices and relations,
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including how processes of textual invention locate all writers
within these practices and relations.
GENRE AS SITE OF LITERARY ACTION

The relationship between genre and text has historically
been and still remains an uneasy one in literary studies, with
most scholars subordinating genre to an a posteriori classiﬁcatory status that privileges the autonomy of the text and its
author. In such a conﬁguration, genre is treated at best as a category, a transparent lens for looking at and organizing texts
that presumably function independently of it, and at worst as an
imposition on the text and its author’s indeterminacy.4 The
genre function, however, elevates genre from a transparent category to a site of action. A number of literary scholars have recognized genres as such sites of action, and it is to their work that
we will now look in order to see how genres frame the ideological and material conditions within which literary writers, texts,
and their activities and relations function. As I will argue, such
scholarship exposes the constitutive nature of genres in ways
that complement and augment the work of rhetorical genre
scholars. But because this work in literary genre theory tends to
conﬁne the function of genre only to literary actions and relations, we ultimately need to go beyond literary genre theory, as
I will do in the next section, to see how genres constitute a
wider range of social activities. First, though, I will examine how
genres function as sites of literary action.
Heather Dubrow begins her 1982 survey of literary genre
theory by asking readers to consider the following paragraph:
The clock on the mantelpiece said ten thirty, but someone had suggested recently that the clock was wrong. As the ﬁgure of the dead
woman lay on the bed in the front room, a no less silent ﬁgure
glided rapidly from the house. The only sounds to be heard were
the ticking of that clock and the loud wailing of an infant. (1)

How, Dubrow asks, do we make sense of this piece of discourse?
What characteristics should we pay attention to as signiﬁcant
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about it? What state of mind need we assume to interpret the
action it describes? The relevance of these questions, Dubrow
claims, points to the signiﬁcance of genre in helping readers
delimit and interpret discourse. For example, knowing that the
paragraph appears in a novel with the title Murder at
Marplethorpe, readers can begin to make certain interpretive
decisions as to the value and meaning of speciﬁc images, images
which become symbolic and material when readers recognize
that the novel they are reading belongs to the genre of detective
ﬁction. The inaccuracy of the clock and the fact that the woman
lies dead in the front room become important clues when we
know what genre we are reading. The ﬁgure gliding away
assumes a particular subject position within the discourse, the
subject position of suspect. If, Dubrow continues, the title of the
novel was not Murder at Marplethorpe but rather The Personal
History of David Marplethorpe, then the way we encounter the
same text changes. Reading the novel as a Bildungsroman, we
will place a different signiﬁcance on the dead body or the fact
that the clock is inaccurate. Certainly, we will be less likely to
look for a suspect. That is, we will not be reading with “detective
eyes” as we would if we were reading detective ﬁction. The crying baby, as Dubrow suggests, will also take on more relevance,
perhaps being the very David Marplethorpe whose life’s story
we are about to read.
Dubrow’s example is signiﬁcant for what it reveals about
what I am calling the genre function. Not only does the genre
function in this case constitute how we read certain elements
within the discourse, allowing us to occupy certain interpretive
frames as readers of the discourse, but it also constitutes the
roles and relations we assign to the actors and events within the
discourse. The actors in the discourse—the crying baby, the
dead woman, the inaccurate clock, the gliding ﬁgure—all
assume subject positions within and because of the genre.
Genre thus coordinates both the actors involved, including the
reader and the characters, as well as their actions in speciﬁc textured relations and orientations so that, for example, the ﬁgure
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who glides rapidly away from the house can either be recognized as in the act of escape or in the act of seeking help,
depending on the genre. The type of action taking place within
the text, then, is largely constituted by the genre in which the
text functions, because genre frames the conditions—what
John Austin in his theory of speech acts calls the “felicity conditions” (1962)—within which utterances become speech acts.
The meaning of the utterances in the Marplethorpe paragraph,
including the actions these utterances are performing, the roles
of the characters doing the performing, and even the sequence
and timing of the utterances, are all interpretable in relation to
the contextual conditions maintained by the genre. These
genre conditions allow readers to limit the potentially multiple
actions sustained by the utterances to certain recognizable
social actions. As Bazerman explains, “even though multiplicity
of action remains [especially in literary texts], attribution of
genre still helps to limit the domain and focus the character of
the multiplicities offered by, or to be read out of, the text—that
is, genre recognition usually limits interpretive ﬂexibility”
(1994a, 90). Sufﬁce it to say, we recognize, interpret, and, in the
spirit of reader-response theory, also construct (and deconstruct) the discourses we encounter using the genre function.
Genres, in short, function as sites of action that locate readers
in positions of interpretation.
In her work, Dubrow acknowledges the genre function when
she explains, following E. D. Hirsch (1967), that genre acts like a
social code of behavior established between the reader and
author (1982, 2), a kind of “generic contract” (31) that stabilizes
and enables interpretation. Such a recognition, echoed in
the work of Beebee (1994), Cohen (1989), Perloff (1989),
Threadgold (1989), and Todorov (1970), understands genre as
a psychological concept rather than a classiﬁcation system, a disposition a reader assumes in relation to a literary text. But genres not only establish a relationship between reader and text in
what amounts to a psychological relationship; they also establish
a relationship between texts in what amounts to a sociological
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relationship—a kind of literary culture within which readers,
writers, and texts function.
In the Marplethorpe example, we have already discussed the
way that genres function on a psychological level as conceptual
frameworks for interpretation, helping readers construct what
reading theorist Frank Smith calls “speciﬁcations” with which to
predict, navigate, and interpret texts (1994). On a sociological
level, genres function to create a literary culture within which
texts are deﬁned and operate in relation to one another.
Sociology is the science of social relations, organization, and
change, what Anthony Giddens calls the study of “human social
activities” and the “conditions that make these activities possible” (1984, 2). Sociologists study how social life is enacted and
organized, how social activity is deﬁned and related to other
social activity in space-time. In his book Metaphors of Genre,
David Fishelov explores the connections between sociology and
genre theory, explaining that the metaphor “genres are social
institutions” is commonly used by literary scholars to explain
genre (1993). Like social institutions, genres coordinate textual
relations, organization, and change. In fact, like social institutions, genres also frame the conditions that make literary activity possible and even meaningful, the discursive sites within
which readers and writers organize, deﬁne, and enact textured
language practices and relations.
Following Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism, Fishelov
describes genres as shaping and governing a speciﬁcally literary
universe, so that genre theory becomes akin to the sociology of literary culture or what is more commonly understood as “poetics.”
As René Wellek and Austin Warren put it, literary genres are institutions in the same way as church, university, and state are institutions (1942, 226). Fredric Jameson similarly describes genres as
“essentially literary institutions, or social contracts between a
writer and a speciﬁc public, whose function is to specify the
proper use of a particular cultural artifact” (1981, 106). Genres
thus endow literary texts with a social identity in relation to other
texts within this “universe of literature” (Todorov 1970, 8),
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constituting a literary text’s “mode of being” in that universe.
This genred universe organizes and generates practices of textual
production, circulation, and interpretation.
As sociological concepts, one way that genres organize and
generate literary activity is by establishing particular space-time
conﬁgurations within which texts function. Käte Hamburger, for
example, argues that each genre choreographs a particular orientation, especially a temporal orientation, so that, for instance,
the “past tense in ﬁction does not suggest the past tense as we
know it but rather a situation in the present; when we read ‘John
walked into the room,’ we do not assume, as we would if we
encountered the same preterite in another type of writing, that
the action being described occurred prior to one in our world”
(qtd. in Dubrow 1982, 103). Genres synchronize our perceptions
of time. But they also synchronize how we spatially negotiate our
way through time, as both readers and writers. Recall, for example, the Marplethorpe paragraph discussed earlier. If we read it
as detective ﬁction, then we immediately begin to make certain
space-time connections: the gliding ﬁgure and the dead woman
assume a certain spatial-temporal relationship to one another as
possible murder victim and suspect. That is, they assume a genremediated cause-effect relationship in terms of their spatial proximity and their temporal sequence. The gliding ﬁgure may
simply be a gliding ﬁgure, peripheral to the plot. However, if we
read the paragraph as detective ﬁction, then this ﬁgure’s gliding
away from the site of a dead body at this particular time and at
this particular distance makes this ﬁgure a suspect and the dead
body a victim. The actions of each actor, in other words, along
with the inaccurate clock, combine together within the genre to
form a genre-mediated socio-rhetorical orientation in which
space and time are conﬁgured in a certain way in order to allow
certain events and actions to take place. Bakhtin refers to this
articulation of space and time as “chronotope,” which Schryer
adapts to genre theory by positing that “every genre expresses
space/time relations that reﬂect current social beliefs regarding
the placement of human individuals in space and time and the
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kind of action permitted within that time/space” (1999, 83).
Genres are discursive articulations of the chronotope.5
As conceived by the aforementioned scholars in literary studies, literary genres play a signiﬁcant role in the “sociological”
constitution of literary culture by helping to identify the various
roles that texts and their authors play within it and how these
roles get performed within the space-time conﬁgurations it constructs. This is why genre theorists often deﬁne genre in terms of
literary social institutions, institutions that enable and shape
“human social activities” and the “conditions that make these
activities possible” (Giddens 1984, 2). David Fishelov, for example, explains that as “a professor is expected to comply with certain patterns of action, and to interact with other role-players
(e.g. students) according to the structure and functions of an
educational institution . . . , a character in a comedy is expected
to perform certain acts and to interact with other characters
according to the structural principles of the literary ‘institution’
of comedy” (1993, 86). It is these “structural principles,” which
often function and are articulated at the level of genre, that
make the activity at once possible and recognizable, socially and
rhetorically. And just as social institutions coordinate institutional positions and relations, so genres coordinate genre positions and relations, both in terms of the subjects who participate
within them and the writers and readers who produce and interpret them. Yet the problem here, as has been the case traditionally within literary genre theory, is that literary scholars limit
genre positions and relations only to literary activities. For many
such scholars, genres function only to help organize and generate a literary institution, in which various literary activities and
identities are enacted.
We can go a long way toward understanding genres as sites
within which individuals acquire, negotiate, and enact everyday
language practices and relations if we identify genres not only as
analogical to social institutions but as actual social institutions,
constituting not just literary activity but social activity, not just
literary textual relations but all textual relations, so that genres
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do not just constitute the literary scene in which literary actors
(writers, readers, characters) and their texts function, but also
constitute the social conditions in which the activities of all social
participants are enacted. For example, to what extent is the
university as a social institution mediated by its genres, including
research articles, grants, syllabi, assignment prompts, lectures,
student essays, course evaluations, oral exams, memos, and
committee minutes, to name just a few? This is the question that
theorists in rhetorical genre studies have been asking over the
last twenty years, and it is the question that we will now begin to
consider. Answering it will allow us to begin synthesizing the literary as well as the nonliterary ways that the genre function is at
work in making all kinds of social practices, relations, and subject
positions possible and meaningful within situated space-time
conﬁgurations. Answering it will also set the stage for later
chapters to examine how the genre function positions writers
and their processes of invention within speciﬁc social and rhetorical sites of action, whether these writers are D. H. Lawrence, a
social worker, or a student in a ﬁrst-year writing course.
Understanding how genres situate and help generate rhetorical
and social activities will allow us in composition studies to acquire
a richer understanding of the writer and invention.
GENRE AS SITE OF SOCIAL ACTION

Not all literary scholars limit genre’s jurisdiction only to the
literary world.6 In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin
argues that genres mediate all communicative activity, from
novels to military commands to everyday short rejoinders
(1986). In so doing, Bakhtin takes perhaps the most signiﬁcant
step toward a view of genre as social, not just literary, action.
Deﬁning speech genres as typiﬁed utterances existing within
language spheres (60), Bakhtin claims that “we speak only in
deﬁnite speech genres[;] that is, all our utterances have deﬁnite
and relatively stable typical forms of construction of the whole” (79;
Bakhtin’s emphasis). Such generic forms of the utterance shape
and enable what Bakhtin calls a speaker’s “speech plan” or
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“speech will” (78). After all, Bakhtin quips, “the speaker is not
the biblical Adam, dealing only with virgin and still unnamed
objects, giving them names for the ﬁrst time” (93). Instead,
every speaker’s utterance exists in a dialogical relationship with
previous utterances and can be understood through that relationship. Speech genres function as sites for the articulation
and exchange of utterances. Bakhtin explains:
The speaker’s speech will is manifested primarily in the choice of a particular speech genre. This choice is determined by the speciﬁc nature of
the given sphere of speech communication. . . . And when the
speaker’s speech plan with all its individuality and subjectivity is
applied and adapted to a chosen genre, it is shaped and developed
within a certain generic form. Such genres exist above all in the great
and multifarious sphere of everyday oral communication, including
the most familiar and the most intimate. (78; Bakhtin’s emphasis)

Genres, therefore, do not just constitute literary reality and its
texts. They constitute all speech communication by becoming
part of “our experiences and our consciousness together” and
mediating the “dialogic reverberations” that make up communicative interaction (78, 94).
Individuals communicate by choosing (and being chosen by)
a particular genre (or by combining genres) within a system of
related genres in a given sphere of speech communication—
what is popularly referred to in composition studies as a discourse community but more accurately depicted by Bazerman
(1997a) and Russell (1997), following Cole and Engeström, as
an “activity system.”7 Avoiding the abstraction and homogeneity
often associated with the idea of discourse community, an activity system describes the complex, coordinated, ongoing, and
often contradictory interactions of individuals within “systems
of purposeful activity” (Russell 2002). These systems are mediated by a constellation of related, sometimes conﬂicting genres,
what Devitt (1991) calls “genre sets” and Bazerman (1994a)
calls “genre systems,” which enact and organize these interactions. An individual’s choice of genre, then, is based to a large
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extent on his or her participation in and knowledge of the
sphere of communication and its related genres, although of
course it is also possible for communicants to import and
export genres from one sphere to another as they travel
through the various systems of activity that make up their lives.
Within their chosen genres, communicants assume certain
genre-constituted positions and participate in certain language
games while interacting with one another. Bakhtin refers to the
participants within language games as “speech subjects” (1986,
72). The speech subject’s “speech plan” is mediated by his or
her chosen genre, as is his or her style. In addition, the speech
subject’s very conception of the addressee is mediated by genre,
because each genre embodies its own typical conception of the
addressee (Bakhtin, 98). In fact, at the level of diction the very
word and its relation to other words are also mediated by
speech genres: “In the genre the word acquires a particular typical expression. Genres correspond to typical situations of
speech communication, typical themes, and, consequently, also
to particular contacts between the meanings of words and
actual concrete reality under certain typical circumstances”
(Bakhtin, 87). Speech genres thus organize and generate the
very communicative conditions within which speech subjects—
both speakers and addressees—interact, in the same way that
literary genres constitute the literary contexts within which literary subjects—writers, readers, and characters—interact.8
Trajectories of Inquiry: Genre and Register
In applied linguistics, the site of this dialectical relation
between language and its situations of use is often deﬁned as
“register,” the “conceptual framework for representing the
social context as the semiotic environment in which people
exchange meanings” (Halliday 1978, 110). The concepts of register and genre are closely related, but because this relationship
is not always clear (some scholars see them as interchangeable;
some see them as hierarchically distinguished, with either genre
or register as the higher order concept; and some see them as
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different in value, with either genre or register as more useful
to a systematic study of language), it is worthwhile brieﬂy to
examine the relationship between the two, especially since such
an examination will contribute to an understanding of how
genres organize and generate the conditions of discursive production in which writers and writing take place.
In his functional approach to language, articulated in
Language as Social Semiotic, M. A. K. Halliday (1978) describes
how “the network of meanings” that constitute any culture,
what he calls the “social semiotic” (100), is to a large extent
encoded in and maintained by its semantic system, which represents a culture’s “meaning potential” (13). As such, “the construal of reality [social semiotic] is inseparable from the
construal of the semantic system in which the reality is
encoded. In this sense, language is a shared meaning potential,
at once both a part of experience and an intersubjective interpretation of experience” (1–2). This is why, as Halliday insists,
language is a form of socialization, playing a role in how individuals become socialized within formations of culture he calls
“contexts of situation.”
Language is functional not only because it encodes and
embodies the social semiotic but also because it helps enact the
social semiotic. Language, therefore, makes social reality recognizable and enables individuals to experience it, others, and
themselves within it. Halliday explains: “By their everyday acts of
meaning [their semantic activities], people act out the social
structure, afﬁrming their own statuses and roles, and establishing
and transmitting the shared systems of value and of knowledge”
(2). The semantic system, representing what Halliday calls a culture’s “meaning potential,” in turn constitutes its individuals’
“behaviour potential,” which characterizes individuals’ actions
and interactions within a particular social semiotic. The semiotic
system, which is social in nature, becomes cognitively internalized as a system of behavior when it is manifested in the semantic
system, so that we internalize and enact culture as we learn and
use language. The semantic potential (what a communicator can
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do or mean within social reality) constitutes the “actualized
potential” (what a communicator does or means within social
reality) (40).
Halliday explains that contexts of situation are not isolated
and unique, but often reoccur as “situation types,” a set of typiﬁed semiotic and semantic relations that make up “a scenario . . .
of persons and actions and events from which the things which
are said derive their meaning” (28–30). Examples of situation
types include “players instructing novice in a game,” “mother
reading bedtime story to a child,” “customers ordering goods
over the phone” (29). Because contexts of situation reoccur as
situation types, those who participate in these situations develop
typiﬁed ways of acting and interacting within them. As these situation types become conventionalized over time, they begin to
“specify the semantic conﬁgurations that the speaker will typically fashion” (110).
Halliday refers to this typiﬁed social and semantic scenario as
“register.” Register is “the clustering of semantic features according to situation types” (68), a situated and typiﬁed semantic
system which describes the activities of communicators,
including their contexts and their means of communication,
within a particular type of situation. Register assigns a situation
type with particular syntactic and lexicogrammatic properties,
becoming a linguistic realization of a situation type. As a framework within which a situation type is linguistically realized,
register describes what actually takes place communicatively (the
“ﬁeld”), who is taking part (the “tenor”), and what role language
is playing (the “mode”). For example, the “ﬁeld” of discourse
represents the setting in which language occurs; that is, the
system of activity within a particular setting. The “tenor” of
discourse represents the relation between participants—their
interactions—within the discourse. And the “mode” of discourse
represents the channel or wavelength of communication
adopted by the participants (33). All three levels interact in
particular and fairly typiﬁed ways within register. When linguists
identify a “scientiﬁc register,” then, they not only describe a style
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of language, but also the set of words, structural choices, and
interactional patterns associated with scientiﬁc contexts.
Halliday locates genre as a mode or conduit of communication, one of the textual and linguistic means available within register that helps communicants realize the situation type.
Functioning at the level of mode, within the ﬁeld, tenor, and
mode complex, genre represents the vehicle through which
communicants interact within a situation type. In Halliday’s
model, genres are thus relegated to typiﬁed tools communicants
use within registers to enact and interact within a particular type
of situation. It is this situation, Halliday explains, “that generates
the semiotic tensions and the rhetorical styles and genres that
express them” (113). Yet, as we have been discussing so far, genres perform more than just an expressive function; they do not
simply describe how participants typically communicate in typiﬁed situations. Rather, genres function in relation to other genres as typiﬁed sites of action that position their users within
situated motives for action, language practices, and social relations and activities. And so, I propose to assign genres more of a
constitutive role in Halliday’s theory of language, imagining
them as bounded discursive sites for the organization and realization of situation types, including the complex relations of
ﬁeld, tenor, and mode that take place within situation types.9
Elevating genre study as a method of inquiry over register not
only allows us to identify and examine speciﬁc ideological,
semantic, and lexicogrammatic conﬁgurations and activities
within situation types, but it also allows us to interrogate the very
nature of situation types. The study of register generally assumes
a situation type as a precondition of language use and then goes
on to describe that language use. Rhetorical genre study tends
to offer genre as a location for the production and articulation
of situation types. Part of the action genres accomplish, through
their use, is the reproduction of the situations that require their
use. As such, genre theory provides what might be called a
“thicker” description of the textured, situated activities that
reﬂect and generate complex forms of social organization. And
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so, although register is valuable for identifying and describing
the language interactions within recurrent situations, it seems
pitched at too abstract a level to help account for the speciﬁc
activities and relations that comprise situation types. Within the
same situation type, for example, more than one genre is often
at work, and, as I will argue in more detail in chapters 4 and 5,
each genre within a situation type constitutes its own situated
register—that is, its own system of activity, its own subject positions as well as relations between these positions, and its own
rhetorical and formal features.
Each genre, I argue, organizes and generates its own ﬁeld,
tenor, and mode complex—its own site of action—in relation to
other genres within a larger sphere of action or “activity system.”
The genres that form this constellation function together to coordinate the dynamic relations that make up the larger activity systems. Within such systems, genres not only constitute particular
participant positions and language practices; they also regulate
how participants recognize and interact with one another. As
such, any typiﬁed social activity is mediated by a range of genres,
each of which frames its own situated genre identities and
actions, including motives and intentions, as well as relations.
This notion of situation type as one resulting from and mediated
by a set of genres can be clariﬁed if we look at an example.
If we take a situation type, say “teacher instructing students in
a classroom,” we recognize that there cannot be only one register at work within it. This situation type is much too dynamic—
actualized by a range of shifting, even conﬂicting, situational
activities, participant relations, and rhetorical styles and goals—
to be embodied by a single register. What is at work within the
situation type is a system of related genred sites of action that
constitute what we recognize as this overall situation type. For
instance, the lecture represents one genre which constitutes a
particular ﬁeld (literally the physical conﬁguration of the room,
with teacher in front, students facing teacher in rows, etc.),
tenor (the way students raise their hands and wait for signals
from the teacher to ask questions, and the power dynamic this
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sets up), and mode (how the teacher organizes the lecture itself,
the question-answer nature of the dialogue, and so on). But it is
not the only genre. Others include the assignment prompt,
which in turn constitutes a different ﬁeld, tenor, and mode; the
student papers; the teacher’s comments on the students’ papers;
the syllabus; the course description; and so on. Each of these
genres organizes and generates a particular site of action which
both students and teachers come to recognize and which in turn
shapes and enables their various positions, activities, and relations within the situation type (see chapter 5 for more on the
classroom as a genre-mediated environment).
Halliday writes that “reality consists of meanings” (139).
Genres do not just express or help communicate these a priori
meanings as part of register; rather, genres organize and generate these meanings. As such, genres are not merely classiﬁcation
systems or innocent communicative tools; genres are socially
constructed, ongoing cognitive and rhetorical sites—symbiotically maintained rhetorical ecosystems, if you will—within which
communicants enact and reproduce speciﬁc situations, actions,
relations, and identities. As individuals make their way through
culture, they function within various and at times conﬂicting
genred spaces, spaces that reposition them in speciﬁc relations
to others through the use of speciﬁc language exchanges as well
as frame the ways they recognize and enact their language practices, activities, and themselves.
GENRE AND THE ENACTMENT OF SOCIAL MOTIVES

In later chapters, we will consider how writers’ rhetorical
inventions, including their motives and intentions to invent,
take place within and against the very genred sites of action that
construct their subject positions and social relations. Here,
though, I would like to conclude this chapter by examining
how, as sites of action, genres maintain the desires that writers
acquire, negotiate, and articulate—how, that is, genres locate
writers in relation to desires that inform the choices they make
when they begin to write.
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Sociologist Anthony Giddens argues that human activity—
including motive, intention, and agency—is constituted by,
enacted within, and helps reproduce social systems. Giddens
explains: “Human social activities . . . are recursive. That is to say,
they are not brought into being by social actors but continually
recreated by them via the very means whereby they express
themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible” (1984,
2). Giddens describes this ecological process as the “duality of
structure,” which is based on the theory “that the rules and
resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of
social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction” (19). I will address Giddens’s theory of structuration in
greater detail in chapter 4. For now, let me just note that human
actors, in their social practices, reproduce the very social conditions that in turn make their actions necessary, possible, and recognizable, so that their actions maintain and enact the very
conditions that consequently call for these actions.
Giddens’s theory of structuration, echoing Raymond
Williams’s (1981) Marxist formulation of the dynamic correspondence between the base (productive forces) and superstructure
(cultural practices), has much to offer genre studies. Carolyn
Miller (1994), for one, has explored the connections by arguing
that genres, as typiﬁed socio-rhetorical sites of action, play a
mediating role in enabling their users to reproduce the very conditions of production within which they in turn function.10 Miller
writes: “The rules and resources of a genre provide reproducible
speaker and addressee roles, social typiﬁcations of recurrent
social needs or exigencies, topical structures (or ‘moves’ and
‘steps’), and ways of indexing an event to material conditions,
turning them into constraints and resources” (1994, 71). But
how do genres do this? How do they maintain the desires that
they help to fulﬁll?
We function within genre-constituted conditions that we
socially and rhetorically sustain in our practices because, as
Miller has argued (1984), genre is recursively and inseparably
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linked to the concept of exigence, deﬁned as a situation or event
that we recognize as requiring immediate attention or response.
Exigencies compel us to respond and/or act. Yet our compulsions to act are not as intuitive or unmediated as we might think.
On a physiological level, of course, we certainly do respond
instinctively, as when we quickly withdraw our hand after touching a hot stove. But exigence, as Miller explains, is not instinctive
in the same way. Rather, exigence is learned behavior, a learned
recognition of signiﬁcance that informs why and how we learn
to respond in and to various situations. In our social interactions, all sorts of conventions mediate how we recognize exigencies as social motives to act. Genres are examples of such
mediating conventions. As cultural artifacts, they embody
exigencies, and in using genres, we enact and reinforce these
exigencies as recognizable, meaningful, consequential actions.
An example will help clarify how genres predispose us to act
and/or respond in certain ways by rhetorically framing how we
conceptualize certain situations as social motives. Like many
other events, death is a physical and social reality in our world,
one that calls for various and often culturally idiosyncratic reactions. At some basic level, our response to death is certainly
instinctive, perhaps even biological, but at the ideological level
in which we function as social beings, our response to death is
mediated by a range of social and rhetorical conventions, including genres, each of which constitutes death as a slightly different
exigency recognized as a particular social motive requiring a
particular type of immediate attention or response. The various
ways in which individuals recognize, experience, and respond to
death, therefore, become informed by the genres available to
them and those they “choose” to use.
As a situation type, the “response to death” is represented
and realized by a variety of genres in contemporary Western
culture, each of which constitutes it as a speciﬁc exigency, calling for a particular kind of response to ﬁll a particular social
need. So each genre constitutes its own site of action within
which death takes on a particular social meaning and becomes
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treated as a particular social action (ﬁeld), within which those
involved take on particular social roles and relate to one
another in particular ways (tenor), and within which certain
rhetorical strategies and styles are used (mode). In our culture,
for example, we have elegies, eulogies, obituaries, epitaphs,
requiems, even greeting cards, just to name a few. Each of these
socially sanctioned and typiﬁed rhetorical responses is not just a
form or a tool we use to express our feelings about death as an a
priori exigency; instead, each comes to constitute one of the
various, sometimes conﬂicting ways we make sense of and treat
death in our culture by transforming it into a speciﬁc social
motive. The obituary and the elegy, for instance, rhetorically
respond to death differently because each genre represents
death as a slightly different exigency, serving a different social
motive and requiring a different type of immediate attention
and remedy. Thus, the genres we have available to us are integral to the ways we construct, respond to, and make sense of
recurring situations, even when these situations revolve around
the same physical event. At the same time, genres are related to
the subject positions we assume, the language practices we
enact, as well as the relations we establish between ourselves
and others within these situations.
We recognize obituaries, for example, as notices of a person’s
death, usually accompanied by a short biographical account.
They serve to notify the general public, and so do not play as
direct a role as, say, the eulogy does in helping those who are
grieving deal with their loss. The purpose of the obituary, then, is
not so much to console those closest to the deceased or to help
them maintain a sense of continuity in the face of loss, but to
ascribe the deceased with a social identity and value, one that is
recognizable to others within the community. So the obituary’s
purpose is not, like the eulogy, to assess and praise the meaning
of the deceased’s life and death; rather, it is to make the
deceased’s life publicly recognizable, perhaps even to celebrate
the value of the individual-as-citizen. Rhetorically, therefore, the
obituary often begins with an announcement of death, often
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without mention of the cause, and a notice of where the funeral
services will be held. What is most telling about the obituary,
though, is how it biographically represents the deceased. Unlike
the eulogy, in which the deceased’s personal accomplishents,
desires, even disappointments are celebrated, the obituary
describes the deceased’s life in terms of its social value: who the
deceased’s parents are, who his or her spouse(s) and children
are, where the deceased was born, lived, and died, what jobs the
deceased held over the span of his or her life, what organizations
and clubs the deceased belonged to, and so on. In other words,
the obituary narrates a certain public identity for the deceased,
one that makes him or her recognizable to the general public in
terms familiar to them: as a fellow citizen. As a genre, then, the
obituary constitutes death as an exigence that motivates us to
reafﬁrm, using the occasion of someone’s death, the public
worth of that individual. The obituary positions the deceased as a
public citizen, whose life is told in terms of the public institutions
in which he or she participated. In short, the obituary constitutes
death as a different kind of exigency endowed with a different
social motive that requires a different rhetorical action, a different relation among the participants, and different social roles
than does the eulogy or other related genres.
Carolyn Miller argues that because “situations are social constructs that are the result, not of ‘perception,’ but of deﬁnition,”
the very idea of recurrence is socially deﬁned and constructed
(1984, 156). What we recognize and experience as recurring is
the result of our construing and treating it as such. Moreover,
the way we recognize a recurring situation as requiring a certain
immediate attention or remedy (in short, an exigence) is also
socially deﬁned. Over time, a recursive relationship results, in
which our typiﬁed responses to a situation in turn lead to its
recurrence. As Giddens would put it, we reproduce a situation as
we act within and in response to it. In all this, exigence plays a
key role, at once shaping how we socially recognize a situation
and helping us rhetorically enact it. As Miller explains,
“exigence is a form of social knowledge—a mutual construing of
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objects, events, interests, and purposes that not only links them
but also makes them what they are: an objectiﬁed social need”
(157). Exigence becomes part of the way we conceptualize and
experience a situation by endowing it with social meaning—
meaning that shapes how individuals act within the situation.
This dynamic process is bound up in and made possible by
genre. Exigence, as such, is not only a form of social knowledge
but also speciﬁcally a form of genre knowledge. We rhetorically
recognize, respond to, and potentially change exigence through
genres, because genres are how we socially construct situations
by deﬁning and treating them as particular social motives.
We recognize this phenomenon when we look at the genre of
the greeting card. The greeting card may have emerged as a
response to recurring physical and social exigencies (birth of
loved ones, marriage, and so on), but the greeting card also
serves to transform these exigencies into social motives by
endowing them with a certain social signiﬁcance that in turn
sanctions them as deserving of a greeting card, a typiﬁed rhetorical action. Today we see the extent to which the greeting card as
a genre constructs the very recurring exigencies to which it
responds in such examples as the “secretaries’ day card,” the
“bosses’ day card,” the “grandparents’ day card,” etc. The greeting card, then, like the obituary (and like all genres, literary and
nonliterary), becomes part of its users’ “regularized social relations, communicative landscape, and cognitive organization”
(Bazerman 1997b, 22). Within this genre environment, writers
and other communicants “acquire and strategically deploy genre
knowledge,” which refers to situated cognition (Berkenkotter
and Huckin 1995, 3); assume genre identities; and, as we saw
earlier, reproduce the very recurrence that they come to recognize as a situation type. Genre, therefore, is not merely a rhetorical tool that comes after the semiotic fact; it is itself the semiotic
fact—the site of “social and ideological action” (Schryer 1994,
107) in which social motives are maintained and enacted.11
Because genres are one of the ways that exigencies are transformed into social motives—that is, because genres constitute
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both our need to respond and the way in which we do so—I
argue that genres are sites which enable and shape communicative action by ﬁrst staging the social situation in which communication takes place and then motivating the way communicants
rhetorically act within it, including the positions they assume
and the relations they enact. It is how and why these genre-constituted positions, relations, commitments, and practices affect
the choices writers make when they begin to write that will be
the focus of the remainder of the book.
SUMMARY

This book is based on the premise that genres function as
sites of action in which writers acquire, articulate, and potentially resist motives to act. It conceives of genre as operating on
both an ideological and a material level—both a disposition
and its articulation. Fundamental to this understanding is the
notion that genre is a social motive and a rhetorical instantiation of that motive. Genre is what it allows us to do, the potential that makes the actual possible, the concept and its practice,
the “con-” and the “-text” at the same time. As such, genre
allows us to study the social situation and the rhetorical action
as they are at work on one another, reinforcing and reproducing one another. This is why genre is both social and rhetorical,
the articulation and effect of what we do and the reason and
means for why we do it.
As we write various texts, then, we rhetorically enact and
reproduce the desires that prompted them. This recursive
process is what genre is. And as we rhetorically enact and reproduce these desires, we also rhetorically enact, reproduce, and
potentially resist and/or transform the social activities, the
roles, and the relations that are embedded in these desires. It is
the genred positions, commitments, and relations that writers
assume, enact, and sometimes resist within certain situations
that most interest me. In particular, I am interested in the way
these positions, commitments, and relations inform the choices
writers make during the scene of invention. As we make our way
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from day to day and from situation to situation, we assume various and at times even conﬂicting genre identities, identities
which are certainly informed by our gender, our sexual orientation, our class, our race, our ethnicity, our personal history, our
immediate context, and our genetics. In chapter 4, we will consider how these factors affect genre identity formation and
potential transformation. Yet, as we will also see, there is always
the ideology of genre at work, an ideology with which we have
to contend. Some genres invite more resistance than others.
Literary genres, for example, are more self-conscious than most
nonliterary genres. As Thomas Beebee argues, literary writers
often resist their generic categorizations even as they exist
within them, so that they self-consciously position themselves
on the margins of different genres: “the meaning of a literary
text can depend on the play of differences between its genres”
(1994, 250). Other, more “rhetorical,” genres are less pliable
but just as transformable. No matter our motives, whether to
resist or conform to social and rhetorical conventions, the
choices we make as writers before and when we begin to write
are always mediated by genres. Invention takes place within
genres, and can be a site of conformity and/or resistance.
For example, there are the cases in which women poets have
sought to invent differently by subverting male-dominated genres such as the elegy. Peter Sacks, for instance, has argued that
the elegy performs what Freud terms the “work of mourning,”
and so “each elegy is to be regarded . . . as a work, both in the
commonly accepted meaning of a product and in the more
dynamic sense of the working through of an impulse or experience” (1985, 1). The elegy as a genre, just like the obituary as a
genre, shapes and enables how we as a culture “work through”
our experiences with death, albeit in different ways. According
to Sacks, the elegy helps us work through our mourning in its
very poetic movements, representing, as such, a rhetorical journey in which our loss becomes compensated by the elegy itself
(6). Intended to overcome grief, this compensatory function of
the elegy, Allison Giffen explains, represents male desire for

The Genre Function

47

Oedipal resolution (1997, 121). In a very interesting twist, however, Giffen claims that early American women poets strategically appropriated the elegy for their own ends. Because grief
was one of the few socially permissible emotions a woman could
express poetically, early American women poets began to write
elegies at an unprecedented rate, so much so that “the elegiac
voice emerges as one of the most distinctive features of the poetess” (118). But they subverted the elegy by using it to sustain
grief rather than to overcome it—to resist resolution and to
maintain attachment with the lost beloved rather than to seek
poetic compensation. The reason for this is not so much that
these women poets had more of an inherent or intuitive store of
grief; rather, by sustaining grief, Giffen explains, these women
poets could continue to write: “to cease grieving, would mean to
give up her poetry” (119). So these women poets adopted an
elegiac identity while partly undermining the social purpose of
the elegy, so that, within the “marginalized site of grief, [these
poets are] able to articulate desire for a lost love object and thus
deﬁne [themselves] as speaking subject[s]” (118). Such an
elegy-mediated identity gave these poets a voice, but also
deﬁned them as grieving subjects, “characterized as saccharine,
pious, and maudlin” (118). As much as gender played a role in
how these women poets positioned themselves within the genre,
ultimately the elegy allowed them to “deﬁne [themselves] as
speaking subject[s]” only by deﬁning them as speaking subjects.
Even resistance to genre still leaves us functioning within genre.
What happens to writers when they write? This is, in its most
general form, the question this book seeks to answer. What
motivates the choices writers make before and as they begin to
write? What happens to writers as they move from one genre to
the next? In what way is a writer’s subject position shaped by the
genre in which he or she writes? How are a writer’s intentions
shaped by the genre in which he or she writes? How do writers
transform genres as they work within them? And, as a result, to
what extent does invention involve writers in the process of
acquiring and articulating a rhetorical subjectivity within genre
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rather than the process of expressing self-possessed motives?
The notion that genres are sites of action, as I have examined it
in this chapter, suggests that a writer’s ways of (re)cognizing—
that is, both identifying and knowing—and carrying out his or
her purpose, subject matter, and even intentions is organized
and generated by the genres in which he or she writes. We can
learn a great deal about how and why writers invent by analyzing how writers get positioned within these genred sites of
action. We can also, I will argue, demystify invention by teaching students how to make these sites of action visible to themselves in a way that allows them to participate more consciously
and critically at the intersection between the acquisition and
articulation of motives where agency and beginnings take place.

3
INVENTING THE WRITER IN
COMPOSITION STUDIES
The ﬁrst stage [of composing], the ﬁnding of material
by thought or observation, is the fundamental and
inclusive ofﬁce of invention. . . . Yet this is, of all
processes, the one least to be invaded by the rules of the
textbook. It is a work so individual, so dependent on the
particular aptitude and direction of the writer’s mind,
that each one must be left for the most part to ﬁnd his
way alone, according to the impulse that is in him.
J O H N G E N U N G , “The Study of Rhetoric in the
College Course”
Genres, in-so-far as they identify a repertoire of
possible actions that may be taken in a set of
circumstances, identify the possible intentions one may
have. Thus they embody the range of social intentions
toward which one may orient one’s energies.
C H A R L E S B A Z E R M A N , “Systems of Genres and the
Enactment of Social Intentions”

The above observations by Genung and Bazerman, made more
than a century apart, represent two possible ways of imagining
the writer-as-agent in composition. Genung locates agency within
the writer, whose self-motivated, private intentions guide his or
her processes of invention. Bazerman locates agency within a
larger sphere of social motives, which orients and generates a
writer’s intentions to act. In both cases, Genung and Bazerman
acknowledge that intention “belongs” to the writer and shapes
how he or she begins to write, but they present different visions
of where intentions come from and how and why they are
acquired, leading to questions about the nature of agency and
where it resides. That writers “have” intentions and that writers
are the most palpable agents of invention is not under dispute.
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Under dispute, rather, is how writers come to have intentions in
the ﬁrst place. And here we return to the question of motive that
we began to address in the previous chapter, namely, what is
involved when we say what writers are doing and why they are
doing it? Writers, of course, are the ones who do the writing; they
are the most obvious and immediate agents of their writing, the
ones who transform intentions into words and actions as they
invent their texts. But to designate and treat writers as the sole
agents of invention because they are its most visible agents, as is
largely still the case in composition pedagogy (Howard 1999, 57,
163), is to overlook the less obvious but just as signiﬁcant factors
that are at work on the writer, factors that shape writers’ intentions and motivate the choices they make as agents.1 As I will
describe at the end of this chapter, genre theory helps us extend
the sphere of agency in the study and teaching of writing to
include not only what writers do when they write, but what happens to writers that makes them do what they do. Extending the
sphere of agency in this way allows us to explore Kenneth Burke’s
expression “the motivation to act” in the fullness of its complexity, as a process of simultaneously acting and being acted upon.
Such a formulation recognizes the writer as a “double agent,”
one who is both an agent of his or her desires and actions and an
agent on behalf of already existing desires and actions. Invention
occurs at the intersection of this dialectic between the social and
the individual (which includes what Marshall Alcorn describes as
the relation between libidinal attachments and ideological structures [2002, 23]) where agency is acquired, negotiated, resisted,
and deployed. As they invent, writers participate in this agency,
but they are not its sole agents.
Generally speaking, process-based research and pedagogy in
composition studies have privileged the writer as the primary
agent of invention. Toward that end, scholars and teachers of writing have developed valuable methods of encouraging writers,
alone and in collaboration with others, to discover, organize, construct, reconstruct, and reﬂect on their ideas and writing in ways
that acknowledge and manage their agency as writers. As valuable
as such work has been and continues to be, however, it leaves us
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with a partial understanding of the agency at work when writers
write, an understanding that imagines the writer as the point of
departure for writing. Even when teachers acknowledge the social
presence of writing by creating a space for and encouraging writers to collaborate with others, this social participation still mainly
identiﬁes and serves writers as the primary agents of writing, who
invent privately and then subject the work of their invention to the
inﬂuences of others (see Lunsford and Ede 1994, 431; and
Howard 1999, 36–39). This partial notion of agency not only
informs the teaching of invention, but, as I will argue in the ﬁnal
chapter, it also limits the teaching of writing in ways that ultimately threaten the place and purpose of post-secondary writing
instruction. Yet it remains the prevailing notion, despite the work
of composition scholars who have challenged it and offered in its
place evidence of the thoroughly social nature of invention and
authorship (see, for example, LeFevre 1987, Brodkey 1987, S.
Miller 1989, Cooper 1989, Ede and Lunsford 1990, Faigley 1992,
Lunsford and Ede 1994, and Howard 1999).
In this chapter, I investigate how and why process-based
methodologies in composition came to privilege such a partial
view of the writer and invention, a view that “invents” the writer as
the primary site and agent of writing. At the end of the chapter
and in the remainder of the book, I will examine what it would
mean for the study and teaching of invention if we located intentions within a larger sphere of agency that includes not only the
writer as agent but also the social and rhetorical conditions,
namely genres, which participate in this agency and in which the
writer and writing take place. Recasting invention in this way
challenges us to reconsider entrenched assumptions about the
writer and what it means to write in ways that will contribute, I
hope, a richer, more pedagogically useful understanding of both.
THE PROCESS MOVEMENT IN COMPOSITION:
RECLAIMING INVENTION

In order to uncover general assumptions about the writer and
invention in composition, we need to locate these assumptions in
the context of the process movement in which they emerged.
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The writing process movement in composition studies, as is well
known, developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a rejection of traditional, product-driven, rules-based writing instruction. And with
its popularization in the years since, the process movement has
helped legitimize composition as a theoretical and professional
academic discipline by giving those involved in it something to
study in addition to something to teach, namely students’ composing processes (Crowley 1998, 191; see also Harris 1997 and S.
Miller 1991). Such an emphasis on the process rather than the
product of writing—really a shift in attention from textual product
to textual production—resulted in a shift in focus away from
arrangement and correctness (this is what a ﬁnished text should
look like) and back to invention (this is how a ﬁnished text
comes to exist), thereby encouraging composition scholars to
investigate the archeology of textual production right down to its
beginnings in the writer’s mind, the very realm, Genung had
explained a half century earlier, that textbooks and teachers
cannot invade. Inﬂuenced by work in cognitive psychology and
creativity theory, early studies of writing processes such as Janet
Emig’s (1971) and Sondra Perl’s (1979) demonstrated that writing is not simply the product of already formulated thought, but
rather the process of working through thought, the process, as
Perl explains, of seeing “in our words a further structuring of the
sense we began with and . . . [recognizing] that in those words we
have discovered something new about ourselves and our topic”
(1988, 117). This attention to process revealed and provided
access to an entire cognitive geography behind textual production, a geography that led many process theorists once again to
inquire, after a period of neglect, into the nature of invention.
In shifting the balance of inquiry from the product to its production, advocates of process pedagogy inaugurated a veritable
renaissance in rhetorical invention. “It is no accident,” Richard
Young wrote in 1978, “that the gradual shift in attention among
rhetoricians from composed product to the composing process is
occurring at the same time as the reemergence of invention as a
rhetorical discipline” (33). Renewed interest in invention, Young
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explains, was heavily inﬂuenced by classical rhetoric, work in
linguistics, and research in mid-twentieth century cognitive psychology and creativity theory. These different inﬂuences led to
different and competing trajectories of inquiry into invention
during the ’60s and ’70s, including Corbett’s use of the classical
topoi, Young, Becker, and Pike’s development of tagmemic
rhetoric, and Rohman and Wlecke’s work on prewriting (Young
1978; for a more detailed account of competing theories of
invention, see Lauer 1984). These inﬂuences also led to different
heuristic procedures for teaching invention. Classical rhetoric
contributed the topics, which provided rhetors with strategies for
ﬁnding arguments; tagmemic rhetoric, developing from work in
linguistics, provided strategies for inquiring into a problem from
various perspectives and then formulating and solving it; and
prewriting, growing out of work in creativity theory and developmental psychology, provided strategies to stimulate the discovery
of ideas within writers through the use of journaling, meditation,
and thinking-via-association. While classical and tagmemic
rhetoric located invention for the most part externally in relation
to an audience, argument, or problem, prewriting located invention introspectively in relation to the writer. Yet despite their
different orientations, these theories and practices of invention
did what current-traditional rhetoric had not done—they
rendered invention accessible to inquiry, rendered it, that is, codiﬁable and teachable.
Rohman’s and Wlecke’s work on prewriting, referencing and
reinforcing entrenched post-Enlightenment concepts of authorship, has had the most enduring inﬂuence on process-based pedagogies of invention. To this day, composition teachers and
textbooks frequently refer to invention as prewriting and
promote introspective heuristics such as freewriting, mapping,
clustering, and brainstorming to help students discover and
generate subject matter about which they will consequently write.
These heuristics rightfully acknowledge and endorse writers as
agents of their invention, the ones who access, develop, and articulate (with or without the collaboration of others) desires and
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intentions. But alone, these heuristics do not account for the
complex relations of agency in which writers participate during
invention. Their use overlooks, for example, the extent to which
invention situates writers within what I, following Schryer (1994)
and Bazerman (2002), described in chapter 2 as genred sites of
action in which writers acquire, negotiate, and articulate desires
and intentions. Ironically, for example, teachers and textbooks
frequently overlook the fact that heuristics such as freewriting,
brainstorming, and clustering, far from “free,” are themselves discursive and ideological sites of action, genres that position writers
within situated commitments, relations, and subjectivities.2 By
texturing cognition in speciﬁc ways (both in the sense of locating
cognition within textual formations and in the sense of organizing or “texturing” cognition), these genres not only enable writers to acquire and articulate certain kinds of desires, but they also
enable writers to participate in as well as potentially resist the discursive relations and activities bound up in and deployed
through these desires. Agency gets enacted within these genred
sites of action, but, again, writers are not its only agents. When
composition pedagogies position writers as the primary or originating agents of invention, they deny writers access to the agency
in which they necessarily participate. In so doing, such pedagogies perpetuate what Howard, following LeFevre (1987), Crowley
(1990), and Lunsford and Ede (1994), calls the “normative
model of the inspired, autonomous author [which] so pervades
contemporary composition pedagogy that it even informs models for classroom collaboration” (1999, 57). This model is symptomatic (in the psychoanalytical sense of the term) of the enduring
attachments teachers have to the idea of invention as prewriting
and of writers as its originating agents.
In reclaiming invention as a teachable subject, thus, the
process movement shifted the focus of writing instruction from
the text and toward the writer. This shift from text to writer
resulted in the destabilization of the text, since the text became
treated as an ongoing production rather than as a freestanding
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product. The text now had a history that could be traced to its
writer’s mind and analyzed through the processes of its production. The process movement, hence, rejected the modernist stability of the new critical literary text as something somehow
already composed only to be interpreted and evaluated, and
embraced a view of the text as something contingent, something that is always in the process of being composed. Yet, for all
its challenges to the text as a ﬁxed, stable, and ﬁnal product, for
all its emphasis on revision, open-endedness, and recursivity,
the process movement remains a decidedly modernist practice
when it comes to its preservation of the writer as the self-possessed, identiﬁable agent of invention.3 The process movement
has left composition studies with an archeology and even a psychology of texts, but it has not equally provided a sociology of
texts that accounts as fully for their social and socializing presence, as recent work in post-process theory has argued (see
Kent 1999).
As a result, process-based theories of writing continue to posit
the writer as an “originating consciousness” from which invention begins (Crowley 1990, 16). Indeed, Karen Burke LeFevre
reﬂects, “composition theory and pedagogy in nineteenth and
twentieth century America have been founded on a Platonic
view of invention, one which assumes that the individual possesses innate knowledge or mental structures that are the chief
source of invention. According to this view, invention occurs
largely through introspective self-examination” (1987, 11). What
I ﬁnd curious about this concept of the writer is not so much
that it still dominates our cultural and pedagogical imaginary,
but that it remains as an assumption still shared by both currenttraditional and process pedagogies. In what follows, I would like
to consider brieﬂy why even more recent process-based theories
and practices of invention, despite having rejected so much of
the current-traditional practices that had informed their views,
continue, as John Genung did in 1892, to view invention as “a
work so individual, so dependent on the particular aptitude and
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direction of the writer’s mind, that each one must be left for the
most part to ﬁnd his way alone, according to the impulse that is
in him” (217).
T H E M O R E T H I N G S C H A N G E . . . : T H E D E AT H ( A N D
REBIRTH) OF INVENTION

By the time Genung wrote those words in the late nineteenth
century, invention had been pretty much exiled from the public realm of rhetoric and relegated to the private workings of
the writer’s mind. So much so, in fact, that by the middle of the
nineteenth century most composition and rhetoric textbooks
no longer even bothered to deal with it in any substantial way.
As Alexander Bain conﬁdently explains in his popular textbook, English Composition and Rhetoric (ﬁrst published in 1866),
“The direct bearing of the Rhetorical act is, of course, not
Invention, but Correctness; in other words, polish, elegance, or
reﬁnement” (1887,vii; my emphasis). The matter of fact way in
which Bain makes this claim suggests how prevalent this
assumption regarding rhetoric had become, but this assurance
masks the fact that the assumption was at most only a hundred
years old, largely a result, as I will explain in more detail shortly,
of eighteenth century empiricism. For over two thousand years
before that, invention was central to the rhetorical act.
Aristotle, as is well known, deﬁned rhetoric as the art of discovering the available means of persuasion in any given situation. Invention, as “the canon of classical rhetoric through
which arguments, or the substance of a message, are discovered
or devised” (C. Miller 1980, 243), was central to this art. As Scott
Consigny argues, “the art of rhetoric is thus a heuristic art, allowing the rhetor to discover real issues in indeterminate situations”
(1994, 63). To assist rhetors in discovering the available means
of persuasion, classical rhetoricians devised a series of topics
(topoi) or commonplaces to serve as heuristics to invention.
The topoi, as the etymology of the word suggests, were “places”
rhetors could go to locate the available means of persuasion for
a given situation. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between
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common and special topics. The former were invention strategies that could be used on any occasion—“depositories of general arguments that one could resort to when discussing virtually
any subject”—and included deﬁnition, comparison, relationship, circumstance, and testimony (Corbett 1990, 97, 133). The
latter were discourse-speciﬁc invention strategies “guiding the
rhetor to subject matter as evidence for different rhetorical situations” (Lauer 1996, 725). In his De Inventione, Cicero extended
Aristotle’s topics as inventional techniques to include even more
conceptual lines of discovering effective means of argumentation (Farrell 1996, 116). In their various manifestations, the
topoi were publicly available to language users, quite literally,
Sharon Crowley explains, “located in the participants’ current
or potential discourse” (1990, 68). As such, the topoi were part
of the collected wisdom of a community, based on shared
assumptions and communal knowledge, for locating one’s discourse, including lines of reasoning, types of evidence, and
appeals to audiences, within a social method of inquiry (Crowley
1990, 3, 68). To invent, to discover or formulate the available
means of persuasion, a rhetor had to turn to these socially
agreed upon topoi for guidance. Rhetors had to place themselves within these already existing rhetorical places.
Treating invention as an act so private as to be inaccessible and
unteachable or, at its most extreme, as an act that does not even
belong within the scope of rhetoric was very much a phenomenon that had its beginnings in eighteenth century empiricism—
the birth of modernism. It had to do with a momentous shift in
theories regarding the nature of knowledge, of epistemology—
where knowledge comes from and how it is produced. “In classical
epistemology,” Crowley explains, “wise persons were those who
had thought long and hard about the cultural assumptions that
inﬂuenced their lives and those of other persons. In turn, their
shared wisdom became part of communal knowledge. Knowledge
itself was always changing its shape, depending on who was doing
the knowing. Every act of knowing inﬂuenced the body of knowledge itself” (1990, 162). Classical epistemology thus proceeded
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deductively from a set of social assumptions, with rhetoric being a
discursive means of engaging in these assumptions and participating in the communal actions upon which they are predicated (the
enthymeme is a case in point). The topoi or commonplaces
enabled rhetors to gain access to this social knowledge, making
classical rhetoric, as Robert Connors explains, a “public discipline,
devoted to examining and arguing questions that could be shared
by all members of the polity” (1997, 298–99). Modern epistemology, however, privatized the locus of knowledge so that inquiry
proceeded inductively from external parts derived from sense
impressions to an internal whole derived through mental association.4 Such a privatized economy not only shifted the trajectory of
invention from an outwardly directed activity to an inwardly
directed activity, thereby placing invention outside the realm of
rhetoric and within the logical workings of the individual mind,
but as Howard, following M. Rose, explains, it also identiﬁed the
results of mental labor as the property of the individual that produced them (1999, 79–80).
Whereas classical epistemology saw rhetoric as a means of
socially participating in the shared knowledge of the polis, eighteenth century epistemology literally saw rhetoric as an afterthought, a means not of inventing ideas but of arranging them
logically and clearly so that they could be communicated (or
miscommunicated) to others (see Berlin 1987; Connors 1981;
Crowley 1990; C. Miller 1979; Murphy 1990). The shift from
invention to arrangement as the central focus of modern
rhetoric had far-reaching effects on the teaching of writing for
almost the next two hundred years, not to be seriously challenged until the early 1960s with the renaissance of classical
rhetoric and, as we discussed earlier, the emergence of the
process movement. The history of this modern rhetoric, what
came to be known as “current-traditional” rhetoric, and its
impact on the teaching of writing is by now well known to scholars in composition and rhetoric, and it is not necessary for me
to rehearse it here.5 Instead, I would like to explore in more
detail why this modernist emphasis on the individual mind as
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the locus of knowledge came to privatize the study and teaching
of rhetorical invention to this day.
If one assumes that individuals accumulate knowledge empirically through experience, rational investigation, and research,
and if one also assumes that reason is self-evident, then there is
little need to teach invention since, on the one hand, writers
either possess knowledge or they do not and, on the other hand,
there is no need for writers to discover strategies for persuasion.
Instead, the teaching of rhetoric involves helping the individual
arrange already formulated ideas so that they can be communicated accurately to others. In his inﬂuential Lectures on Rhetoric
and Belles Lettres (ﬁrst published in 1783), for example, Hugh
Blair rejected classical invention altogether by arguing that rational investigation, rather than rhetorical inquiry, would lead to
the shaping of arguments (Crowley 1990, 11). “In a single
stroke,” Crowley claims, “Blair placed the entire process of invention beyond the province of rhetorical study, arguing that the art
of rhetoric can only teach people how to manage the arguments
they have discovered by other [more empirical] means” (11).
Such a privatized notion of invention held “the quality of an
author’s mind solely to account for the quality of his discursive
intentions” (Crowley 1990, 54). After all, as Samuel Newman
observed in his Practical System of Rhetoric (ﬁrst published in
1827), “the store-house of the mind must be well ﬁlled; and [a
rhetor] must have that command over his treasures, which will
enable him to bring forward, whenever the occasion may
require, what has here been accumulated for future use” (1838,
16–17; my emphasis). In this formulation, ideas and intentions
not only reside pre-rhetorically within a writer’s mind, but, as
suggested by the word “treasures,” they are also a form of capital
that a writer owns. It is not surprising, then, that by 1892 John
Genung can describe invention as an act so individual, “so
dependent on the peculiar aptitude and direction of the writer’s
mind,” that writers must be left to invent alone. Equally not surprising is the move, toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, to abandon the teaching of invention altogether, since
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invention was so introspective, so individual, that it could not be
taught. A. S. Hill, the Boylston Chair of Rhetoric at Harvard
from 1876 to 1904—the time during which some of the earliest
ﬁrst-year writing courses were being developed (see Berlin
1987)—placed invention out of the reach of rhetoric when he
proclaimed in his extremely popular textbook, Principles of
Rhetoric and Their Ampliﬁcation (1878), that rhetoric “does not
undertake to furnish a person with something to say”; it “shows
how to convey from one mind to another the results of observation, discovery, or classiﬁcation” (iv). It was in this context that
the ﬁrst-year writing course emerged as an institutional reality, a
context that saw rhetoric as product replace rhetoric as production, signaling not only the privatization of invention, but also
the diminishment of rhetoric as an epistemic process.
Today, our teaching of invention remains so invested in a
private economy of the writer as a self-possessed agent that we forget that it was this very invention of the writer as self-possessed
agent that led to the diminishment of rhetorical invention in the
ﬁrst place. So many of our contemporary perceptions of invention assume the writer as its starting point that the way we understand and teach invention today is premised on an epistemology
that has well nigh destroyed it. Even by the 1960s when the
process movement in composition studies tipped the rhetorical
balance from product back to production and hence rescued
invention by once again giving it a central role in the teaching of
writing, it maintained the partial view of the writer as the primary
agent of invention rather than as an agent who participates within
a larger discursive and ideological agency. Yet whereas currenttraditional rhetorics dismissed it as unteachable because inherent, process-based rhetorics recognized invention as generative
(as the stage of the writing process in which writers construct
knowledge rather than recall it), and developed a range of strategies for helping writers, alone or in collaboration with others, to
learn through writing. In so doing, the process movement deﬁned
the writer’s growth as the subject of writing instruction.
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D. Gordon Rohman and Albert O. Wlecke’s 1964 federally
funded research project on “prewriting” reveals this focus on
the writer’s development as the subject matter of writing
instruction. As Rohman deﬁnes it in his 1965 article, “PreWriting: The Stage of Discovery in the Writing Process,”
prewriting is all that happens before the point at which the
“‘writing idea’ is ready for the words on the page” (1994, 41)—
that is, before arrangement. Prewriting has been neglected,
Rohman argues, because it exists “within the mind and [is] consequently hidden,” yet it marks a formative stage in the writing
process (42). It is formative because it shapes thinking, which
Rohman describes as
that activity of mind which brings forth and develops ideas, plans,
designs, not merely the entrance of an idea into one’s mind; an
active, not a passive enlistment in the “cause” of an idea; conceiving,
which includes consecutive logical thinking but much more
besides; essentially the imposition of pattern upon experience. (41)

Here we recognize many of the assumptions that guide the
process movement, the most signiﬁcant of which is that far
from being simple mental reﬂections of the external world, our
ideas actually emerge as we organize and impose a pattern
upon them. Teachers of writing were encouraged to nurture
this process through such heuristic techniques as journal writing, meditation, and analogy.
Rohman describes prewriting as an introspective process of
invention located within writers and meant to help writers express
their experiences to themselves both before and while they communicate them to others. Such a view of invention presupposes a
concept of the writer as a self-contained sphere of agency, “one,”
Rohman tells us, “who stands at the center of his own thoughts
and feelings with the sense that they belong to him” (43).
Contemporary practices of invention that encourage the use of
prewriting heuristics such as freewriting, brainstorming, and clustering inherit the concept of the writer that informs them. Unlike
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the classical topoi, which were publicly available rhetorical strategies, these introspective heuristics assume that an individual possesses a priori topics “inherently there, waiting to be mined”
(Ohmann 1976, 150). To “unlock discovery,” for example,
Rohman recommends the use of meditation as a heuristic. He
advises students “to compose a ‘place’ for your subject, one where
you can live. Keep composing until you reach the point that your
understanding of your ‘subject’ is experienced within, until, in
other words, the ‘event’ of your subject happening to you becomes
an experience happening within you” (46; my emphasis).
This advice marks a major turning point in invention theory,
for it signals the rebirth of invention in composition. Rohman not
only rejects current-traditional, product-based theories of writing,
but he also rescues invention as the central canon of rhetoric. Yet
his work maintains a privatized economy of invention as a “place”
writers foster within themselves rather than as social “places”
(topoi) to which writers turn in order to orient themselves within
social methods of inquiry, as classical and tagmemic rhetoric had
described. In a way that classical and tagmemic rhetoric could not,
Rohman and Wlecke’s work on prewriting gained credibility in
part because it referenced and conﬁrmed deeply held beliefs
about authorship, beliefs that had been gaining momentum since
the late eighteenth century as a result of copyright laws, Romantic
theories of originality, literary assumptions about authorship, the
inﬂuence of the printing press, and Enlightenment privatization
of knowledge (LeFevre 1987; M. Rose 1993; Woodmansee and
Jaszi 1994). Not only did Rohman and Wlecke’s work draw on
such beliefs; it also supported them by turning to contemporary
work in creativity research, which was emerging as a subdiscipline
of cognitive psychology at about the same time as the process
movement was emerging.
I N V E N T I O N A N D / A S C R E AT I V I T Y

Rohman and Wlecke’s research was heavily inﬂuenced by
mid-twentieth century developmental psychology and creativity
theory. Like their contemporary Janet Emig, they drew from
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Brewster Ghiselin’s collection of essays on creativity, The Creative
Process (1952) and The Paris Interviews: Writers at Work, which
began to be published in 1958; as well as Jerome Bruner’s work
on cognition and discovery published in the early 1960s
(Crowley 1998, 195; Schreiner 1997, 88). In “The Uses of the
Unconscious in Composing” (1964), for instance, Emig turns to
the testimony and advice of artists in order to understand writing processes, claiming that contemporary textbooks rarely
acknowledge “that writing involves commerce with the unconscious self and that because it does, it is often a sloppy and inefﬁcient procedure for even the most disciplined and longwriting
of professional authors” (7). Seven years later, in The Composing
Processes of Twelfth Graders, Emig once again takes writing textbooks to task for encouraging students to use externally
schematized sources such as topics for invention when they
should focus more on a writer’s personality and feelings, in
short, a writer’s psychology (1971, 16). It is not surprising, then,
to ﬁnd Emig beginning The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders
with a review of contemporary theories of literary creativity,
including Joseph Wallas’s four stages of creativity: preparation,
incubation, illumination, and veriﬁcation (17–19). Indeed, as
Steven Schreiner has argued, Emig’s work on composing, work
that was to have such a profound inﬂuence on process theories
and pedagogies, was predicated on a view of literary creation
and authorship, one built on the assumption that writing
reﬂects and serves the needs of its writer, who is also its primary
agent (1997, 87, 100–102).
In identifying the writer as the point of departure for writing,
Rohman and Wlecke’s and Emig’s work drew on the work of
creativity researchers who were beginning to investigate how
ideas, particularly novel ideas, are created in the mind. Such
research was based on the assumption that the mind does not
only combine what it takes in through sense impressions, but
can also invent something valuable and new (Feldman et al.
1994, 1). Because creativity theorists were beginning to focus on
the cognitive processes involved in creative production, and
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because the process movement in composition developed in
part out of such research, we can learn a great deal about
process-based theories of invention by turning to work in creativity theory, so I will brieﬂy turn to it now. As I will argue, however,
while such work helped describe the complex cognitive
processes involved when writers invent, and encouraged writing
teachers to treat student writers as agents of their own writing
and to respect their writing choices in ways that greatly
enhanced the teaching of writing, it nonetheless presented a
partial view of this process by focusing on the writer as selfcontained agent of invention rather than on the larger sphere of
agency in which the writer as agent participates.
In Changing the World: A Framework for the Study of Creativity,
Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner describe how, since the
1950s, modern creativity research, as a branch of cognitive
science, has attempted to locate and describe the various cognitive traits creative individuals might possess (1994, 4), hence
books such as Ghiselin’s The Creative Process and The Paris
Interviews which encourage creative individuals to describe such
activities as their work habits, personality traits, and psychological
states while composing.6 Once observed, these traits could then
be presumably taught to others. (Cognitive research into student
writers’ composing strategies is very much predicated on this
mode of inquiry.) By the 1970s, Feldman et al. explain, creativity
research became more specialized, focusing not on general
cognitive traits but rather on the nature and development of
creative thinking in speciﬁc ﬁelds or disciplines (12–15). And yet,
the focus of research, while more domain speciﬁc, continued to
be on the cognitive processes of the individual involved in
creative thinking. For example, in The Emerging Goddess (1979),
Albert Rothenberg locates creativity in a “form of cognition” he
calls “janusian” thinking, a way of conceiving “opposing or antithetical ideas, images, or concepts . . . as existing side by side and
operating simultaneously” (138, 139–40). In a suggestive statement, one which in many ways reﬂects the goals of the process
movement, Rothenberg argues that his primary concern “is not
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with whether the ﬁnal [creative] product does or does not conform to objectively veriﬁable reality, intrinsic reality, or to any
other metaphysical criteria for truth, but with the thought processes
responsible for the creation of that product” (139; my emphasis).
Silvano Arieti’s inﬂuential book, Creativity: The Magic Synthesis
(1976), also focuses on the thought processes involved in
creativity. Even though at the end of the book Arieti does admit
the need for what he calls a “creativogenic society,” one which
provides the appropriate conditions for creative persons to
achieve their potential (312–25), his focus is ultimately on the
cognitive and precognitive stages of creative development as
they are seemingly abstracted from the forms of social organization that organize and generate cognition. For example, he
begins by taking recent creativity theories to task for neglecting
the unconscious thought processes that account for the “birth”
of ideas (20) and then calls for a more thorough use of what he
calls a “deep psychology” in creativity study (34).
This deep psychology traces the creative process back to
what Arieti calls its conceptual, primitive, and amorphous
stages, each respective stage reaching further back into the
private recesses of the mind. Arieti describes the origins of the
creative process as based in an individual’s “amorphous cognition,” which is not expressed in images, words, or even
thoughts, but instead as a form of preconscious cognition he
calls an “endocept.” The endocept alone does not mean anything, not even to the individual in whom it occurs. Within the
individual, it just feels like an inspiration that is incubating. In
order for the endocept to become manifested in any way, it
must ﬁrst be transformed into a concept that is meaningful to
its host, the individual, and then to others, the culture. This
occurs through the primary and secondary processes. Primary
processes are a form of “primitive cognition” in which what is
formless first enters the world of conscious signification, of
words and ideas. It is at this point that the endocept becomes
recognizable to its host and only to its host, since primitive cognition, while conscious, is very illogical. For example, primitive

66

GENRE AND THE INVENTION OF THE WRITER

cognition will identify and group objects according to whim,
perception, or feeling, not according to any kind of culturally
accepted systemic logic, classes, species, or categories. It is
imagination running freely, moving unpredictably through
metaphor and simile without being subjected to critical or evaluative judgments.
As Arieti warns, however, primitive cognition cannot be
allowed to dominate the creative process. In fact, the very reason
that lunatics or schizophrenics are generally not considered
creative is because they do not progress from the primary to the
secondary processes, and so have no means of socially forming
or conceptualizing their imaginations. During the secondary
processes, then, conceptual cognition dominates. As Arieti
explains, conceptual cognition evaluates primitive cognition; it
either afﬁrms or denies the formulations of the primary
processes. At this conceptual stage, the individual begins to consider how best to represent his or her primitive cognition to others, how, that is, to make it public through the use of already
existing formal and rhetorical conventions such as appropriate
syntactic and semantic rules, literary techniques, and genres.
According to Arieti, social conventions factor late in the cognitive processes. They allow creative individuals to synthesize
and develop what they have already nurtured privately through
endoceptual and primary cognitive processes. Still, this view
ignores the extent to which cognition evolves not from the private to the social but is rather formed throughout life in organized linguistic interactions. Vygotsky (1986) offers a way to
understand cognition in relation to, rather than as a precondition of, social action. Bazerman, for example, describes how,
“from a Vygotskian perspective, the mediating communicative
patterns [of various ﬁelds and activities] are tools both for
action and cognition, or cognition in relation to action” (1997a,
305). As we learn patterns of action and interaction, we also
acquire and practice related patterns of cognition that organize
and generate these actions and interactions. Drawing on work
in distributed cognition and activity theory, Freedman and
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Smart describe how, “within speciﬁc activities, thinking, knowing, and learning are distributed among co-participants, as well
as mediated through the cultural artifacts in place—artifacts
that include semiotic, technological, and organizational structures” (1997, 240). Without denying that preconscious and
libidinal structures exert a force of their own on individuals’
cognitive development and attachments, we can also recognize
that these structures are elicited by and operate in inescapable
relation to ideological structures (Alcorn 2002, 25).
Consciousness is an ongoing, dynamic social and discursive
accomplishment.
In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By
(1980) we see a way in which Arieti’s cognitive processes might be
recast in more thoroughly dynamic and social ways. Investigating
how individuals learn and use metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson
argue that, far from being hardwired into and stemming from our
preconscious cognition, metaphors are actually social concepts we
learn as part of our social and linguistic development. As already
existing social conventions, metaphors structure the ways individuals conceptualize reality. For example, Lakoff and Johnson
describe how a conceptual metaphor that we in contemporary
Western culture live by, “argument is war,” structures the way we
experience and enact arguments. The resulting metaphors we
create to describe how we argue—in fact, the way we actually
argue—do not stem from some endoceptual, precoginitive
process but from this larger conceptual metaphor we have available to us, so that, for instance, we might say, “He shot down all
my arguments,” or “If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out”
(4). The way that we re-cognize argument and describe it
metaphorically is thus coordinated by our overarching cultural
metaphors. Likewise, the conceptual metaphor “time is money,”
so prevalent a part of how we culturally talk and write about time,
structures the various metaphorical ways we are able to conceptualize and experience time, even at the level of “primitive” cognition, since such a metaphor seeps into our most private, most
intuitive understanding of what time is.
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Process-based views of invention, informed by work in creativity theory such as Arieti’s and by Jerome Bruner’s work on
cognition and discovery, largely continue to imagine the inventing writer as a cognitive free agent. While overlooking the systems of linguistic and social interaction that necessarily inform
even early-stage cognitive processes, such a view of the writer
has nonetheless helped writing teachers productively acknowledge and encourage the writer’s agency. It has helped make the
writer a more active and conscious participant in the writing
process, one who makes decisions, shapes meaning and reformulates it while writing, and performs different activities at different stages of writing. But by focusing mainly on the writer as
the agent of his or her cognitive processes, the writing process
movement has provided only a partial view of invention. While
the writer is certainly an agent of writing, to locate him or her as
the prime agent is to ignore the agency that is already at work
on the writer as he or she makes decisions, shapes meaning,
and reformulates it. So while the writer may be the most visible
agent of his or her writing processes, these processes take place
within and against a larger sphere of agency that shapes them.
To describe how these larger spheres of agency affect how and
why writers invent, I will now turn brieﬂy to work in composition studies that examines invention as a situated activity.
Looking in particular at Karen Burke LeFevre’s inﬂuential
Invention as a Social Act, I will ﬁrst describe how social views of
invention locate writers within spheres of activity and then,
turning to work in genre theory, I show how genres can give
teachers, students, and researchers of writing speciﬁc access to
these spheres of activities that build on and add to our understanding and teaching of invention.
INVENTION AS A SOCIAL ACT

LeFevre’s Invention as a Social Act was one of several important
books published in the late 1980s and early 1990s to challenge
the dominant assumption “that invention is the private, asocial
act of a writer for the purpose of producing a text” (LeFevre 1987,
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13). For example, Brodkey (1987) challenged the modernist view
of the writer in composition; S. Miller (1989, 1991) identiﬁed the
writer as a textual subject; Cooper (1989) described an ecological
view of writing; Ede and Lunsford (1990) demonstrated how writers are never alone when they write; Crowley (1990) traced the
privatization of invention in current-traditional rhetoric; and
Faigley (1992) showed how postmodernist theories could inform
notions of subjectivity in composition. More recently, Howard
(1999) has examined how dominant notions of authorship continue to inform attitudes about plagiarism, and Halasek (1999)
provides ways of thinking about writing from a dialogic perspective. This genealogy of work has helped identify and describe the
systems of language, culture, and interpersonal and intertextual
relations in which writers and writing take place, a larger system
of agency in which the writer as agent participates.
Drawing on the work of Richard Young and Janice Lauer, for
example, LeFevre argues that invention is thoroughly a social
act, “ﬁrst, an act that is generally initiated by an inventor (or
rhetor) and brought to completion by an audience; and second, an act that involves symbolic activities such as speaking or
writing and often extends over time through a series of social
transactions and texts” (LeFevre 1987, 38). As LeFevre explains,
this deﬁnition of invention is predicated on the following
assumptions: that the inventing “self” is both socially inﬂuenced
and socially constituted; that the language or other symbol systems individuals use to invent are communal, “socially created
and shared by members of a discourse community”; that invention is more a continuative than an originative activity, built on
already existing foundations of knowledge; that invention
involves an interaction with others, whether through internal
dialogue with real or imagined others, or through the actual
participation of others such as collaborators, editors, critics,
mentors, and patrons; and, ﬁnally, that invention is shaped and
enabled by social collectives (institutions, bureaucracies, governments, paradigms, etc.) which structure the ideological
boundaries not only of what inventing individuals assume to be
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knowable, doable, and possible, but also of how an invention
comes to be received and evaluated by others (33–35).
According to LeFevre, invention includes not only how we discover and develop ideas, but also how we inquire into them in the
ﬁrst place, because invention involves the use of symbolic systems
such as language. Following Ernst Cassirer, LeFevre argues that
language does not mirror or copy an external reality; it helps constitute that reality (111). We come to know and understand the
world around us by way of the language we have available to us,
since language is a symbolic system that mediates between us and
a reality out there. Invention, therefore, is not only social because
it almost always involves more than one person, real or imagined;
it is also social because it involves the use of language, which
immediately connects even the most solitary inventor with others
in a symbolic social collective. Even one’s most private inquiry is
ultimately social because it involves the use of language.
LeFevre’s Invention as a Social Act, along with the work that it
followed and the work that continues to follow it, helps teachers
and researchers of writing recognize that there is more at work
on invention than just the writer. There is a writer’s social context, made up not only of others who help and hinder invention,
but also of social collectives, “supra-individual entit[ies] whose
rules and conventions may enable or inhibit the invention of certain ideas” (LeFevre, 80). These collectives, LeFevre explains,
powerfully “serve to transmit expectations and prohibitions,
encouraging or discouraging certain ideas, areas of investigation,
methods of inquiry, types of evidence, and rhetorical forms”
(34–35). When Frank D’Angelo, therefore, advises students to
invent by reaching “into the recesses of your mind [and spinning] out of yourself a thread of thought that will develop into an
orderly web” (1980, 34), he is overlooking the ideological and
discursive formations that are already institutionally in place
before the student has begun to write and that organize the student’s cognition in textured ways. These formations include such
genres as freewriting and clustering. In fact, D’Angelo’s own
metaphor breaks down when we realize that a web can never be a
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freestanding structure. Rather, it takes its shape in relation to its
surroundings, so that whatever web a student spins (through his
or her own agency) must take shape within an already existing
social web (which gives shape to and motivates his or her
agency). These social webs, informed by and articulated in language, comprise the social collectives within which individuals
function. Their presence complicates our partial understandings
of the writer as the primary agent of his or her desires by reminding us that desires are informed textually, ideologically, and materially. The work of LeFevre, S. Miller, Ede and Lunsford, Cooper,
Howard, and others in composition studies has contributed
mightily to our understanding of how writers participate within
social, interpersonal, and textual formations.7
At the end of Invention as a Social Act, LeFevre calls for continued inquiry into “the ecology of invention—the ways ideas arise
and are nurtured or hindered by interaction with social context
and culture” (126; my emphasis). In the years since, scholars
have taken up this call by examining the interpersonal, textual,
material, and ideological nature of this ecology. In the remainder of this book, I build on and add to their work by turning to
genre theory, which both recognizes and gives teachers, students, and researchers speciﬁc access to the dynamic relations
and interplay of agency at work within textured spheres of activity. As I described them in chapter 2, genres are sites of action
which locate writers within speciﬁc relations, practices, commitments, and subjectivities. Within such discursive ecologies, writers not only acquire and articulate speciﬁc desires, but they also
participate in, resist, and enact the relations and activities
bound up in and deployed through these desires. To identify
genres as sites of action is also to identify them as sites of invention. As I hope the following example will begin to demonstrate, treating genres as such sites allows us to interrogate
analytically how writers position themselves, consciously and
unconsciously, within desires to act as well as how they articulate
and fulﬁll these desires as bounded, recognizable, meaningful,
and consequential actions. In giving teachers, students, and
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researchers access to the ecology of invention, genres can provide a richer account of agency as well as a more useful means
for describing and teaching invention in composition.
GENRE AS SITE OF INVENTION: THE EXAMPLE OF
D . H . L AW R E N C E

As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, genres are
indeed ecological. As rhetorical ecosystems, genres help
communicants recognize, act within, and reproduce recurring
situations. They rhetorically delimit the ways we conceptualize
our environments by “identifying a repertoire of possible actions”
as well as the possible intentions and identities we may assume
within those environments (Bazerman 1994a, 82). As such, it is
perhaps more accurate to say that invention does not so much
begin in the writer or even in some abstract social collective as it
begins when a writer locates himself or herself within the discursive and ideological formation of a genre and its system of related
genres. This is the case even when we are dealing with a literary
“author” who is ostensibly writing about “personal” experiences.
As the following example of D. H. Lawrence suggests, even those
writers whom we popularly designate as geniuses, whose work
seemingly emerges from some inspired and mysterious depth,
are actually constituted by the genres in which they write. The
literary genre Lawrence uses to explore and communicate his
“private” experiences in part shapes and enables how he invents
these experiences, so that the genre he turns to in order to
invent ends up simultaneously inventing him.
It is well known that Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers is an autobiographical novel, a Künstlerroman. It is perhaps less known that
Lawrence also wrote a number of autobiographical poems at
the same time as he was writing Sons and Lovers. In both the
novel and the poems, Lawrence grapples with similar issues, in
particular his relationship to his mother, whom he names “Mrs.
Morel” in the novel (he names himself “Paul”) and “She” in the
poems. Yet in each genre, a very different experience of the
relationship emerges. In the novel, for example, Lawrence’s
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father, Mr. Morel, is an imposing, interfering presence who in
many ways represents the realism of the world that Paul is trying
to avoid. Mr. Morel is an unavoidable function of the novel. It is
in part his presence in the novel that precludes Lawrence from
describing the mythic, idealized relationship with his mother
that appears in the poems.
Part of the mythic, idealized relationship between Lawrence
and his mother that is described in the poems can be ascribed to
the absence of Lawrence’s father from the poems. There is no
counterpart to the Mr. Morel ﬁgure in the poems. Gone is the
interfering, ugly, destructive force that Mr. Morel embodies in the
eyes of Paul and his mother. In the poems, there is no drunk
father, no coal dirt, no ﬁghting, no ﬁnancial troubles, no selfconscious Paul, no aggressive Mrs. Morel. Instead of Paul and
Mrs. Morel there is “I” and “She.” This rhetorical shift from
proper nouns to personal pronouns transforms the speciﬁc to the
universal. It takes a very real, context-speciﬁc relationship and
makes it a timeless, almost mythic, relationship. “She” is no longer
bound by name to a physical, identiﬁable being; no longer particularized by dialogue and title as wife to Mr. Morel, mother to Paul,
William, Annie, and Arthur; no longer speciﬁed by her place in
Bestwood, Nottingham, and so on. “She” becomes the essence of
mother, lover, virginity, beauty, inspiration, as in the poem “The
Bride,” in which even on her deathbed, she is a beautiful bride:
She looks like a young maiden, since her brow
Is smooth and fair;
Her cheeks are very smooth, her eyes are closed,
She sleeps a rare,
Still, winsome sleep so still, and so composed.
Nay, but she sleeps like a bride, and dreams her dreams
Of perfect things.
She lies at last, the darling, in the shape of her dream,
And her dead mouth sings
By its shape, like thrushes in clear evenings. (1977, 464–65)
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The poem provides a useful and telling contrast to the way
Lawrence describes Mrs. Morel’s death in the novel, which
seems to resist such idealizations. Here is Mrs. Morel on her
deathbed in Sons and Lovers:
[Paul] heard a cart clanking down the street. Yes, it was seven
o’clock, and it was coming a little bit light. He heard some people
calling. The world was waking. A grey, deathly dawn crept over the
snow. Yes, he could see the houses. He put out the gas. It seemed
very dark. The breathing came still, but he was almost used to it.
(1977, 397; my emphasis)

What is striking about this scene is its materiality. Mrs. Morel’s
march towards death is not accompanied by her “dead mouth”
singing “like thrushes in clear evenings” as it was in “The Bride.”
Her death is not singular as it is in the poem, but rather takes
place while a cart clanks beneath her window and people are
heard calling to each other. Through the narrator, Lawrence
seems aware that, indeed, the world was waking, and, quite
frankly, getting on with its business. In addition, the bride-like
face of the dying mother in the poem is replaced in the novel
with a very different face: “She lay with her cheek in her hand,
her mouth fallen open, and the great, ghastly snores came and
went” (398). What is it that accounts for this difference between
thrushes singing and ghastly snores? It is at least plausible to say
that the genre Lawrence chooses in part organizes and generates not only how he perceives signiﬁcant events in his life, but
also how he invents them.
Not dependent on the detail, dialogue, characters, and narrator in the same way as the novelist, the poet D. H. Lawrence can
universalize his personal experience, transcending proper names,
time, and place. This universalizing quality of poetry allows
Lawrence to remember his mother not as a snoring, decrepit old
woman, but as the great mother/lover—the eternal beauty and
essence of woman. Poetry does this by not insisting on a strictly
linear ordering of time. As such, Lawrence can reconstruct the
image of his mother without sacriﬁcing, as he would in the novel,
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the unity of the plot. Poetry allows for a greater degree of abstraction. It rhetorically allows Lawrence to abstract his mother from
the conditions that deﬁne her in the novel, so that she becomes
husbandless and virginal. Lawrence writes:
Now come west, come home,
Women I’ve loved for gentleness,
For the virginal you.
Find the way now that you never could ﬁnd in life,
So I told you to die. (476)

She dies, it seems, so she could be reinvented into Lawrence’s
poetry.
Ian Watt, however, argues that the early novel resists such
idealizations because of its realist orientation (1983). As a genre,
the novel emerged as a rejection of universals, driven by a desire
to record a seemingly naturalistic account of the “real” behavior
of “real” people. This desired ﬁdelity to human experience
forced a collapse between interiority and exteriority, between
the external material world and the internal psychological
worlds of the people who inhabit it. Such a collapse implied that
the characters within novels are bound to a particular time and
place. Not only, for example, are individuals deﬁned by time,
especially past time, but they are also deﬁned by their environment. In short, the nineteenth century novel is realistic because
it embodies a circumstantial view of life, situating individuals
both temporally and physically.
It is in its rejection of neoclassical universals and absolutes and
its privileging of individual experience and perception that the
nineteenth century novel resists idealizations. This is the genred
orientation and commitment that Lawrence positions himself
within. Any desire on the part of Lawrence to idealize his mother
in Sons and Lovers is repressed by the novel’s generic orientations
and commitments, of which Mr. Morel is a part. Lawrence, for
example, cannot ignore the fact that Mrs. Morel has a husband,
that this husband works in the mines, drinks, and, in general,
does not live up to her expectations. As one more personality in a
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cast of characters, all inﬂuenced by their time and place, Mrs.
Morel cannot be abstracted from her conditions. If Lawrence
decontextualizes her, she will lose her identity in the world of the
novel. Because the novel as a genre requires a certain ﬁdelity to
the human experience in all its complexity, because, that is, the
“realistic” novel’s generic conventions demand that characters be
situated, named beings who engage in speciﬁc dialogue,
Lawrence, if he is to successfully write within this genre, must decenter, or, better yet, demythologize his perception of his
mother. That is, he must invent her differently.
There is something to be learned about invention from this
example, in particular, something about why and how writers
acquire and articulate desires and intentions as they participate
in genred sites of action, whether in literary representations or,
as we will see in the next chapter, in actual social practices and
relations. Positing genre in addition to the writer as the locus of
invention suggests that invention is not only a process of introspection but also a process of socialization, a process of positioning oneself within and managing one’s way through a set of
relations, commitments, practices, and subjectivities. In this
case, the genres within which Lawrence chooses to write (and
this choice is not as free as it seems, as we will see in the next
chapter) become very much akin to situated topoi or commonplaces—socio-rhetorical sites and strategies of action—within
which he locates and invents his “autobiography.”8 Each genre,
then, represents a different topic or commonplace, a situated
and typiﬁed way of rhetorically organizing, conceptualizing,
relating to, and acting in our real or imagined environments.
When Lawrence begins to think about writing his autobiography
in a certain genre, he enters into that genre’s discursive and ideological space, including what Bazerman calls its “repertoire of
possible actions” (1994a, 82), and so is in part habituated to
experience and narrate his life story in ways made possible by
the genre’s rhetorical conventions. In such a way is a writer a
double agent, an agent of his or her actions as well as an agent
on behalf of already existing social actions. By extending the
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sphere of agency in this way, we acknowledge that the writer participates in this agency, but is not its sole agent.
Obviously, there is much that could account for why
Lawrence’s intentions differ in the novel and the poems, including his working through of libidinal desires. However, I just do
not think we can understand these intentions and desires independently of the genred discursive and ideological formations
within which they are generated and operate. The genres
Lawrence uses to articulate his experiences also locate him in
positions of articulation. As the sites or topoi within which he
invents, the genres both habituate Lawrence within a social
motive and provide him with the rhetorical conventions for
enacting that motive as invention. We need to pay more speciﬁc
attention to the situated discursive conditions within and against
which communication and communicators take place and are
made possible—the conditions that prompt us to invent. Genres
provide access to and help us to understand and describe these
conditions, since genres do not just ideologically structure the
way individuals conceptualize situations; they also provide individuals with the discursive means for acting within situations, so
that genres maintain the social motives which individuals interpret and enact as intentions. In the next two chapters, I will
describe how genres function as textured sites or topoi of invention that rhetorically maintain the social motives that shape and
enable writers’ intentions—maintain, that is, the desires they
help writers fulﬁll. In the ﬁnal chapter, I will argue for a pedagogy that makes visible and teaches students how to access these
genred sites of action so that they can participate more critically
and effectively as agents within this agency.

4
CONSTRUCTING DESIRE
Genre and the Invention of Writing Subjects
[P]erforming a genre concerns a joint agreement to
perform certain positionalities within an institutional
regime—to “be” or “become” certain kinds of subjects.
Crucial to “becoming” is the notion that the “self” that
writes or reads is assembled at the site of utterance, is
the point of convergence of a range of possible subject
positions brought into being at any particular historical
moment for the achievement of a social action.
G I L L I A N F U L L E R and A L I S O N L E E ,
“Assembling a Generic Subject”
A boundary is not that at which something stops but . . .
the boundary is that from which something begins its
presencing.
M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R , “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”

We cannot understand genres as sites of action without also
understanding them as sites of subject formation, sites, that is,
which produce subjects who desire to act in certain ideological
and discursive ways. Genres are deﬁned as much by the actions
they help individuals perform as by the desires and subjectivities
they help organize, which generate such performances. For
example, the genres D. H. Lawrence writes in not only help him
organize and articulate different desires, especially in relation to
his mother; they also, as the Latin root of the word genre suggests,
help generate these different desires to enact that relationship.
In this way, genres are sites of action as well as sites of invention,
topoi in which invention takes place.
To offer that genres maintain and elicit the desires that they
help writers to fulﬁll, however, is not to suggest that writers are
simply the effects of genres. As Fuller and Lee point out, the
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subject produced at the generic site of utterance is a “convergence of a range of subject positions” (2002, 215), each presumably with its own ideological and libidinal attachments and
defenses. Although part of the work that genres perform is to
assemble and recruit a particular subject position for the
achievement of a particular social action, this assemblage does
not and cannot entirely evict the multiple, sometimes competing, commitments that converge at this site of articulation.
Certainly, some genres enforce their subjects more powerfully
than others, but this subject formation is nonetheless a negotiated stance. As Robert Brooke and Dale Jacobs observe, “we’re
endlessly in negotiation with the internal structures of the ideas
we’re building and the external structures that come from what
we know of [a particular] genre. In the process of this negotiation, our ideas are transforming themselves. So are the ways we
think of ourselves as writers, the roles we use to describe ourselves” (1997, 216). This negotiation, which also includes the
relationship between a writer’s material, local conditions, and
the genre’s ideological and discursive demands, accounts in
part both for how and why writers resist and transform genres
and for textual variations within genres, as I will discuss later in
the chapter. After all, no two texts within a genre are exactly
alike. Each textual instantiation of a genre is a result of a
unique negotiation between the agency of a writer and the
agency of a genre’s conditions of production. Because of this
ongoing negotiation, generic conventions always exert inﬂuence over but do not completely determine how writers think
and act because these conventions rhetorically maintain larger
social motives (predispositions or desires to act) which writers
acquire, negotiate, and articulate when they write. It is within
the discursive and ideological space of genre—which I will later
describe as the intersection between a writer’s intentions and
the genre’s social motives—where agency resides. In this chapter, I examine this intersection in order to demonstrate how
agency involves both the performance of an action as well as
the construction of the desires that elicit such performance—in
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short, the processes by which writers are articulated by the very
genres they use to articulate themselves, their commitments,
relations, and social practices. Looking at several examples, I
analyze how genres situate writers within such positions of
articulation.1
GENRES AS RHETORICAL ECOSYSTEMS

Human beings are rhetorical beings. We are not only different
from other animals because of our capacity to use language as
symbolic action or because we can use language to express ourselves in rhetorical ways; more signiﬁcantly, we use language to
construct rhetorical environments in which we exist, interact with
one another, and enact social practices. We are constantly in the
process of shaping our environments as we communicate within
them, speaking and writing our realities and ourselves. Within
these rhetorical constructs, we assume different subjectivities and
relations, and we perform different activities as we negotiate our
way from one environment to the next, often balancing multiple,
even contradictory, subjectivities and activities at the same time.
While on a visit to Florida a couple of years ago, I was struck by
the extent to which this is the case. Seemingly everywhere, the
geography of Florida is rhetorically demarcated by such slogans
as “the real Florida” or billboards that promise real estate that
allows one to “experience the wild in your backyard.” These slogans and billboards ironically stand interspersed between billboards advertising the staged realities of Disney’s Epcot Center
and Universal Studios. Marking Florida’s highways, these signs
appear to be engaged in a rhetorical argument with one another:
the “real” Florida versus the “tourist” Florida. But this binary does
not hold. The “real” Florida is as much a rhetorical formation as
is the “tourist” Florida. That is, Epcot is as complex and dynamic
a discursive and ideological site as any wilderness-designated
area; one is no less “artiﬁcial” than the other. Both are rhetorical
demarcations—ways we organize, conceptualize, and participate
within these formations—and both are at work in constructing
the narrative of what we mean when we say what Florida “is.”2
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Anthony Petruzzi notes that “human beings dwell rhetorically
through rhetoric’s most primordial function: the ‘making-known’
of being which discloses the modes of human existence through
articulated self-understanding” (1998, 310). Rhetorical practices
not only help individuals communicate their realities to one
another; they also help organize these realities. The Greek
Sophists understood the contingent and rhetorical nature of
human reality. Like the so-called “new rhetoricians” (Richards,
Burke, Perelman) who followed them in our own century, the
Sophists recognized that rhetoric is epistemological, involved not
just in how we order particular arguments, but more signiﬁcantly
in how we order and come to know reality, which itself becomes a
cultural argument or mythos writ large. The Sophists referred to
this rhetorical construction of reality as nomos, what Susan Jarratt
deﬁnes as “rhetorical construct” or “habitation” (1991, 42).
Within this rhetorical habitation, human customs of social and
political behavior are historically and provisionally situated and
reproduced through cultural narratives, which, according to
Kenneth Burke, shape the symbolic conditions in which we identify and relate to one another (1969b). These habitations, these
nomoi, do not exist only on the symbolic level, however. As Jarratt
explains, they are also realized syntactically and rhetorically so
that, as the Sophists understood, rhetorical habits sustain the very
habitats within which “reality” and “truth” get enacted. As the
Sophists also understood and used to their advantage, a disruption of syntactic and rhetorical habits could also disrupt the social
habitats upon which they are predicated. Our interactions with
others and with our environments, therefore, are mediated not
only by physical conditions but also by rhetorical conditions that,
in part, are ideologically and discursively organized and generated through genres. Genres—what Catherine Schryer deﬁnes as
“stabilized-for-now or stabilized-enough sites of social and ideological action” (1994, 108)—thus constitute typiﬁed rhetorical sites
or habitations in which our social actions and commitments are
made possible and meaningful as well as in which we are rhetorically socialized to perform (and potentially transform) these
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actions and commitments. As Carolyn Miller explains, “rhetoric
provides powerful structurational resources for maintaining (or
shoring up) social order, continuity and signiﬁcance” (1994, 75).
Genres rhetorically embody these structurational resources, helping “real people in spatio-temporal communities do their work
and carry out their purposes” as well as helping “virtual communities, the relationships we carry around in our heads, to reproduce
and reconstruct themselves, to continue their stories” (Miller
1994, 75). In this ecological scenario, genres coordinate a symbiotic relationship between rhetorical habits and social habitats.
Within material constraints, then, our social relations, subjectivities, commitments, and actions are rhetorically mediated
by genres, which organize the rhetorical conditions within
which we enact and reproduce our social relations, subjectivities, commitments, and actions. In this way, genres are not
merely passive backdrops for our actions or simply familiar
tools we use to convey or categorize information; rather, genres
function more like rhetorical ecosystems, dynamic sites in
which communicants rhetorically reproduce the very conditions within which they act. Within genres, therefore, our typiﬁed rhetorical practices support the very recurring conditions
that subsequently make these rhetorical practices necessary and
meaningful. This is why genres, far from being innocent or arbitrary conventions, are at work in rhetorically shaping and
enabling not only social practices and subjectivities, but also the
desires that elicit such practices and subjectivities.
We notice the extent to which genres function as rhetorical
ecosystems (rhetorical habits and social habitats) if we look at
the example of the physician’s ofﬁce. A physician’s ofﬁce is
both a material and a discursive site in which doctor and patient
interact. The genres used within this site coordinate this interaction. Prior to any interaction between doctor and patient, for
example, the patient has to complete what is generally known
as the Patient Medical History Form.3 Patients recognize this
genre, which they encounter on their initial visit to a physician’s
ofﬁce, as one that solicits critical information regarding a
patient’s physical statistics (sex, age, height, weight, and so on)
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as well as medical history, including prior and recurring physical conditions, past treatments, and, of course, a description of
current physical symptoms. This is followed by insurance carrier information and then a consent-to-treat statement and a
legal release statement, which the patient signs. The genre is at
once a patient record and a legal document, helping the doctor
treat the patient and presumably protecting the doctor from
potential lawsuits. But these are not the genre’s only functions.
The Patient Medical History Form (PMHF) also helps organize
and generate the social and rhetorical environment within
which the patient and doctor use language to interact and produce meaningful, situated action. For instance, the genre supports and enacts a separation between the mind and the body
in treating disease, constructing the patient as an embodied
object. It is mainly rhetorically concerned with a patient’s physical symptoms, suggesting that we can treat the body separately
from the mind—that is, we can isolate physical symptoms and
treat them with little to no reference to the patient’s state of
mind and the effect that state of mind might have on these
symptoms. In so doing, the PMHF reﬂects Western notions of
medicine, notions that are rhetorically naturalized and reproduced by the genre and that in turn are materially embodied in
the way the doctor recognizes, interacts with, and treats the
patient as a synecdoche of his or her physical symptoms. (For
example, it is not uncommon for doctors and nurses to say, “I
treated a knee injury today” or “The ear infection is in room
three.”) The PMHF, then, locates the individual who completes
it in the position of “patient” (an embodied self) prior to his or
her meeting with the doctor at the same time as it works on the
doctor who reads it, preparing him or her to meet the individual as an embodied “patient.” So powerful is the socializing
power of this genre in subject formation that individuals more
often than not become willing agents of the desires embedded
within it. As Tran explains: “Also on the [PMHF], there is a part
that says ‘other comments’ which a patient will understand as
asking whether or not he or she has any other physical problems, not mental ones” (1997, 2; my emphasis). Even when a
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patient ostensibly has a choice, the genre and the ideology it
reﬂects and naturalizes are already at work constituting the
patient’s subjectivity in preparation for meeting the doctor.
Thus, the genre compels individuals to assume certain situational positions, positions established by our culture and rhetorically articulated and reproduced by the genre.
The PMHF thus becomes a site for the material exchange of
language within which the doctor and patient enact speciﬁc practices, positions, and relations. As a genre, it is both a habit and a
habitat—the conceptual habitat within which individuals perceive and experience a particular environment as well as the
rhetorical habit by and through which they function within that
environment. But the PMHF does not function in an ecological
vacuum. It is one of a number of genres (genres such as prescription notes, letters to insurance companies, referral letters, various medical records, etc.) that function in relation to one
another and that together enable their users to maintain and
participate in the situated activities that constitute the larger
“ecosystem” we call the physician’s ofﬁce. Each of the genres in
this constellation of interconnected, competing, and sometimes
conﬂicting genres constitutes its own micro-environment—speciﬁc social situations, commitments, practices, and relations
(relations between nurses and doctors, doctors and other
doctors, doctors and pharmacists, doctors and insurance companies, and so on). Together, these genres—what Amy Devitt has
called “genre sets” (1991)—interact to constitute the macro-environment we recognize as the physician’s ofﬁce. As a result, the
physician’s ofﬁce becomes an intra- and intergeneric environment. Within this genre-constituted and genre-mediated macroenvironment, communicants assume and enact various
heterogeneous desires, language games, social practices, relations, and subjectivities—multiple ways of identifying themselves
and relating to others in particular situations, much as we write
ourselves into the position of patient in the PMHF and, in so
doing, shape and enable not only our social practices and
relations, but also “the ways we think of ourselves as writers, the
roles we use to describe ourselves” (Brooke and Jacobs 1997, 216).
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JoAnne Yates and Wanda Orlikowski, drawing on Bazerman
(1994a), describe how “genre systems serve as organizing structures within a community, providing expectations for the
purpose, content, form, participants, time, and place of coordinated social interaction” (2002, 104). By identifying a system of
genres such as the one at work in the physician’s ofﬁce,
researchers can examine how typiﬁed textual practices mediate
complex forms of social organization. Carol Berkenkotter, for
example, has recently demonstrated how psychotherapists and
their clients are engaged in a network of related genres that
synchronizes their activities and subjectivities. In the process of
their interaction, for example, therapists and clients will engage
in a number of genres, including the “client’s narrative during
the therapy session,” the “therapist’s notes” (which are taken
during the session), and the “psychosocial assessment” (which
the therapist writes after the session). Each of these genres,
which Berkenkotter argues are coordinated in part by the metagenre of the DSM IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders), maintains the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings for how therapist and client identify one another, interact,
and perform their activities. As Berkenkotter explains:
The psychotherapist’s practice of making notes and reports that
recontextualize the [client’s] self-reports and interactions within
psychiatric discourse begins the work of drawing the individual
clients into the systems of reimbursement, health care, research,
and medical reasoning. Perhaps even more importantly, psychotherapy notes and reports are the site at which we see the therapist constructing accounts that may inﬂuence how the clients
themselves may begin to recontextualize their own perceptions of
themselves. (2001, 341)

Taken together, these related genres coordinate the complex,
multitextured social organization and activities of psychotherapy
as well as “recontextualize” their users into different subjectivities within this organization.
Within systems of genre, some genres might perform regulative and managerial functions. For instance, Peter Medway
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(2002) presents the difﬁcult case of the architecture students’
sketchbooks and wonders if these sketchbooks constitute a genre,
especially since they do not share patterns of format, organization, or linguistic features—the traditional markers of genre. In
fact, they do not even seem to produce an obvious typiﬁed social
action. Part of Medway’s conclusion, however, is that these sketchbooks do constitute a genre because of their afﬁliative function:
by possessing them, students identify themselves as budding
architects and practice the sensibilities that underwrite that subjectivity. While they may lack typiﬁed textual features, the sketchbooks can nonetheless be deﬁned as a genre by the typiﬁed
subjectivity—the architectural identity—they help their users perform (146). Even more interesting, however, is the function these
genres might be serving in relation to the other architecture genres students are learning. Medway explains, for example, that
these sketchbooks contain drawings, measurements, personal
notes, formulas, maxims, notes, quotations, bibliographic information, pasted artwork, maps, building designs, drafts of arguments and texts, evaluations, and so on (131). Some of what the
sketchbooks contain are examples of the other architecture genres students are expected to learn, which raises the question of
whether this genre is not only a site of subject formation but also
a site for regulating students’ interaction within the generic system of relations of which it is a part. In this way, the sketchbooks
enable students to acquire and practice the subjectivities and
desires that facilitate their various genred performances within
the architectural genre system.4 In the remainder of the chapter,
I analyze how writers position themselves within such genred
ecologies and acquire, negotiate, and perform the desires and
subjectivities that shape the choices they make when they write.
M O T I VAT I N G I N T E N T I O N S : G E N R E A N D T H E
TRANSMISSION OF DESIRE

In “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Martin Heidegger argues
that we begin our “presencing”—our coming into being—
within boundaries (1992). Similarly, Erving Goffman explains
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that “the individual . . . [is] a stance-taking entity, a something
that takes up a position somewhere between identiﬁcation with
an organization and opposition to it. . . . It is thus against something that the self can emerge” (1961, 319–20; Goffman’s
emphasis). How does this identiﬁcation and “becoming” happen within the ideological and discursive boundaries we call
genres? How, that is, are “selves” always situated and hence
always presencing into identity as they are recontextualized
from one genred site of action to the next, even within a constellation of genres such as the physician’s ofﬁce or, as we will
consider in the next chapter, a ﬁrst-year writing classroom?
Anthony Giddens’s work in sociology can provide an answer.
The environment and its participants’ activities and subjectivities are always in the process of reproducing one another within
genre: the Patient Medical History Form, for example, rhetorically maintains the situational conditions within which doctor
and patient enact their roles and activities, and their roles and
activities in turn reproduce the very conditions that make the
PMHF necessary and meaningful. Anthony Giddens, in The
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration,
describes this ecological process as the “duality of structure”
(1984). Giddens’s theory of structuration is largely an attempt to
reconcile what he perceives as inaccurately dichotomized views
of human agency and social systems, what he calls “hermeneutic
sociologies” (“the imperialism of the subject”) versus “structuralist sociologies” (“the imperialism of the social object”) (2). Both
sociologies are inaccurate, Giddens argues, because they overlook the extent to which human actions both enact and reproduce social structures. In their social practices, human beings
reproduce the very social structures that subsequently make
their actions necessary, possible, recognizable, and meaningful,
so that their practices reproduce and articulate the very structures that consequently call for these practices.5 Genre is a site in
which this dialectic of agency takes place.
For Giddens, structures, as I have been arguing about genres,
do not merely function as backgrounds for social activities;
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instead, they are “fundamental to the production and reproduction of social life” (36), including especially identity formation.
Structures function on two simultaneous, homologous levels:
the conceptual and the actual. On the one hand, structures are
concepts, virtual rules and resources that exist ideologically and
that dwell in memory traces regardless of whether we are conscious of them or not (25). They function on the level of ideology, as what Pierre Bourdieu calls “predispositions” (1990; 1998)
that frame the ideological and epistemological boundaries of
what we assume to be knowable, doable, or at least possible in
any given situation. On the other hand, structures do not just
have a conceptual existence, but are actualized as social practices that “comprise the situated activities of human agents,
reproduced across space and time” (Giddens, 25). According to
Giddens, social practices, manifested as certain technologies,
conventions, rituals, institutions, tools, and so on, materialize
structures. These structural practices are the social means (the
tools, resources, conventions) by which we put ideology into
practice, the means by which we enact ideology as social action.
Thus, they allow human agents to enact and hence reproduce
ideological structures—the two recursively interact to form a
“duality of structure” on both an epistemological and ontological level. Structures, in short, are both the ideology and the
enactment of the ideology. As Giddens explains, “the rules and
resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of
social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction” (19). Referring back to our discussion in chapter 2 of
Halliday’s work (1978) on language as social semiotic, we can
compare structures to what Halliday calls “semantic potential”
and social practices to what Halliday calls “actualized potential”
so that structures constitute the potential for action, and social
practices, recursively working within structures, constitute the
actualization of that potential. As such, structures both provide a
deﬁned, socially recognized, and ideological action-potential
(what individuals can do in a given situation) as well as the
means of instantiating that potential as actualized social practice

Constructing Desire

89

in space and time (what individuals actually do in a given
situation).
Insofar as structure represents the ideological potential for
action, it is linked to “motive.” According to Giddens, motive
exists on the conceptual level of structure, meaning that it is
already conceptually built into the structural framework of a situation. He explains, for instance, that “motivation refers to
potential for action rather than to the mode in which action is
chronically carried out by the agent. . . . For the most part
motives supply the overall plans or programmes . . . within which a
range of conduct is enacted” (6; my emphasis). Given this
explanation, we can combine Halliday and Giddens to deﬁne
structure as a motive-potential which frames the possible ways
of acting and meaning in any given time and space. Operating
on the conceptual level of structure, motive frames the ideological boundaries that socially deﬁne and sanction an appropriate
“range of conduct” within a particular situation, thereby regulating the possible ways we can act in a speciﬁc situation. This
notion of motive is related to what Carolyn Miller has deﬁned as
exigence. If exigence, as Miller argues, is “a form of social
knowledge,” a learned recognition of signiﬁcance that informs
how and why we respond to and in a situation, then, indeed,
exigence constitutes “an objectiﬁed social need” (1984, 157) or
motive-potential for action. In short, exigencies inform our
desires to act in certain situations and under certain conditions.
Often, social motives are so sedimented a part of our social
knowledge, so ideologically naturalized, that we as social actors
are unaware of their constitutive presence. Motive becomes
such a part of what seems our “natural” or logical desire to act
that we no longer consider the ideologies that compel our
actions. We rarely pause to consider how or why we come to recognize a situation as requiring a certain action. We just act.
We function, then, within motive-potentials that constitute in
part what Giddens calls structures. But, as we discussed earlier,
structures are not just potentials and desires; they are also actualizations of potential and desire. In order for us to actualize the
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potential for action—in order, that is, for us to become agents of
social motives—we must internalize and transform social motive
into individual action, and this is where intention comes into
play. Intention is where motive-potential becomes internalized
by actors and then articulated as agency. Whereas motive is
socially deﬁned, intention is an individualized interpretation
and instantiation of social motive. Intention is a form of social
cognition—an embodiment of desire and the means by which
individuals become social agents, interpreting and carrying out
the social motives available to them. According to Giddens,
intention can only exist in relation to motive, since “for an event
to count as an example of agency, it is necessary at least that
what the person does be intentional under some description, even if
the agent is mistaken about that description” (8; my emphasis).
Intention must have some socially deﬁned motive in order to be
recognized as a meaningful social action, something that gives it
generalizable meaning and value within a particular environment. It must be intentional under some described social motive.
Yet whereas motive is largely unconscious, intention is conscious, goal-driven, and spatially and temporally bound.
Intention is, ﬁnally, the acquisition, negotiation, and articulation of motive as social practice, motive being the desire within
and against which individuals enact their intentions and their
agency—their coming into being, their presencings.
The “motive-intention” interaction described above is situated
within and reproduces structure, which provides both the ideological conditions and the socio-rhetorical conventions agents
need for enacting their social practices. These practices, in turn,
reproduce the very structures they enact. This recursive process
at work in what Giddens calls structures is similar to the one I
have been describing as at work in genres. Genres are structures
in that they maintain the ideological potential for action in the
form of social motives and the typiﬁed rhetorical means of actualizing that potential in the form of social practices. Genres are
ideological concepts and material articulations of these concepts
at once, maintaining the desires they help individuals fulﬁll. This
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actualized activity (the patient completing the PMHF, for
instance) reproduces the ideological conditions—how physicians
conceptualize their practices and respond to their patients—that
in turn result in the kind of patient-physician interaction that
prompted the PMHF in the ﬁrst place. Intention is where motive
is enacted as socio-rhetorical action, and socio-rhetorical action is
where motive is reproduced as ideology, so that the enactment of
motive as intentional action reproduces the very motive that
made it possible. Genre is central to this ecological process.
Returning to Heidegger (1992), then, we notice that genre is
both the boundary and the presencing, both the ideological construction of a situation and its rhetorical enactment—in short,
the boundary that makes presencing possible. To assume, therefore, that the writer is the locus of invention because he or she is
the most immediate agent of his or her intentions is to overlook
the larger spheres of agency, such as genres, which organize and
generate writers’ desires to act. We will now look at some examples of how writers act as they are acted upon by genres.
GENRE AND THE INVENTION OF WRITING SUBJECTS

The power of genre resides, in part, in this sleight of hand, in
which social obligations to act become internalized as seemingly
self-generated desires to act in certain discursive ways. This does
not mean, however, that writers’ desires are completely determined, as evidenced by the fact that textual instantiations of a
genre are rarely if ever exactly the same. Every time a writer
writes within a genre, he or she in effect acquires, interprets,
and to some extent transforms the desires that motivate it. As
such, every articulation necessarily involves an interpretation,
which means that different writers will interpret, to some extent,
the same genre motive slightly differently, based on their social
and psychological experiences, the demands of their immediate
conditions, their social position and location within the larger
sphere of culture, their metacognitive awareness of the genre,
their knowledge of other genres, and so on. Genre motive alone
thus does not “do” anything; it is a potential that requires
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individual interpretation and articulation in order for the
motive to become actualized as social action. As a result, genres
“are always sites of contention between stability and change.
They are inherently dynamic, constantly (if gradually) changing
over time in response to the sociocognitive needs of individual
users” (Berkenkotter and Huckin 1993, 481). This is why no two
texts within a genre are exactly alike and also why genres are not
completely deterministic. Genres exist at the intersection
between the writer as agent of his or her actions and the writer
as agent on behalf of already existing social motives.
And so, although genres exert inﬂuence over situations and
individuals’ desires to act within them, there is still room for their
users as agents to enact slightly different intentions or even to
resist the ideological pull of genres in certain circumstances. Of
course, such resistance—to be recognized and valued as resistance and not misinterpretation or, worse, ignorance—must be
predicated on one’s knowledge of a genre. For example, writers
who successfully transgress certain genres often do so because
they have established a certain degree of authority in the sphere
in which the genres function coupled with a critical awareness of
the genres’ conventions, in particular what habits of mind are
underwritten by these conventions and which of these conventions can be transformed to greatest effect. The intention and the
ability to transgress genres is thus still connected to the knowledge of the social motives that these genres maintain and articulate. Certainly, some genres—Peter Medway calls them “baggy
genres”—provide more room for transgression than others
(1998). Generally, we think of literary genres as “baggy” in this
sense, meaning they allow for more resistance and playfulness
than most nonliterary genres. In fact, they elicit this playfulness as
part of the very motive that writers must internalize in order to
become considered “creative” writers. Conversely, patients completing the PMHF are less likely to have the same playful intentions, being motivated by different situational exigencies, so that
if a patient were, say, to describe his or her symptoms using personiﬁcation and an allegorically based dialogue between various
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body parts, he or she would either be denied treatment or, more
likely, be asked to receive psychological treatment instead, a
move, ironically, that then situates that individual in another
genre system with its own set of relations, subjectivities, commitments, and practices, as Berkenkotter has described in her study
of psychotherapy genres. In any case, in doing so the individual
has probably succeeded in resisting the patient subject position
that the PMHF compels—opting instead, ironically, for a different, perhaps more literary, genre identity—but in so doing, the
individual has altered not only the situation into which he or she
was attempting to enter, but also the potential relationship
between himself or herself and the doctor as well as perhaps even
the kind of treatment he or she might receive.6 In short, the individual has most likely written himself or herself out of one site of
discursive and ideological action and into another.
To be sure, then, there is room for resistance and transformation within genres, some genres more than others. And any
account of invention, including this book’s, must take this into
account. The potential for resistance and transformation, however, does not preclude the fact that invention takes place within
genres, within the social motives that are sustained rhetorically by
generic conventions. As such, transgression, which itself depends
on the conventions it seeks to resist, remains a function of genre.
According to Brooke and Jacobs, “genre is a site of identity negotiation. . . . Our relationship to genre as writers, thus, follows the
same logic as our relationship to social roles as individuals. In the
same way we create a self by negotiating our stance toward the
social roles we inhabit . . . so we create our self as writer by negotiating our stance toward the genres we use” (1997, 217; Brooke’s
and Jacob’s emphasis). Regardless of how we may position ourselves within genre-mediated situations, then, the point remains
that we write and speak ourselves in relation to the social and
rhetorical conditions we call genres. As Bazerman explains,
“through an understanding of the genres available to us at any
time we can understand the roles and relations open to us”
(1994a, 99). These roles and relations are articulated in various
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genres, some more powerfully than others, so that these already
available subject positions will inform but never completely
determine our more immediate circumstances as writers.
We ﬁnd remarkable evidence of this phenomenon in
Kathleen Jamieson’s research on antecedent genres, which
complicates Lloyd Bitzer’s now classic notion of rhetorical situation by exploring the role that genres play in shaping rhetorical
action. Bitzer regards rhetorical situation as “a natural context
of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which
strongly invites utterance” (1968, 303). According to Bitzer, the
context and exigence that form the basis of a rhetorical situation have an ontological status as “real, objective, historical
events” existing independently of human deﬁnition (C. Miller
1984, 156). That is, the situation that calls for a rhetorical
response exists prior to and independently of our rhetorical
participation. Jamieson counters, however, that when individuals are faced with an unprecedented rhetorical situation, they
often respond “not merely from the situation but also from
antecedent rhetorical forms” or genres (1973, 163; Jamieson’s
emphasis). These carry with them the social knowledge individuals have of particular situations (what Giddens refers to as
motive) as well as the rhetorical conventions for enacting that
knowledge as social action (what Giddens calls intention). As
antecedent forms, then, genres constitute the ways we perceive
situations, including unprecedented situations, as well as the
ways we deﬁne our positions within them—that is, they maintain the motives that make our intentions possible.
As an example, Jamieson cites George Washington’s response
to “the Constitutional enjoinder that the President from time to
time report to Congress on the state of the union and recommend necessary and expedient legislation” (1975, 411). Faced
with this unprecedented situation, the ﬁrst president of the
United States, who had earlier led a successful rebellion against
the British monarchy, promptly responded by delivering a state
of the union address “rooted in the monarch’s speech from the
throne” (411). That is, Washington adopted an already existing
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genre to respond to the demands of a new situation, a situation,
ironically, that had emerged as a reaction against the situation
appropriate for that antecedent genre. Even more remarkably,
this presidential address, so similar to the“king’s speech” in style,
format, and substance, in turn prompted a response from
Congress which, far from being critical of the president’s
speech, reﬂected the “echoing speech” that the House of
Parliament traditionally delivers in response to the king’s speech
(411). As Jamieson explains, “the parliamentary antecedent had
transfused the congressional reply with inappropriate characteristics,” characteristics which not only masked an approval not
felt by all members of Congress, but also, “because patterned on
a genre designed to pay homage and secure privileges,” carried
“a subservient tone inappropriate to a coequal branch of a
democratic government” (413).
What Congress was responding to in its reply to Washington’s
state of the union address was not so much the rhetorical situation as Bitzer describes it as it was the genre function as embodied by the “king’s speech.” Members of Congress assumed a
subject position motivated by the king’s speech and consequently enacted that role by responding in ways that were made
possible by the “echoing speeches” of Parliament. One genre
thus created the socio-rhetorical condition for the other in what
Anne Freadman has called an “uptake,” a concept adapted from
speech act theory to refer to the inter- and intrageneric relationship between texts, in which one text—the king’s speech—
prompts an appropriate response or uptake from another—the
echoing speech—in a particular context or ceremonial (1988,
95; see also 2002). “Patterning the ﬁrst presidential inaugural on
the sermonic lectures of theocratic leaders,” Jamieson claims,
“prompted an address consonant with situational demands”
(1975, 414), demands motivated by the genres communicants
had available to them. Antecedent genres thus play a role in constituting subsequent actions, even acts of resistance. Despite
efforts to resist monarchical practices, Washington, perhaps
unconsciously, assumed a monarchical position when he wrote
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his state of the union address as a king’s speech, turning to an
already textured position to respond to a more immediate and
idiosyncratic circumstance. Aware of the powerful constraints
antecedent genres impose, Jamieson asks: “How free is the
rhetor’s choice from among the available means of persuasion?”
(1975, 414) She answers:
To hold that“the rhetor is personally responsible for his rhetoric
regardless of genres,” is . . . to become mired in paradoxes. We
would by that dictum have to interpret our founding fathers as
deliberately choosing monarchical forms while disavowing monarchy . . . but those rhetors would be held“personally responsible” for
rhetorical choices that in fact they did not freely make. (414–15)

It took until Woodrow Wilson’s 1913 presidential address for
the state of the union address to completely break from its
generic antecedent—one hundred and twenty three years
(Jamieson 415). Uptakes, Freadman reminds us, have memories—indeed, very long memories (2002).
Jamieson’s research illuminates the role that genres play in
constituting not only the ways we respond to and function within
unprecedented situations, but also the subject positions we
assume in relation to these situations. Genres have this generative power because they maintain the desires that elicit their
use—socially sanctioned motives for “appropriately” recognizing
and behaving within certain recurring situations—which
become part of our intentions as social agents and which we
then enact rhetorically as social practices. So even when unique
circumstances such as the ﬁrst state of the union address and the
democratic ideals on which it is based call for new intentions—
require the invention of something “new”—George Washington,
as the writer of this address, performs a subjectivity that is
informed in part by the desires embedded in the“king’s speech.”
Washington’s intention to invent, thus, does not simply stem
from some deep-seated impulse located within him, as popular
theories of invention would have us believe. The ﬁrst state of the
union address does not begin only with Washington, although
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he is certainly the most visible agent of that beginning. Rather,
Washington invents by locating himself within the social motives
embedded rhetorically in an already existing genre, which represents a larger sphere of agency within which his own agency
takes place. Invention, in this case, is an act of turning outward,
not just inward, a way of positioning oneself rhetorically and ideologically at the same time as it is a way of discovering and
exploring ideas. When we consider the locus of invention, therefore, we need to look not only at the writer, but also at the genre
within which the writer functions. We need to look, that is, at
how the writer—whether it is George Washington or D. H.
Lawrence—acts as he or she is acted upon. As Anthony Paré and
Graham Smart conclude, after conducting research into the
workplace genre activities of social workers and bank employees,
genres conventionalize collective roles “despite the idiosyncrasies of the various individuals who ﬁll the roles” (1994, 150).
Such conclusions challenge us as scholars and teachers of writing to expand and complicate our notions of agency in ways that
more fully account for how and why writers invent.
Because they are so entrenched in how we are socialized to
respond to recurring situations, genre-constituted desires, subjectivities, and practices are difﬁcult but not impossible to resist.
Genres change, among many other reasons, because writers, over
time, challenge the genre positions and relations available to
them, especially when these positions and relations conﬂict with
other subject positions and relations—gendered, racial, classbased, ethnic—that constitute writers’ experiences, as in the case
of Patricia Williams, whose The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1992)
transgresses legal genres by introducing the element of autobiography. This autobiographical turn in legal studies seeks to undermine the ostensibly “objective” nature of legal discourses, in
much the same way as ethnography seeks to expose the subjective
nature of quantitative research (Helscher 1997, 32–33). But the
fact remains that Williams is using autobiography, another genre,
to subvert already existing legal genres, which means that she is
turning to one subject position, this time an autobiographical
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one, in order to resist another subject position, that of an objective, rational lawyer. Autobiographically, Williams is positioned as
a chronicler of events—one who has acquired what Brad Peters
calls “an autobiographical grammar” that allows her to name the
self, contextualize the self, and detect “thematic patterns in the
development of the self” (1997, 204). These patterns form the
autobiographical plot that organizes the life being narrated. As
Eileen Schell notes, in the “autobiographical tradition, there is a
double referent in the ‘I’ who writes—the ‘I’ who is constructed
as the Subject in the current narration of events, and the ‘I’ who
remembers the past events and reconstructs them” (1997, 172).
Quoting Shari Benstock’s work on autobiography and authority,
Schell describes how “the ‘gaps in the temporal and spatial
dimensions of the text itself are often successfully hidden from
the reader and writer, so that the fabric of the narrative appears
seamless, spun of whole cloth.’ . . . This ‘seamless’ autobiographical writing is magical, ‘the self appears organic,’ and the writer
appears to have control over her subject matter” (1997, 172; my
emphasis). To assume, then, that autobiography in some way
enables writers to express a more authentic self, something more
“personal” or “inherent” in order to resist the apparent objectivity of law, is to overlook the power of genre, any genre, to shape
and enable writers’ identities even as they transform the genre.7
Writers, of course, do not occupy only one genre position.
They assume multiple positions and relations as they enact various social practices, both within genre systems and between
genre systems. These subject positions and relations are always
shifting, always multiple, as they are enacted by individuals
within different genres. These positions also carry with them
the ideological and libidinal desires that inform them, and
which are manifest in terms of various attachments, values,
repressions, and defenses. Within genre systems, as we saw in
the case of the architecture students’ sketchbooks, some genres
function to organize and regulate these multiple subjectivities
and desires, giving them a kind of coherence and logic. Janet
Giltrow has recently described this unifying principle at work
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within a system of genres as “meta-genre” (2002). Metagenres
are not genres per se, but more like “atmospheres surrounding
genres” (Giltrow, 195) which provide the background knowledge and assumptions that tie the genres together and sanction
their use, “patrolling or controlling individuals’ participation in
the collective” and “foreseeing or suspecting their involvements
elsewhere” (203). On the one hand, a metagenre helps organize individuals’ multiple subjectivities and desires within a
genre system in such a way that it reduces the potential friction
between these multiple subjectivities and desires. It works to
repress conﬂict. On the other hand, individuals carry this metageneric knowledge with them from one collective to the next,
and it is when one metagenre conﬂicts with another that the
possibility for resistance and transformation arises.
Although writers occupy various subject positions, they are
not committed to these positions evenly. Because of training,
experience, attachment, and/or proclivity, a writer may certainly
feel more “at home” in one genre position than another. Such a
default or alpha genre position travels with the writer as he or
she negotiates various and contradictory genre positions and
practices from situation to situation and from day to day. As
Marshall Alcorn explains, “subjects contain a great deal of discourse, but some modes of discourse, because they are libidinally invested, repeatedly and predictably function to constitute
the subject’s sense of identity” (2002, 17). This alpha position
and its discursive attachments could very well inform the different subject positions the writer assumes, affecting how the
writer, in these different subject positions, interprets and performs different genred desires. Such attachments to certain subjectivities and desires, Alcorn reminds us, are very durable, and
individuals will aggressively defend them, which explains both
why certain genres persist even when they no longer serve their
user’s best interests (as we saw in the example of the state of the
union address) and why writers will resist certain genres that
conﬂict in some way with their commitments. The multiplicity of
subject positions and desires within and between genre systems,
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thus, while it certainly makes transgression possible, does not
mean that transgression is motivated by an extradiscursive, prerhetorical inherent intention. As Nikolas Rose proposes:
Resistance—if by that one means opposition to a particular regime
for the conduct of one’s conduct—requires no theory of agency [as
popularly conceived as self-willed]. It needs no account of the
inherent forces within each human being that love liberty, seek to
enhance their own powers or capacities, or strive for emancipation,
that are prior to and in conﬂict with the demands of civilization and
discipline. (1996, 35)

More accurately, resistance arises from the contradictions
individuals experience in their multiple subject positions—in
their “constant movement across different practices that subjectify them in different ways” (Rose, 35). What appears as an interior desire to resist generic conventions and identities might
actually be what Rose calls a “kind of infolding of exteriority”
(36), an effort on the part of writers to work internally through
the contradictory subject positions and relations they assume as
they write various genres.
As Pierre Bourdieu explains it, resistance and change occur
when there is a breakdown in logic between practice and ideology, that is, when individuals begin to experience a tension
between the materiality of their practice and the “systems of
structured, structuring dispositions” that Bourdieu calls “habitus” (1990, 52). The habitus endows practices with a “logic” or
“common sense.” But when the actual conditions of practice no
longer support the “common sense” that underscores and motivates them, a breakdown in logic occurs that the habitus can no
longer sustain. Such is the case with genres, which also predispose speciﬁc practices by endowing them with a certain common sense. When a breakdown occurs between the writer as
agent of his or her actions and the writer as agent on behalf of the
genre, writers, as we saw in the case of Patricia Williams, can try
to transform the genre to make it reﬂect more accurately the
actual conditions of practice.8
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Genres, then, shape and enable our positions as writers, even
as they serve as the potential sites of resistance, because they
maintain powerful desires which writers work within and against
as they move from one situation to the next. This process of
socialization and transformation takes place discursively, and is
dramatized in the ways that individuals are taught and learn to
write (see, for example, Bartholomae 1985; Bazerman 1994a;
Berlin 1987; Bizzell 1992; Brodkey 1987; Cooper and Holzman
1989; Faigley 1992; Freedman 1993a; Lu 1991; Schryer 1994;
Villanueva 1993). Anthony Paré, who for years has studied the
role of writing in the socialization processes of social workers,
describes how this process works. One genre social workers frequently write is the “assessment report,” which contains a social
worker’s initial review of a client’s condition and needs. In his
research, Paré observes that the assessment report, like other
social work genres, is loaded with such “self-effacing constructions as ‘the undersigned believes’ and ‘the worker recommends,’ as well as completely self-erasing phrases, such as ‘it is
believed,’ ‘the assessment is based on,’ and ‘recommendations
include the following’” (1998, 1). These rhetorical self-erasures,
meant to mimic the ostensible certainty of science and its positivistic observation of phenomena, is common in social work,
“where allegiance to ‘objectivity’ is like a professional mantra”
(2), socializing employees into the institutional life of social
work. Interestingly, however, Paré ﬁnds no “ofﬁcial” documentation of this mantra: “Although I have not in 10 years of looking
actually found a printed or explicitly stated regulation against the
use of the ﬁrst person pronoun, and despite the fact that students
and workers are often not clear why they shouldn’t use it or who
told them not to, there is almost universal obedience to the rule
in social work” (1–2). We can, following Giddens, speculate that
such a rule exists on the ideological level of genre, where motive
has a virtual existence as “objectiﬁed social need” and where individuals enact motives unconsciously, only aware of them as they
are instantiated in textual and social practices. In any case, when
social workers enact their institutionally motivated “professional,
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disembodied persona” (Paré, 4) in such genres as the assessment
report, they are at once rhetorically instantiating as their intention that motive for objectivity and, in turn, recursively reproducing that motive as part of social work ideology. In short, they are
writing themselves into the very conditions that they are reproducing in their writing.
Paré’s research shows how writers acquire desires and subjectivities as they learn to write genres. For example, the following
transcript from a discussion between a social work supervisor
and a student named Michael reveals the early stages of this
socialization. The student asks, “It has to be impersonalized as
in ‘the worker,’ even if it’s you, you have to say ‘the worker’?”
(2002, 67). The supervisor’s answer is illuminating, and so I cite
it in its entirety:
That’s right. So you wrote here, “I contacted.” You want to see it’s
coming from the worker, not you as Michael, but you as the worker.
So when I’m sometimes in Intake and [working] as the screener, I
write in my Intake Notes “the screener inquired about.” . . . So it
becomes less personal. You begin to put yourself into the role of the
worker, not “I, Michael.” . . . [I]t’s a headset; it’s a beginning. And
even in your evaluations . . . the same thing: as opposed to “I,” it’s
“worker,” and when we do a CTMSP for placement for long-term
care, “the worker.” So it positions us, I think. It’s not me, it’s my
role; and I’m in the role of a professional doing this job. (Paré
2002, 67; my emphasis)

What does the supervisor mean by “it’s a headset; it’s a beginning”? A beginning of what? According to Heidegger, this
beginning could refer to the moment of presencing that begins
in relation to boundaries, the moment when the supervisor
becomes “interpellated” or “hailed”—to borrow terms from
Louis Althusser—by the genre into the subject position of social
worker. As Althusser formulates it, ideology interpellates individuals as subjects, who actualize that potential both in the texts
they produce and the identities they assume as social workers.
This process of interpellation works consensually, Althusser
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insists, by making it appear as though we are choosing the subject
position imposed on us, choosing, that is, our own subjectivity
(1984). As the supervisor tells the student, “You begin to put
yourself into the role of the worker.” This interpellation is what
the patient undergoes as he or she completes the Patient
Medical History Form in the physician’s ofﬁce. It is the process
of presencing into subjectivity that the supervisor alludes to—in
this case, the process by which the student, Michael, becomes
positioned by the assessment report into the role of professional “doing this job.” Once again, writers begin to write by
locating themselves within rhetorical ecosystems we call genres.
It is within genres that writers invent themselves, their subjects,
and their texts.
As a writer, Michael occupies multiple subject positions both
within social work genre systems and within various other genre
systems. He might be a patient, a social worker, a student (and as
a student, a ﬁrst-year writing student, a sociology student, a
physics student, and so on), a defendant, a job candidate, and so
on. Each of these positions is mediated by a variety of genres at
work within the various situations and activities Michael encounters and performs everyday.9 To say, then, that the assessment
report is a self-effacing genre, as some might claim, may not be
entirely accurate. It is not so much that the genre is self-effacing
as it is self-constructing, although this constructed self may very
well repress the other possible selves that could be performed in
this genred site of action. The emerging professional persona
that the assessment report helps make possible is no less a self
than the self that emerges from writing more intimate, “personal” genres, such as the classroom “log” or “journal.” Recall,
for example, D. Gordon Rohman’s suggestion (described in the
previous chapter) that teachers should encourage student writers to keep journals as a way of discovering themselves (Rohman
1994, 44–45). Rohman’s assumption is that the journal, as a
genre, allows students to access and actualize their true selves, to
establish, in the words of one of Rohman’s students, “a discovery
of myself” (45). In fact, however, Aviva Freedman and Peter
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Medway argue that the classroom journal, promising to provide
students with the opportunity to express and explore their
thoughts in a manner unfettered by formal conventions and
strict rules of argumentation, actually constitutes a new set of
institutional conventions, conventions seemingly overlooked by
Rohman and others who espouse an introspective theory of
invention (Freedman and Medway 1994b). As Freedman and
Medway explain, “although the writer’s focus was now claimed
to be solely on thinking about the topic, the rhetorical demands
had not disappeared; they had simply taken a new form” (1994b,
17). The new rhetorical demands made by the journal required
a “self” as constructed as the more restrictive social work self
constructed by the assessment report. Although the generic
criteria of the journal were not made explicit, research by
Barnes, Barnes, and Clark revealed that
clever students knew they were there and learned to manipulate
textual features to create an impression of artless expression. The
genres the successful students evolved were an effective response to
the new rhetorical exigence, part of which was an expectation that
texts be produced of a certain length, expressivity, unconventionality, and sparkiness and that they mix observations about the material with indications of personal enjoyment, frustration, or
amusement. Many of the texts fulﬁlling these expectations were
indeed refreshing and delightful; less apparent at the time was that
they were refreshing and delightful works of literary artiﬁce.
(Freedman and Medway, 17–18)

The classroom journal, then, like the assessment report,
locates the writer within a discursive and ideological formation,
in which he or she acquires, negotiates, and articulates particular desires, subjectivities, and activities. Even a genre like
freewriting, which gives the illusion of a free space from which
writers can begin to write, situates writers, consciously or unconsciously, within positions of articulation. As such, rather than
assuming the writer to be the primary locus of invention, we
should think of the writer as always positioned by genre within
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situated desires in order to perform certain social practices in a
certain rhetorical manner.
Rather than claiming that a certain genre “effaces” self, then,
it is perhaps more accurate to say that a certain genre replaces or,
better yet, adds to the range of possible selves that writers have
available to them. This way, we avoid problematic claims such as
the ones Lester Faigley and Randall Popken make about the way
the résumé as a genre ironically asks job candidates to construct a
self while formally and rhetorically denying that self (Faigley
1992, 140-42; Popken 1999, 92–93). Faigley, for instance,
describes how “agents are consistently deleted in résumé descriptions” in such subjectless sentences as “Maintained power control
packages” and “Performed and supervised technical training of
personnel” (141). In addition, social actions become represented
as abstract nouns such as “sales effectiveness” and “personal relationships,” all together leading to the representation of the agent
in an abstract nominal style which renders him or her absent
(141). Certainly, these résumé conventions, along with others,
such as the generic categories (“career objectives,” “work experience,” “education”) in which candidates must represent themselves; the spatial limitations (one or, at most, two pages); and the
“topical prohibitions” (generally, no discussion of home life, nonwork interests, and so on) all impose severe limitations on how a
writer represents himself or herself in this genre (Popken 1999,
92–93). Doubtless, these generic conventions elicit the writer of
the résumé into the subject position of “job candidate,” a commodiﬁed subject trying to sell himself or herself by embodying
his or her skills, work experiences, and education (Faigley, 142).
But to make this claim is not then to conclude that the résumé
effaces its writer’s subjectivity (142) or, for that matter, that “the
résumé has few properties that permit writers to reveal ‘presence’
. . . a sense of an individual human being who produced the document”
(Popken, 93; Popken’s emphasis). If anything, actually, the
résumé invokes presence, a particular résumé identity that is as
“real” as any other genre identity that writers have available to
them. To a great extent, writers will be more attached to one
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genre identity than to others, perhaps because it is a subject position they most frequently occupy and so seems more “natural,” or
because they feel emotional attachment to it, or because it is one
in which they are most successful, or because it is a position that
aligns them with institutions of power. This default or alpha identity will push up against the genres a writer encounters, from the
most to the least “personal,” but nonetheless, these genres maintain the situational conditions within and against which individuals invent and deﬁne themselves as participants.
G R E E T I N G C A R D S A N D T H E A R T I C U L AT I O N O F D E S I R E

I will conclude this chapter by brieﬂy analyzing how even
“humble genres” (Bazerman 1997a, 298) such as greeting cards
organize and generate a range of possible and at times conﬂicting desires that regulate and help individuals perform situated
activities and subjectivities. Although there are variations, generally, we typically recognize greeting cards (GCs) as folded cards
with some kind of illustration and message on the front, a brief
message on the inside sometimes written in rhyme (which usually remarks in some way on the front message and/or illustration), and a blank space for a more personal message from the
sender. The back of the card includes the name of its manufacturer, its price, as well as a bar-code. The GC is also ﬁtted with an
envelope for delivery purposes. (More recent e-greeting cards
add multimedia and dispense with envelopes and so forth, but
they still organize a similar discursive and ideological space.)
Traditionally, GCs bear messages of goodwill and are used on
socially acknowledged special occasions, such as birthdays, holidays, anniversaries, and graduations. However, GCs have
recently come to be used on more commonplace occasions such
as a promotion at work, a retirement, or a move to a new city and
to exchange more everyday sentiments such as “thinking of
you,” “thank you,” “good luck,” and so on. In fact, as we
observed in chapter 2, the cards now seem to sanction, and, in
turn, reproduce, the very occasions that call for their use in such
examples as the “secretaries’ day card,” “the bosses’ day card,”
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“the grandparents’ day card,” and so on. These cards not only
respond to certain occasions; they also maintain these occasions
as certain desires that their use helps fulﬁll.
Any serious examination of the GC will have to take into
account its various subgenres. If we deﬁne genres as typiﬁed
sites of action that at once elicit and reproduce recurrent situations by organizing and generating the desires, activities, subjectivities, and relations that take place within these situations,
then we have to consider the possibility that a “humorous birthday card from a friend” is a different subgenre from an
“anniversary card from a husband.” In fact, the “humorous birthday card from a friend” would even have to be a different subgenre from the “serious birthday card from a friend,” or, for that
matter, the “serious birthday card from a wife.” Each of these
subgenres orchestrates a more speciﬁc site of action, engaging
the sender and receiver in a speciﬁc textured economy with its
own attachments, relations, subjectivities, and consequences.10
Whatever we wish to call this constellation of related subgenres and however ﬁnely we wish to distinguish them, what is of
interest here are the various social relations and subject positions these sub-genres make possible to us as a culture. When
an individual approaches a GC display, he or she is confronted
with hundreds of choices: cards for various occasions and cards
representing various social relations, including receiver and
sender subjectivities. These situations and relations are labeled
on the display stand. First, there are the overarching labels,
indicating the occasion the card represents: birthday, anniversary, Mother’s Day, Christmas, and so on. Below these labels are
more speciﬁc distinctions, which represent various subject positions: friend, wife, husband, son, daughter, daughter-in-law,
father, mother, lover, and so on. Although these positions generally refer to the recipients of the GC, they indirectly regulate
the cultural positions that the senders assume as a result of
engaging in this relationship with the receiver. If I choose, for
example, a GC labeled as “wife,” then I enter into this relationship in the role of husband. I might instead have chosen a card
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for a lover or friend, or a general one about age. Each would situate me in a different position of articulation. In each case, the
GC has begun to reproduce larger cultural prescriptions as to
who can engage in what relationships, when, and under what
conditions. The occasions represented on the CG display, organized by subjectivities and relations, are largely indicative of
what our culture sanctions as the potential social relations and
identities we can assume on a given occasion, textually embodying the range of possible occasions, desires, relations, and subjectivities available to us. This GC-maintained motive potential
informs the ideological superstructure which for Giddens
deﬁnes the allowable sentimental intentions we can internalize
and then enact. Subjects who do not ﬁnd themselves represented in or who opt out of these subjectivities, desires, and
relations will often have to enact their subjectivities in opposition to these formations.
An individual, of course, “chooses” from these various GC relations and subject positions. It is not uncommon, in fact, to ﬁnd
oneself lingering for lengthy periods of time before the array of
desire-able subjectivities and relations trying to locate the card
most suitable for one’s particular situation and one’s particular
relation to the receiver. We struggle because we want to ﬁnd the
right card, the one that appropriately actualizes our relation to
the receiver as well as our sense of who we imagine ourselves to
be. Yet what we choose is always going to situate us within a discursive and ideological formation that frames who we are and
how we relate to the receiver. We choose, that is, a subject position in the Althusserian sense of being interpellated. The GC
does what an ideological apparatus does: it procures from individuals the “recognition that they really do occupy the place it
designates for them as theirs in the world” (Althusser 1984, 52).
It positions us as agents of the desires it elicits. So no matter what
our “real” relation is to the receiver, that relationship becomes in
part mediated by the socio-rhetorical environment of the card.
Once chosen, the card becomes not merely a textured representation of its receiver, but rather situates the receiver within a
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desired subjectivity that is then invoked by the sender. At the
same time, when we as senders write our personal message
(PM—and not all senders write PMs), we too are being invoked
by the card: the GC position we chose to occupy, the style of the
card (humorous, somber, serious, playful), the relation established by the already existing message and illustration, etc. That
is, the GC in which we write our PM is not some free, open space
we use to communicate a message we invented beforehand;
rather, it informs the nature of the relation between us as writers
and the receiver as audience because to some extent both writer
and audience positions are already partly deﬁned by the card and
its genre. Within what Freadman calls the “jurisdiction” (2002) of
the genre, the PM becomes an “uptake” of the card’s message
and illustration.
Of course, PMs particularize the GC to our immediate circumstances. I have received cards in which part of the printed
message was crossed out by the sender in an effort to make the
card apply speciﬁcally to our relationship. Frequently, senders
will write their PM in direct relation to the GC’s message or
illustration, extending the printed message or resisting it. But
even this act of resistance is made possible by the situation of
the card, which we identify with and/or rebel against in our
uptake. An example of such identity construction and the possibility of resistance can be seen if we look at a line of Hallmark
GCs. Called the “Mahogany” line, these cards are designed
speciﬁcally for people of color in an effort, presumably, to
include people of color in these commodiﬁed desires, subjectivities, and relations. Not surprisingly, these cards represent cultural stereotypes. For example, non-Mahogany GCs that offer
congratulations for the birth of a child will commonly represent
the birth of a child either as a solemn, blessed occasion or as an
occasion for sleepless nights for the parents, great joy, and endless bottles and diapers. But rarely if ever would we ﬁnd a card
such as the following, from the Mahogany line, which describes
the newborn African-American infant as “the pride of his race”
and then admonishes his parents to instill “morals and values”
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into the child. In this case, individuals may resist the card in a
number of ways, either by choosing not to purchase it, by choosing to write a letter of complaint to Hallmark, or by using the
occasion of the card to comment on or subvert its racial
assumptions in their PM to the receiver. Regardless of the form
of resistance, however, the fact of the card remains as one more
cultural formation of African-American identity. These cards
not only embody the desires that inform their racialized
assumptions, but they also position writers and readers of these
cards within these desires, which organize and generate the
choices writers make when they write in these genred spaces.
The fact that as writers we always confront representations of
who we are and how we should behave whenever we write within
a genre does not mean we do not or cannot contest them. We do.
But, as I have been arguing, we do so not by escaping genre and
entering some genre-free environment in which we can access
some inherent identity. Rather, we do so in part by engaging
other genres, which draw on other subject positions and desires.
This way, our identity is always plural and always in the process of
presencing as we are informed by desires which are reproduced
and rhetorically actualized by the various genres we use every day.
Ignoring the constitutive inﬂuence of these genres leaves teachers and scholars of writing with only a partial view of agency. And
so a great deal of the invention techniques we research and teach
begin with the writer. We teach heuristics such as freewriting,
clustering, and brainstorming in order to help students discover
and explore ideas to write about. Our overriding assumption
continues to be that the writer is the locus of invention.
To argue that writers’ intentions are also generated and organized by the genres they have available to them, however, is to
posit genres, not just writers, as the locus of invention. Writers
invent by locating themselves within genres, which function as
habits as well as habitats for acting in language. Social workers,
for example, must invent themselves within the genre of the
assessment report as they are writing an assessment report. The
assessment report, therefore, does not only provide social
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workers with a habitual way of using language; it is also a habitat
for using language, a way of conceptualizing and enacting social
work practices, desires, relations, and subjectivities—indeed, a
way of being in the world as a social worker. In researching and
teaching invention, we need to redirect our attention from the
writer to the writer’s social and rhetorical location in the world,
the habitat in which the writer functions. In a way, as I
described in the previous chapter, we need to return to a more
rhetorical theory of invention, in which invention takes place,
quite literally, within a place—what classical rhetoricians called
the topoi or commonplaces. These conceptual and rhetorical
places served as the general sites to which rhetors would turn to
discover ideas and means of persuasion for any given situation.
In this chapter, I have considered genres as such sites of invention, situated topoi within which writers invent themselves as
well as their subjects. In the next chapter, I will examine how
writers reposition themselves within sites of invention by looking at an environment that is coordinated by a set of genres,
each of which embodies its own “topoi” or habitat—social activities, relations, subject positions, and rhetorical conventions for
enacting these activities, relations, and positions—within the
overall environment: the ﬁrst-year writing classroom.
Embodying and helping communicants to enact these habitats
within the classroom, genres can teach us a great deal about
why and how writers invent as they reposition themselves from
one genre to another. The case I have tried to make in this
chapter, that genres situate writers within positions of articulation, and the more detailed analysis I will provide in the next
chapter lead me to argue, as I will in the ﬁnal chapter, that we
can and should teach students how to access and interrogate
these genred positions of articulation so that students can participate in these positions more meaningfully and critically.

5
SITES OF INVENTION
Genre and the Enactment of First-Year Writing
Genres themselves form part of the discursive context
to which rhetors respond in their writing and, as such,
shape and enable the writing; it is in this way that form
is generative.
AV I VA F R E E D M A N , “Situating Genre”
We need to be aware not only that genres are socially
constructed but also that they are socially constitutive—
in other words, that we both create and are created by
the genres in which we work.
T H O M A S H E L S C H E R , “The Subject of Genre”
[A genre’s discursive features] are united within the
relatively stable discursive “type” to offer us a form
within which we can locate ourselves as writers—that is,
a form which serves as a guide to invention,
arrangement, and stylistic choices in the act of writing.
J A M E S F. S L E V I N , “Genre Theory, Academic
Discourse, and Writing in the Disciplines”

Reﬂecting on the concept of invention in the classical rhetorical tradition, Jim Corder writes that “inventio, by its nature, calls
for openness to the accumulated resources of the world a
speaker lives in, to its landscapes, its information, its ways of
thinking and feeling. . . . Inventio is the world the speaker lives
in” (1994, 109). Similarly, Sharon Crowley writes that “invention
reminds rhetors of their location within a cultural milieu that
determines what can and cannot be said or heard” (1990, 168).
Invention takes place, which is why classical rhetoricians recommended the topoi or commonplaces as the sites in which
rhetors could locate the available means of persuasion for any
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given situation. As heuristics for invention, the topoi were thus
rhetorical habitats—“language-constituted regions” (Farrell
1996, 116) and “resources, seats, places, or haunts” (Lauer
1996, 724)—which framed communal knowledge and provided
rhetors with shared methods of inquiry for navigating and participating in rhetorical situations. Invention, as such, was not so
much an act of turning inward as it was an act of locating oneself socially, a way of participating in the shared desires, values,
and meanings already existing in the world. As Scott Consigny
explains, the topoi were both “the instrument with which the
rhetor thinks and the realm in and about which he thinks”
(1994, 65; my emphasis). The topoi helped rhetors locate themselves and participate within common situations.
In much the same way, genres are also instruments and
realms—habits and habitats. Genres are the conceptual realms
within which individuals recognize and experience situations at
the same time as they are the rhetorical instruments by and
through which individuals participate within and enact situations.
The Patient Medical History Form, for example, not only conceptually frames the way the individual recognizes the situation of the
doctor’s ofﬁce; it also helps position the individual into the ﬁgure
of “patient” by providing him or her with the rhetorical habits for
acting in this situation. Likewise, George Washington “invents”
the ﬁrst state of the union address by rhetorically situating himself
within the conceptual realm of an antecedent genre, the “king’s
speech,” which provides him not only with a way of recognizing
the situation he is in, but also a way of rhetorically acting within it.
And similarly, D. H. Lawrence is motivated to invent his autobiography differently as he perceives and enacts it within different
genres. As such, why individuals are motivated to act and how they
do so depends on the genres they are using. These genres serve as
the typiﬁed and situated topoi within which individuals acquire,
negotiate, and articulate desires, commitments, and methods of
inquiry to help them act in a given situation, thereby inventing
not only certain lines of argument (logos), but also certain subjectivities (ethos—think of the subject position Washington assumes
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when he writes the “king’s speech) and certain ways of relating to
others (pathos—think of the relation Washington sets up between
himself and Congress, and, as a result, how Congress reacts to
Washington).1 Conceived thus, invention does not involve an
introspective turn so much as it involves the process by which individuals locate themselves within and devise ways of rhetorically
acting in various situations. In this way, invention is a process that
is inseparable from genre since genre coordinates both how individuals recognize a situation as requiring certain actions and how
they rhetorically act within it.
Genres, thus, are localized, textured sites of invention, the
situated topoi in which communicants locate themselves conceptually before and rhetorically as they communicate. To begin
to write is to locate oneself within these genres, to become
habituated by their typiﬁed rhetorical conventions to recognize
and enact situated desires, relations, practices, and subjectivities
in certain ways. I will now consider one such genre-constituted
environment within which teacher and students “invent” various situated practices, relations, and subjectivities as they
(re)locate themselves from one genre-situated topoi to the
next: the ﬁrst-year writing course.
In Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, Wayne Booth speculates on a theory of interaction and self-formation similar to
the one I have been proposing in my discussion of genre and
agency. “What happens,” he wonders, “if we choose to begin
with our knowledge that we are essentially creatures made in
symbolic interchange, created in the process of sharing intentions,
values, meanings? . . . What happens if we think of ourselves as
essentially participants in a ﬁeld or process or mode of being
persons together?” (1974, 134; my emphasis). In this chapter, I
will examine the ﬁrst-year writing course from the perspective
of Booth’s question, describing and analyzing the ﬁrst-year writing course as an activity system coordinated by a constellation of
genres, each of which constitutes its own topoi within which
teachers and students assume and enact a complex set of
desires, relations, subjectivities, and practices. By investigating
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how teachers and students make their way through these genres, we can observe the complex relations and repositioning
that teachers and students negotiate as they participate within
and between genred discursive spaces. Invention takes place
within and between these genred spaces, as one genre creates
the timing and opportunity for another. When they write their
essays, for example, students are expected to perform a discursive transaction in which they recontextualize the desires
embedded in the writing prompt as their own self-sponsored
desires in their essays. Invention takes place at this intersection
between the acquisition and articulation of desire. By analyzing
the syllabus, writing prompt, and student essay as genred sites
of invention, I hope to shed light on how students and teachers
reposition themselves as participants within these topoi at the
same time as they enact the activity system we call the ﬁrst-year
writing course.
T H E F I R S T- Y E A R W R I T I N G C O U R S E A N D I T S G E N R E S

In the previous chapter, I discussed how a site of activity (for
example, a physician’s ofﬁce) is coordinated by a variety of
genres, referred to as “genre sets” (Devitt 1991) or “genre systems” (Bazerman 1994a), each genre within the set or system constituting its own site of action within which communicants
instantiate and reproduce situated desires, practices, relations,
and subjectivities. Within a site of acitvity, thus, we will encounter
a constellation of related, even conﬂicting situations, organized
and generated by various genres. David Russell, adapting
Vygotsky’s concept of activity theory to genre theory, has
described this constellation of situations that make up an environment as an “activity system,” which he deﬁnes as “any ongoing,
object-directed, historically conditioned, dialectically structured,
tool-mediated human interaction” (1997, 510). Examples of activity systems range from a family, to a religious organization, to a
supermarket, to an advocacy group. As Russell deﬁnes it, an activity system resembles what Giddens calls “structure.” Like structure, an activity system is constituted by a dialectic of agents or

116

GENRE AND THE INVENTION OF THE WRITER

subjects, motives or social needs, and mediational means or tools
(what Giddens refers to as “structurational properties”). Each element of the dialectic is constantly engaged in supporting the
other, so that, for instance, agents enact motives using tools which
in turn reproduce the motives that require agents to use these
tools and so on. As Russell explains, “activity systems are not static,
Parsonian social forces. Rather, they are dynamic systems constantly re-created through micro-level interactions” (512). In their
situated, micro-level activities and interactions, discursively and
ideologically embodied as genres, participants in an activity system are at work “operationalizing” and, in turn, reproducing the
ideological and material conditions that make up the activity system within which they interact. Each genre enables individuals to
enact a different situated activity within an activity system.
Together, the various genres coordinate and synchronize the ways
individuals deﬁne, interact within, and enact an activity system.
Russell’s description of an activity system helps us conceptualize both how genres interact within a system of activity and how
they help make that system possible by enabling individuals to
participate within and in turn reproduce its related actions. The
genres that constellate an activity system do not only organize
and generate participants’ activities within the system, however.
They also, as Russell describes, link one activity system to
another through the shared use of genres (1997; 2002).
Participants in one activity system, for instance, use some genres
to communicate with participants in other activity systems,
thereby forming intra- and intergenre system relations. By applying the concept of activity system to school settings, especially to
the interactions among micro-level disciplinary and administrative activity systems that together form the macro-level activity
system of the university, Russell provides us with a model for analyzing the ﬁrst-year writing course as one activity system within a
larger activity system (the English department), within an even
larger activity system (the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences),
within an even larger activity system (the university), and so on.
The constellation of genres within each of these related systems
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operationalizes the situated actions of participants within that
system in order “to create stabilized-for-now structures of social
action and identity” (Russell 1997, 514). The genres that coordinate each of the mirco-level activity systems within a macro-level
activity system function interactively as a series of uptakes, with
one genre creating an opportunity for another, as in the example of the Department of Defense, in which requests for proposals generate funding proposals, which generate contracts, which
generate reports and experimental articles, and so on (520). At
the same time, not everyone involved in an activity system is or
needs to be engaged in all its genres. As Russell explains, “in a
typical school, for example, the teacher writes the assignments;
the students write the responses in classroom genres. The
administrators write the grade form; the teachers ﬁll it out. The
parents and/or the government ofﬁcials write the checks; the
administrators write the receipts and the transcripts and report
to regents” (520). In this scenario, the various participants
(teachers, students, parents, administrators) are all involved in
micro-level activity systems which interact in close proximity to
one another and which together comprise the macro-level
activity system called a school. In what follows, I will focus on one
particular micro-level activity system within a college or university: the ﬁrst-year writing course.
Like other college or university courses, the ﬁrst-year writing
(FYW) course takes place, for the most part, in a physical setting,
a material, institutionalized site most often situated within a
building on campus.2 It is a place a teacher and students can
physically enter and leave. But as in the case of the physician’s
ofﬁce, the classroom is not only a material site; it is also a discursive site, one mediated and reproduced by the various genres its
participants use to perform the desires, positions, relations, and
activities that enact it. For example, one of the ﬁrst ways that a
classroom becomes a FYW course (or any other course for that
matter) is through the genre of the syllabus, which, as I will
describe shortly, organizes and generates the classroom as a textured site of action which locates teacher and students within a
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set of desires, commitments, relations, and subject positions. At
the same time, the syllabus also manages the set of genres that
will enable its users to enact these desires, relations, and subjectivities. In this way, the syllabus and its related FYW course genres orient teachers and students in a discursive and ideological
scene of writing which locates them in various, sometimes simultaneous and conﬂicting positions of articulation. The choices
teachers and students make in this scene emerge from, against,
and in relation to these positions. As such, “the classroom is
always invented, always constructed, always a matter of genre”
(Bazerman 1994b, 26). When we only identify students as writers
in the writing classroom, then, we are ignoring the extent to
which teachers (as well as those who administer writing programs) are also writers of and in the writing classroom—writers
of the genres that organize and generate them and their students within a dynamic, multitextured site of action. The FYW
course, thus, is a site where writing is already at work to make
writing possible. Seen in this light, the FYW course is not as artiﬁcial as some critics make it out to be. It may be artiﬁcial when,
chameleon-like, it tries to mimic public, professional, or disciplinary settings, or when it tries to imagine a “real” external audience for student writing. But the classroom in its own right is a
dynamic, textured site of action mediated by a range of complex
written and spoken genres that constitute student-teacher positions, relations, and practices.3 As they reposition themselves
within and between these genres, teachers and students acquire,
negotiate, and articulate different desires, which inform the
choices they make as participants in the FYW course.
The set of written genres that coordinates the FYW course
includes, but is not limited to, the course description, the syllabus,
the course home page, student home pages, the grade book, the
classroom discussion list, assignment prompts, student essays, the
teacher’s margin and end comments in response to student
essays, peer workshop instructions, student journals or logs, peer
review sheets, and student evaluations of the class. These “classroom genres” (Christie 1993; Russell 1997) constitute the various
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typiﬁed and situated topoi within which students and teacher recognize and enact their situated practices, relations, and subjectivities. I will now examine three of these classroom genres, the
syllabus, the assignment prompt, and the student essay, in order
to analyze how writers reposition and articulate themselves within
these sites of invention. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate the
extent to which, when they invent, writers locate themselves in a
complex, multilayered set of discursive relations, so that by the
time students begin to write their essays they do so in relation to
the syllabus, the writing assignment, and the various other genres
that have already located them and their teachers in an ideological and discursive system of activity.
The Syllabus
In many ways, the syllabus is the master classroom genre, in
relation to which all other classroom genres, including the
assignment prompt and the student essay, are “occluded” (Swales
1996). According to Swales, occluded genres are genres that
operate behind the scenes and often out of more public sight, yet
play a critical role in operationalizing the commitments and
goals of the dominant genre, in this case, the syllabus. As such,
the syllabus plays a major role in establishing the ideological and
discursive environment of the course, generating and enforcing
the subsequent relations, subject positions, and practices teacher
and students will perform during the course. In some ways, the
syllabus, like the architecture students’ sketchbooks described in
the previous chapter, functions as what Giltrow calls a “metagenre,” an “atmosphere surrounding genres” (2002, 195) that
sanctions and regulates their use within an activity system. It is
not surprising, thus, that the syllabus is traditionally the ﬁrst document students encounter upon entering the classroom.
Immediately, the syllabus begins to transform the physical setting
of the classroom into the discursive and ideological site of action
in which students, teacher, and their work will assume certain signiﬁcance and value. That is, within the syllabus, to paraphrase
Giddens, the desires that inform the structure of the course
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become textually available to the students and teacher who then
take up these desires as intentions to act. No doubt, the syllabus is
a coercive genre, in the same way that all genres are coercive to
some degree or another. It establishes the situated rules of conduct students and teacher will be expected to meet, including
penalties for disobeying them. But even more than that, the syllabus also establishes a set of social relations and subjectivities
that students and teacher have available to them in the course.
It is curious that, as signiﬁcant a genre as it is, the syllabus has
received so little critical attention (Baecker 1998, 61). In fact, to
the extent that it is discussed at all, the syllabus is mostly described
in “how to” guidebooks for novice teachers. For instance, both
Erika Lindemann’s A Rhetoric for Writing Teachers (1995) and
Robert Connors and Cheryl Glenn’s The St. Martin’s Guide to
Teaching Writing (1995) describe the syllabus in terms of its formal
conventions, listing them in the order they most often appear:
descriptive information such as course name and number, ofﬁce
hours, classroom location, signiﬁcant phone numbers; textbook
information; course description and objectives; course policy,
including attendance policy, participation expectations, policy
regarding late work, etc.; course requirements, including kinds
and sequence of exams and writing assignments; grading procedures; any other university or departmental statements; and then
a course calendar or schedule of assignments. In addition to
presenting these conventions, Lindemann and Connors and
Glenn also describe the purpose of the syllabus, acknowledging its
contractual as well as pedagogical nature. Lindemann, for example, cites Joseph Ryan’s explanation of the informational and
pedagogical purposes of the syllabus:
Students in the course use the syllabus to determine what it is they
are to learn (course content), in what sense they are to learn it
(behavioral objectives), when the material will be taught (schedule), how it will be taught (instructional procedures), when they
will be required to demonstrate their learning (exam dates), and
exactly how their learning will be assessed (evaluation) and their
grade determined. (1995, 256–57)
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In this sense, Lindemann claims that “syllabuses are intended
primarily as information for students” (256).
Connors and Glenn, however, recognize the more political
function of the syllabus. For them, “the syllabus, for all intents
and purposes, is a contract between teacher and students. It
states the responsibilities of the teacher and the students as well
as the standards for the course” (1995, 10). The syllabus, then,
informs the students and the teacher, protecting both from
potential misunderstanding. It also informs the “structure of
the class” by developing “a set of expectations and intentions
for composition courses” (10–11). In other words, the syllabus
establishes the course goals and assumptions as well as the
means of enacting these goals and assumptions—both the
structure of the course and the rhetorical means of instantiating that structure as situated practices. As Connors and Glenn
remind teachers, the syllabus is “the ﬁrst written expression of
your personality that you will present to your students” (10).
Neither Lindemann nor Connors and Glenn, however, go on
to analyze exactly how the syllabus locates teachers and students
within this position of articulation or how it frames the discursive
and ideological site of action in which teacher and students
engage in coordinated commitments, relations, subjectivities,
and practices. What effect, for instance, does the contractual
nature of the syllabus have on the teacher-student relationship?
What positions does the syllabus assign to students and teacher,
and how do these positions get enacted and reproduced in the
various situations and activities that constitute the FYW course?
An analysis of the typiﬁed rhetorical features of the syllabus, especially its use of pronouns, future tense verbs, and abstract nominalizations, helps us begin to answer some of these questions.4
One of the more obvious characteristics of the syllabus is the
way it positions students and teachers within situated subjectivities
and relations. The student is frequently addressed as “you” (“This
course will focus on introducing you to . . .”), as “students”
(“Students will learn . . .” or “The goal of this course is to introduce
students to . . .”), and as “we” (“We will focus on learning . . .”) quite
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often interchangeably throughout the syllabus but at times even
within the same section. For example, one teacher addresses her
students in the “Course Objectives” section as follows: “Over the
course of the semester, you will develop speciﬁc writing strategies
which will help you adapt your writing skills to different contexts
and audiences. Also, we will discuss how to approach and analyze
the arguments of other writers, and how to either adapt or refute
their views in your writing.” This interchange between “you” and
“we” on the pronoun level reﬂects a larger tension many teachers
face when writing a syllabus: between establishing solidarity with
students and demarcating lines of authority (Baecker 1998, 61).
This tension is especially heightened in FYW courses which tend
to be taught mostly by inexperienced teachers, most often graduate students who are themselves struggling with the tension
between being teachers and students. Diann Baecker, drawing on
Mühlhäusler and Harré’s work (1990) on pronouns and social
identity, applies this tension within pronouns to the social relations they make possible in the syllabus. Pronouns such as “you”
and, in particular, “we” not only create social distinctions among
communicants; they also “blur the distinction between power and
solidarity and, in fact, allow power to be expressed as solidarity”
(Baecker, 58).
It is perhaps this desire to mask power as solidarity that most
characterizes the syllabus, a desire that teachers, as the writers
of the syllabus, acquire, negotiate, and articulate. Positioned
within this desire, the teacher tries to maintain the contractual
nature of the syllabus while also invoking a sense of community.
On the one hand, the teacher has to make explicit what the students will have to do to fulﬁll the course requirements, including the consequences for not doing so. On the other hand, the
teacher also has to create a sense of community with the students so they can feel responsible for the work of learning. This
balance is difﬁcult, and, as we saw in the above example, many
teachers will awkwardly ﬂuctuate between “you” and “we” in
order to maintain it. The following excerpt from another syllabus also reveals this ﬂuctuation:
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The goals of the course are two-fold. During the initial part of the
semester, we will focus on learning to read critically—that is, how to
analyze the writing of others. The skills that you will acquire while
learning how to read an argument closely . . . will be the foundation
for the writing you will do for the rest of the course. Our second
objective . . .

This “we”/“you” tension reﬂects the balance the teacher is
attempting to create between community and complicity. As
Baecker explains, citing Mühlhäusler and Harré, “we is a rhetorical device that allows the speaker(s) to distance themselves from
whatever is being said, thus making it more palatable because it
appears to come from the group as a whole rather than from a
particular individual” (1998, 59). The “we” construction tries to
minimize the teacher’s power implicit in the “you” construction
by making it appear as though the students are more than
merely passive recipients of the teacher’s dictates; instead, they
have ostensibly acquiesced consensually to the policies and activities described in the syllabus. The teacher, then, uses “you” and
“we” in order to position students as subjects, so that without
knowing it, they seem to have agreed to the conditions that they
will be held accountable for. In this way, the syllabus is an effective contract, incorporating the student as other (“you”) into the
classroom community (“we”) at the same time as it distinguishes
the individual student from the collective. What the“you”/“we”
construction seems to suggest is that “we as a class will encounter,
be exposed to, and learn the following things, but you as a student are responsible for whether or not you succeed. You will do
the work and be responsible for it, but we all agree what the work
will be.”
In her research, Baecker ﬁnds that “you” is by far the most
common pronoun employed in syllabi (1998, 60), a ﬁnding supported by my own analysis. This “you,” coupled with the occasional “we,” the second most common pronoun, works as a
hailing gesture, interpellating the individual who walks into the
classroom as a student subject, one who then becomes part of the
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collective “we” that will operationalize this activity system we call
the FYW course. As Mühlhäusler and Harré explain, it is “largely
through pronouns and functionally equivalent indexing devices
that responsibility for actions is taken by actors and assigned to
them by others” (1990, 89). When a teacher identiﬁes the student as “you,” he or she is marking the student as the“other,” the
one on whom the work of the class will be performed: “You will
encounter,” “You will develop,” “You will learn.” But who exactly
prescribes the action? Passive constructions such as the following
are typical of the syllabus: “During the semester, you will be
required to participate in class discussions,” “You will be allowed a
week to make your corrections.” But who will be doing the
requiring and the allowing? The teacher?
Not really. As much as the syllabus locates students within
positions of articulation, it also positions the teacher within a
position of articulation. The teacher’s agency is seldom explicitly asserted through the ﬁrst person singular; Baecker ﬁnds
that “I” comprises an average of 24 percent of total pronoun
usage per syllabus (1998, 60). More often, teachers mask their
agency by using “we.” Yet this “we” implicates the teacher into
the collective identity of the goals, resources, materials, and
policies of the course so that the teacher as agent of the syllabus
becomes also an agent on behalf of the syllabus. The syllabus, in
short, constructs its writer, the teacher, as an abstract nominalization in which the doer becomes the thing done. This is in
part the genred subjectivity the teacher assumes when he or she
writes the syllabus. For example, writers of syllabi rely on
abstract nominalizations and nominal clauses to depict themselves as though they were the events and actions that they
describe. Take, for instance, these typical examples: “Missing
classes will negatively affect your participation grade,” “Good
class attendance will help you earn a good grade,” “Acceptable
excuses for missing a class include . . . ,” “Each late appearance
will be counted as an absence,” “Guidance from texts constitutes another important component,” “Writing is a process,”
“Conferences give us a chance to discuss the course and the

Sites of Invention

125

assignments,” “Plagiarism will not be tolerated.” In these examples, we ﬁnd objects, events, and actions that are incapable of
acting by themselves treated as if they in fact are performing
the actions. When a verb that conveys action in a sentence is
transformed into a noun, we have the effect that somehow the
action is performing itself—is its own subject, as in “missing
classes” or “attendance.” Rather than being the identiﬁable
agents of the syllabus they write, teachers become part of the
action they expect students to perform. This way, students come
to see teachers less as prescribers of actions and more as guiding, observing, and evaluating student actions. As such, activities become substitutes for the agents who perform them,
activities that teachers recognize and value and students subsequently enact.
The syllabus, therefore, is not merely informative; it is also, as
all genres are, a site of action that produces subjects who desire
to act in certain ideological and discursive ways. It establishes the
habitat within which students and teachers rhetorically enact
their situated relations, subjectivities, and activities. Both the
teacher and the students become habituated by the genre of the
syllabus into the abstract nouns that they will eventually perform. It is here, perhaps, that the syllabus’s contractual nature is
most evident, as it transforms the individuals involved into the
sum of their actions, so that they can be described, quantiﬁed,
and evaluated. No wonder, then, that the most dominant verb
form used in the syllabus is the future tense, which indicates
both permission and obligation, a sense that the activities and
behaviors (the two become one in the syllabus) outlined in the
syllabus are possible and binding. To be sure, the overwhelming
number of future tense verbs present in the syllabus (“you will
learn,” “we will encounter”) indicate that it is a genre that anticipates or predicts future action. Yet the discursive and ideological
conditions it initially constitutes are already at work from day 1
to insure that these future actions will be realized.
The syllabus, in short, maintains and elicits the desires it helps
its users fulﬁll. When a teacher writes the syllabus, he or she is not
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only communicating his or her desires for the course, but is also
acquiring, negotiating, and articulating the desires already
embedded in the syllabus. These desires constitute the exigencies to which the teacher rhetorically responds in the syllabus.
For example, the contractual nature of the syllabus, especially the
way it objectiﬁes agency by constituting actors as actions which
can then be more easily quantiﬁed and measured, is socio-rhetorically realized by such typiﬁed conventions as the “we”/“you” pronoun constructions, the abstract nominalizations, and the
auxiliary “will” formations. By using these rhetorical conventions,
the teacher internalizes the syllabus’s institutional desires and
enacts them as his or her intentions, intentions that he or she will
expect students to respect and abide by. The teacher’s intentions,
therefore, are generated and organized rhetorically by the
generic conventions of the syllabus. Teachers invent their classes,
themselves, as well as their students by locating themselves within
the situated topoi of the syllabus, which functions both as the
rhetorical instrument and the conceptual realm in which the
FYW course is recognized and enacted. Indeed, the syllabus, as
Connors and Glenn warn teachers, is “the ﬁrst expression of your
personality,” but the syllabus does not so much convey this a priori personality as it informs it.
The syllabus, then, helps establish the FYW course as a system
of activity and also helps coordinate how its participants manage
their way through and perform the various genres that operationalize this system, each of which constitutes its own site of
invention within which teachers and students assume and enact a
complex set of textured actions, relations, and subjectivities.
Within this scene of writing, one such genre, the assignment (or
writing) prompt, plays a critical role in constituting the teacher
and student positions that shape and enable student writing.
The Writing Prompt
While it does receive scholarly attention, mainly in handbooks for writing teachers such as Lindemann’s (1995) and
Connors and Glenn’s (1995) (see also Murray 1989 and
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Williams 1989), the writing prompt remains treated as essentially a transparent text, one that facilitates “communication
between teacher and student” (Reiff and Middleton 1983, 263).
As a genre, it is mainly treated as one more prewriting heuristic,
helping or “prompting” student writers to discover something
to write about. As Connors and Glenn describe it, “a good
assignment . . . must be many things. Ideally, it should help students practice speciﬁc stylistic and organizational skills. It
should also furnish enough data to give students an idea of
where to start, and it should evoke a response that is the product of discovering more about those data. It should encourage
students to do their best writing and should give the teacher
her best chance to help” (1995, 58). Indeed, the most obvious
purpose of the writing prompt is to do just that, prompt student
writing by creating the occasion and the means for writing.
To treat the writing prompt merely as a conduit for communicating a subject matter from the teacher to the student, a way
of “giving” students something to write about, however, is to
overlook the extent to which the prompt situates student writers within a genred site of action in which students acquire and
negotiate desires, subjectivities, commitments, and relations
before they begin to write. The writing prompt not only moves
the student writer to action; it also cues the student writer to
enact a certain kind of action. This is why David Bartholomae
insists that it is within the writing prompt that student writing
begins, not after the prompt (1983). The prompt, like any other
genre, organizes and generates the conditions within which
individuals perform their activities. As such, we cannot simply
locate the beginning of student writing in student writers and
their texts. We must also locate these beginnings in the teachers’ prompts, which constitute the situated topoi that the student writers enter into and participate within. As Bartholomae
notes, a well-crafted assignment “presents not just a subject, but
a way of imagining a subject as a subject, a discourse one can
enter, and not as a thing that carries with it experiences or ideas
that can be communicated” (1983, 306). This means that the
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prompt does not precede student writing by only presenting
the student with a subject for further inquiry, a subject a student simply “takes up” in his or her writing, although that certainly is part of its purpose. More signiﬁcantly, the prompt is a
precondition for the existence of student writing, a means of
habituating the students into the subject as well as the subjectivity they are being asked to explore so that they can then
“invent” themselves and their subject matter within it.
As situated topoi, writing prompts are both rhetorical instruments and conceptual realms—habits and habitats. They conceptually locate students within a situation and provide them
with the rhetorical means for acting within it. We notice examples of this in assignments that ask students to write “literacy
narratives,” narratives about their experiences with and attitudes relating to the acquisition of literacy. Teachers who assign
them usually presume that these narratives give students the
opportunity to access and reﬂect on their literacy experiences
in ways that are transformative and empowering, ways that
describe the challenges and rewards of acquiring literacy. What
these assignments overlook, however, is that literacy narratives,
like all genres, are not merely communicative tools; they actually reﬂect and reinscribe desires and assumptions about the
inherent value and power of literacy. Students who are asked to
write literacy narratives come up against a set of cultural expectations—embedded as part of the genre—about the transformative power of literacy as a necessary tool for success and
achievement. Kirk Branch, for instance, describes how students
in his reading and writing class at Rainier Community Learning
Center struggled to invent themselves within the assumptions
of these narratives. Aware of the social motives rhetorically
embedded within these narratives, Branch explains, students
wrote them as much to describe their experiences with literacy
as to convince themselves and others of the transforming power
of literacy. For example, commenting on one such student narrative, titled “Rosie’s Story,” Branch concludes,
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“Rosie’s Story” writes itself into a positive crescendo, a wave of enthusiasm which tries to drown out the self-doubt she reveals earlier.
“Rosie’s Story” does not suggest an unbridled conﬁdence in the
power of literacy to solve her problems, but by the end of the piece
she drops the provisional “maybes” and “shoulds” and encourages
herself to maintain her momentum: “Just keep it up.” Her story,
then, reads as an attempt to quash her self-doubt and to reassert the
potential of literacy in her own life. (1998, 220; my emphasis)

In the end, it seems, the power of genre and the ideology it
compels writers to sustain and articulate wins out. Rosie does
not seem to be expressing some inherent intention as she writes
this narrative. Rather, she seems to be locating herself within
the desires embedded within the literacy narrative, desires that
inform how she recognizes and performs herself in the situation of the reading and writing class. To claim, then, that her
narrative begins with and in her is to overlook the extent to
which she herself is being written by the genre she is writing.
We notice a remarkable example of how genres shape our
perceptions and actions when Lee, a student in Branch’s class,
writes in his literacy narrative: “Furthermore Mr. Kirk gives us
our assignments and he has always wanted us to do our best. He
said, ‘If you hadn’t improved your English, you wouldn’t have
got a good job.’ Therefore I worry about my English all the
time” (Branch 1998, 221). “Does it matter,” Branch wonders
afterwards, “that I never said this to Lee?” (221) Apparently,
Branch does not have to say it; Lee’s assumption about literacy
as a necessary tool for success is already rhetorically embedded
in the genre of the literacy narrative as understood by the student, an assumption that Lee internalizes as his intention and
enacts as his narrative when he writes this genre. It is within the
situated topoi of the genre that Lee “invents” his narrative.
Often, teachers of writing overlook the socializing function of
their writing prompts and consequently locate the beginnings of
student writing too simply in the students rather than in the
prompts themselves. What these teachers overlook—and writing
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teacher guides are no exception—is that students ﬁrst have to
situate and “invent” themselves in our prompts before they can
assume the position of student writer. In fact, as we will discuss
momentarily, it is the prompt that tacitly invokes the position
that student writers are asked to assume when they write, so that
students read their way into the position of writer via our
prompts. Given this, it is perhaps more than a little ironic that
most guides to writing effective assignment prompts emphasize
the importance of specifying an audience in the prompt while
more or less ignoring the students as audience of the prompt. As
one of her ﬁve heuristics for designing writing assignments, for
instance, Lindemann includes the following: “For whom are students writing? Who is the audience? Do students have enough
information to assume a role with respect to the audience? Is the
role meaningful?” (1995, 215). Here, the student is perceived
only as potential writer to the audience we construct in the
prompt. But what about the student as audience to the teacher’s
prompt, the position that the student ﬁrst assumes before he or
she begins to write? The assumption seems to be that the student exists a priori as a writer who has only to follow the instructions of the teacher’s prompt rather than as a reader who is ﬁrst
invoked or interpellated into the position of writer by the
teacher’s prompt. This process of interpellation involves a
moment of tacit recognition, in which the student ﬁrst becomes
aware of the position assigned to him or her and is consequently
moved to act out that position as a writer.
The prompt is a genre whose explicit function is to make
another genre, the student essay, possible. Within the FYW
course activity system, it helps to create a timeliness and an
opportunity for student writing in what Yates and Orlikowski,
following Bazerman, refer to as “kairotic coordination” (2002,
110). In coordinating this interaction, the writing prompt functions to transform its writer (the teacher) and its readers (the
students) into a reader (the teacher) and writers (the students).
It positions the students and teacher into two simultaneous
roles: the students as readers and writers, the teacher as writer
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and reader. First of all, the prompt rhetorically positions the
teacher as both a writer and a reader. As he or she writes the
prompt, the teacher positions him or herself as reader for the
student text that the prompt will eventually make possible. The
challenge that the prompt creates for the teacher is how to create the conditions that will allow students to recognize him or
her not as the writer of the prompt, but as the eventual reader of
their writing. That is, the teacher has to ﬁnd a way to negotiate a
double subject position, a subject subject, one who is doing the
action (the subject as writer) and one on whom the action is
done (the subject as reader). One way the teacher manages this
double position is through a series of typiﬁed rhetorical moves
and statements. For example, the following phrases are typical
of prompts: “You should be sure to consider,” “You probably
realize by now that,” “As you have probably guessed,” “As you all
know.”5 These are loaded phrases, because they not only offer
suggestions the teacher-writer is giving to the student-readers;
they also offer hints about what the teacher-writer will be expecting as a teacher-reader. When the teacher writes, “You probably
realize by now that one effective way to support YOUR evaluation of those reviews is to offer examples from them in the way
of quotes,” he is telling the students something about him as an
audience. He is basically saying, “Look, I care about using quotes
to support evaluation, so if you want to write an effective evaluation for me, use quotes.” Writing “one effective way” allows the
teacher-writer to covertly express what he cares about as a
reader. The next example is even more covert—and clever. After
describing the assignment to the students, the teacher writes:
To do this, you should be able to explain why the scene is central to
the story’s plot, what issues are being dealt with, and how or why the
characters change. The trick here is to employ as many speciﬁc details
from the story as possible. You have the responsibility to explain to
your audience why you made the decision you did. (my emphasis)

The teacher who begins this prompt as a writer describing the
assignment to the students as readers here begins to emerge as a
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reader to the students as writers. “You should be able to” is a subtle, or perhaps not so subtle, way of letting students know what he
as a teacher-reader expects from their writing. “The trick here” is
even more effective, because it allows the teacher to enact the
role of reader while seeming to be an objective observer giving
helpful advice. In fact, however, there is no “trick” involved here,
just a calculated rhetorical way for the teacher to let students
know that he as a reader cares a great deal about the use of speciﬁc details. The only “trick” at work here is how the teacher creates the illusion that the writer addressing them is not the same
person as the reader who will be reading their writing. It is this
rhetorical sleight of hand that the prompt makes possible.
The prompt, therefore, allows the teacher to occupy two subject positions at once: writer/coach and reader/evaluator. As a
result, and at the same time, the prompt also constitutes the students as readers and writers. The students are prompted into
position or invoked as writers by the prompt, within which they
read and invent themselves. Indeed, every prompt has inscribed
within it a subject position for students to assume in order to
carry out the assignment. In FYW prompts, these roles can be
quite elaborate, asking students to pretend that “you have just
been hired as a student research assistant by a congressperson in
your home state” or “you have been asked by Rolling Stone to write
a critique of one of the following ﬁlms.” The prompts do not stop
here, however. They go on to specify to students how they should
enact these roles, as in the following example, in which the
teacher asks students to pretend that they are congressional aides:
You must not explain what you “think” about this subject; the congressperson is more interested in the objective consideration of the
issues themselves. And of course, you shouldn’t recommend whether
or not your employer should support the bill; you are, after all, only
an aide. (my emphasis)

Words such as “of course,” “obviously,” “after all,” “remember,”
and “certainly” all typically appear in prompts. Their function is
to establish shared assumptions; however, we have to question
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just how shared these assumptions really are. How shared, for
example, is the “of course” in the above example? Does the student-writer share this knowledge about congresspersons or is this
a subtle way in which the prompt writer coerces complicity? The
fact that the teacher-writer goes to the trouble of mentioning it
suggests that perhaps the knowledge is not so obvious, that, in
fact, “of course,” “certainly,” and “as we all know” are rhetorical
means of presenting new information in the guise of old information (Pelkowski 1998, 7). If this is the case, then what we are
witnessing is the prompt at work constituting the students as writers who assent to the ideology presented in the prompt, just as we
saw in the case of the literacy narratives.
To a great extent, students have to accept the position(s)
made available to them in the prompt if they are to carry out the
assignment successfully. As all genres do, the prompt invites an
uptake commensurate with its ideology, just as we saw in the
example of the ﬁrst state of the union address in which George
Washington’s choice of the “king’s speech” prompted an appropriate congressional reply mirroring the echoing speeches of
Parliament. While there is room for resistance, for students to
refuse to accept the shared assumptions the prompt makes available to them, Pelkowski reminds us that “the power structure of
the university denies students the ability to offer alternative
interpretations of prompts. . . . Rather, an alternative interpretation of the assignment is not seen as such, but as a ‘failure to
respond to the assignment’ (the F paper is often characterized
in this way in statements of grading criteria)” (1998, 16). The
writing prompt, in short, functions as a site of invention in which
teacher and student create the conditions in which they will
eventually interact as reader and writer.
The Student Essay
The very coercion masked as complicity that we observe in
the syllabus and writing prompt is also at work when students
begin to write their essays. This time, though, rather than being
objects of this discursive move, students are expected to become
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its agents. In this way, students learn to enact the desires they
acquire as participants within the FYW course and its system of
genres. For example, one of the tricks teachers often expect students to perform in their writing involves recontextualizing the
desires embedded in the writing prompt as their own self-generated desires. That is, students are expected to situate their writing within the writing prompt without acknowledging its
presence explicitly in their writing so that it appears as though
their writing created its own exigency, that somehow their writing is self-prompted. This rhetorical sleight of hand appears
most visibly in the introductions of student essays, because it is
there that students are asked to create the opportunity and timing for their essays in relation to the opportunity and timing as
deﬁned by the writing prompt. Experienced student writers
know that they must negotiate this transaction between genres
and do so with relative ease. Less experienced student writers,
however, sometimes fail to recognize that the prompt and essay
are related but separate genres, and their essays can frustrate
teachers by citing the prompt explicitly in a way that shatters the
illusion of self-sufﬁciency we desire students to create in their
writing. In what follows, I will look at several examples of student
essays to examine to what extent and how students negotiate this
difﬁcult transaction between genres as they function as agents
on behalf of the prompt and agents of their own writing.
Yates and Orlikowski’s work on the function of chronos and
kairos in communicative interaction can help us interrogate the
relation between the writing prompt and the student essay.
They describe how genre systems choreograph interactions
among participants and activities chronologically (by way of
measurable, quantiﬁable, “objective” time) and kairotically (by
way of constructing a sense of timeliness and opportunity in
speciﬁc situations) within communities (2002, 108–10). In
terms of chronos, the writing prompt assigns a speciﬁc time
sequence for the production of the student essay, often delimiting what is due at what time and when. In this way, the writing
prompt deﬁnes a chronological relationship between itself and
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the student essay. At the same time, however, the writing
prompt also establishes the kairos for the student essay by providing it with a timeliness and an opportunity. In this way, the
writing prompt deﬁnes a recognizable moment that authorizes
the student essay’s raison d’Étre. Participating within this
kairotic relationship between two genres, the student must, on
the one hand, recognize the opportunity deﬁned for him or
her in the prompt and, on the other hand, reappropriate that
opportunity as his or her own in the essay. Carolyn Miller
describes this interaction as “the dynamic interplay between . . .
opportunity as discerned and opportunity as deﬁned” (1992,
312). Engaged in this interplay, the student writer must discern
the opportunity granted by the prompt while writing an essay
that seemingly deﬁnes its own opportunity. As such, the student
writer needs to achieve and demonstrate a certain amount of
generic dexterity, functioning within a genre system while masking its interplay. I will now look at some examples of how student writers negotiate this discursive transaction.
The following examples, from a FYW course, are all written
in response to the same writing prompt. The students had read
and discussed Clifford Geertz’s “Deep Play: Notes on the
Balinese Cockﬁght,” had been assigned to take on the “role of
‘cultural anthropologist’ or ‘ethnographer,’” had conducted
some ﬁeld observations, and were then prompted to write, “in
the vein of Geertz in ‘Deep Play,’” a
claim-driven essay about the “focused gathering” [a term that
Geertz uses] you observed. Your essay should be focused on and
centered around what you ﬁnd to be most signiﬁcant and worth
writing about in terms of the “focused gathering” you observed. . . .
Some issues you might want to attend to include: How does the
event deﬁne the community taking part in it? What does the event
express about the beliefs of the community? What does the event
say about the larger society?

Not only does the prompt assign students a subjectivity (the
role of cultural anthropologist), but it also grants them an
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opportunity to transform their observations into an argument.
In taking up this opportunity, the students perform a range of
transactions between their essays and the writing prompt.
Below, I will describe a sample of these transactions, starting
with essays in which the writing prompt ﬁgures prominently (so
that the coercion is visible) and concluding with essays in which
the writing prompt is recontextualized as the student’s own selfgenerated opportunity.
In those examples where students fail to enact the desired
relationship between the prompt and the essay, the writing
prompt ﬁgures explicitly in their essays, fracturing the illusion of
autonomy that the essay, although prompted, tries to maintain.
In the most obvious cases, such as the following, the student narrates explicitly the process of the essay’s production:
In my last literary endeavor [ostensibly referring to an earlier draft of
the essay] I focused on one facet of the baseball game that I had gone
to see. This time I am going to try to bring a few more topics to the
table and focus on one thing in particular that I feel is signiﬁcant.6

In this excerpt, the student appears to be narrating the
prompt’s instructions (stated as “be focused on and centered
around what you ﬁnd to be most signiﬁcant”) as he fulﬁlls
them. That is, he is telling us what he has been asked to do from
one stage of the assignment sequence to the next as he does it,
thereby making the coercion visible, as in the words, “This time
I am going to try to . . .” Purposefully or not, the student in this
case fails to perform the desired uptake between the prompt
and his essay so that the prompt essentially speaks through him.
In a similar but less explicit way, the next essay also fails to reappropriate the prompt’s deﬁned opportunity as its own, so that the
essay remains overly reliant on the prompt. The essay begins:
Cultural events are focused gatherings that give observers insights
to that certain culture. Geertz observes the Balinese culture and
gains insights on how signiﬁcant cockﬁghting is to the Balinese:
including issues of disquieting and the symbolic meaning behind
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the cockﬁghts. My observations at a bubble tea shop in the
International District also have similarities with Geertz’s observations of the Balinese cockﬁght on the cultural aspect.

The phrases “cultural events” and “focused gatherings” locate the
language of the prompt in the essay, but the ﬁrst sentence simply
rewords the language of the prompt rather than recontextualizing it as part of the essay’s own constructed exigency. The question that would likely come to most teachers’ minds, even though
they already know the answer, would be, “So what? Why do we
need to know this?” Similarly, in the second sentence, the only
way to understand the relevance of the transition into Geertz is to
know the prompt, which makes that connection. By the time the
student describes her own observations in the third sentence, too
much of the prompt’s background knowledge is assumed, so
that, for the logic of these opening sentences to work, a reader
needs the prompt as context, yet this is the very relationship that
the prompt and essay wish to downplay.
Compare the opening sentences of the above essay to the
opening sentences of the following essay:
When you want to know more about a certain society or culture
what is the ﬁrst thing that you need to do? You need to make and
analyze detailed observations of that particular society or culture in
its natural environment. From there you should be able to come up
with a rough idea of “why” that particular culture or society operates the way it does. That’s exactly what Clifford Geertz did. He
went to Bali to study the Balinese culture as an observer.

As in the earlier example, this excerpt borrows the language of
the prompt, but rather than rewording that language, it reappropriates it. This time, the reader meets Geertz on the essay’s
terms, after the student has provided a context for why Geertz
would have done what he did. The same exigency that motivated Geertz becomes the student’s exigency for writing his
essay. Crude as it might be, the question that begins the essay
performs the sleight of hand I described earlier, in which the
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student recontextualizes the question the prompt asks of him
and asks it of his readers as if this is the question he desires to
ask. In this way, the student becomes an agent of the agency at
work on him. The student, however, seems unable or unwilling
to sustain this uptake, for in the very next paragraph, he fractures the illusion he has begun to create. He writes:
A couple of weeks ago I decided to go visit some friends in Long
Beach Washington. Since it was something different from the norm
of people in my class analyzing concerts and baseball games I
decided to do my paper on Long Beach. I didn’t have to look far for
a cultural event to observe because the little ocean-side town was
having a parade. . . . I pretty much took the Geertz approach and
just tried to ﬁgure out what was going on.

Here, the student not only slips out of his assigned role as a
“cultural anthropologist” by acknowledging his position as a
student, along with other students writing a paper for class, but
he also makes visible the coercion that prompted his essay
when he writes that it did not take him long to find a cultural
event to observe. Suddenly, he identifies himself as someone
who has been prompted to find an event. At the same time,
although he does refer to Geertz in the previous paragraph, the
student’s statement, “I pretty much took the Geertz approach,”
appears to be addressed to a reader who knows more than what
the student has already explained about Geertz. That is, the
statement imagines a reader who is familiar with the prompt
that directed the student to take the Geertz approach in the
ﬁrst place. After all, the prompt asks students to write an essay
“in the vein of Geertz.”
In the previous example, we witness a student who begins to
negotiate but does not quite sustain the complex interplay
between the genred discursive spaces of the writing prompt and
the student essay. In the next couple of examples, we observe
students who manage this discursive transaction by recontextualizing the desires embedded in the prompt as their own seemingly
self-prompted desires to write.
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The following student begins her essay by describing the
activities and interactions that typically occur at her church,
thereby performing her role as a cultural anthropologist. Her
third paragraph, which follows two paragraphs of observations,
marks a transition. She writes:
What purpose does all this serve? Geertz states in Deep Play: Notes
on the Balinese Cockﬁght, “the cockﬁght is a means of expression.”
(Geertz pg. 420) In much the same way the Inn [the name of the
church] is the same thing. It is a gathering for college aged people
to express their faith in God.

By asking, “What purpose does all this serve?” this student asks
the question that the prompt asks of her. In so doing, she makes
it appear as though the inquiry that follows stems from her own
curiosity. In the context of this appropriation, Geertz is not so
much a ﬁgure she inherits from the prompt as he is a ﬁgure she
invokes to create an opportunity for her essay to analyze the signiﬁcance of the Inn. The student recontextualizes the opportunity as well as the authority from the discursive space of the
prompt to the discursive space of the essay.
The next student performs a similar uptake, and does so
with greater elegance. The student begins her essay by describing underground hip-hop music and the function it serves for
its listeners, and then poses the question: “Is music created
from culture, or is culture created from music?” The second
paragraph begins to compare hip-hop to symphonies. The student writes:
On a different note, a symphonic band concert creates a congregation of different status people uniting to listen to a type of music
they all enjoy. “Erving Goffman has called this a type of ‘focused
gathering’—a set of persons engrossed in a common ﬂow of activity
and relating to one another in terms of that ﬂow.” (Geertz 405)
This type of “focused gathering” is an example of music created
from culture. “Focused gatherings” provide different emotions
according to preference. The ﬂocking of similar interests in the
form of “focused gatherings” makes up a culture. Similar values are
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shared to create one group of equals producing music for the same
reason.” (my emphasis)

By posing the question, “Is music created from culture, or is culture created from music?” the student creates an opportunity for
her essay rather than inheriting that opportunity from the
prompt. This is the question the student is asking. In the above
excerpt, the student does not rely on the prompt’s authority to
justify the claim that “a symphonic band concert creates a congregation of different status people uniting to listen to a type of
music they all enjoy.” Instead, she appropriates the authority the
prompt grants her to assert this claim. Only in the context of her
authority does Geertz then ﬁgure into the essay. Notice how cleverly the student uses the quotation from Geertz to make it
appear as though his description of a “focused gathering” was
meant to deﬁne her focused gathering, the symphonic band
concert. The determiner “this” no longer modiﬁes the cockﬁght
as Geertz meant it to; instead, it refers back to the concert,
which is the student’s subject of inquiry. In a way, this move creates the impression that the student found Geertz rather than
having been assigned to use Geertz. There is very little evidence
of prompting here.
In the remainder of the above excerpt, the student appears
to perform what Fuller and Lee have described as an interiorized uptake, in which the student becomes positioned, through
her interaction with the writing prompt, as a desiring subject
who speaks from that subjectivity (2002, 222). In this case, the
student internalizes the authority embedded in the prompt as
her own authority in statements such as, “The ﬂocking of similar interests in the form of ‘focused gatherings’ makes up a culture. Similar values are shared to create one group of equals
producing music for the same reason.” The student has appropriated the subjectivity assigned to her and now speaks from
that position as a “cultural anthropologist.” Fuller and Lee refer
to this process of negotiation as “textual collusion,” a term they
use to describe how writers and readers move “around inside
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relations of power” (215). More so than her peers, this student
seems able to negotiate the textured relations between the
prompt and the essay, repositioning herself in the interplay
between genred spaces so that she becomes an agent of the
agency at work on her.
Invention takes place at the intersection between the acquisition and articulation of desire. When teachers assign students a
writing prompt, they position students at this intersection so
that part of what students do when they invent their essays
involves recontextualizing the desires they have acquired as
their own self-prompted desires to write. As such, teachers
expect students to manage the interplay between coercion and
complicity that we saw teachers perform in the syllabus (manifested in the “you” and “we” formations). Not all students, as we
see in the above examples, are able to perform this sleight of
hand with the same dexterity. And the reason for this, I would
argue, has partly to do with the fact that some students do not
know that this transaction requires them to move around
between two genred sites of action, each with its own situated
desires, relations, subjectivities, and practices—in short, its own
positions of articulation. When they conﬂate these two worlds,
students not only fracture the illusion of self-sufﬁciency the
essay desires them to maintain, but students also fail to reposition their subjectivity and their subject matter within the discursive and ideological space of the essay. One way teachers can
help students reposition themselves within such spheres of
agency is to make genres analytically visible to students so that
students can participate within and negotiate them more meaningfully and critically. In the next chapter, I will delineate my
argument for such an explict genre-based writing pedagogy.
SUMMARY

Writing involves a process of learning to adapt, ideologically
and discursively, to various situations via the genres that coordinate them. Writing is not only a skill, but a way of being and acting
in the world in a particular time and place in relation to others.
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The FYW course bears this out. As an activity system, it is sustained
and coordinated by its various genres. Teachers and students
assume ways of being and acting in the classroom not only
because of its material setting—although that certainly does play a
major part (see Reynolds 1998)—but also because of its multitextured sites of action as they are embodied within and between
genres. As such, the writing that students do in the FYW course
does not just begin with them by virtue of their being (enrolled)
in this setting; it begins, rather, in the textured topoi that are
already in place, shaping and enabling the writing that students as
well as teachers do. As such, the environment of the classroom—
or any other environment for that matter, including the doctor’s
ofﬁce—is not only an ontological fact, but also a generic fact. It
exists largely because we reproduce it in our genres, each of which
constitutes a different but related topoi within which students and
teacher function, interact, and enact subjectivities and practices.
Since we reproduce the FYW course in the ways we articulate it,
there is really little that is artiﬁcial or arbitrary about it, at least not
in the way that Paul Heilker describes the FYW course as being
artiﬁcial:
Writing teachers need to relocate the where of composition instruction outside the academic classroom because the classroom does
not and cannot offer students real rhetorical situations in which to
understand writing as social action. (1997, 71)

Part of my argument in this chapter is that the FYW course is
a “real rhetorical situation,” one made up of various scenarios
within which students (and their teachers) recognize one
another, reposition themselves, interact, and enact their situated practices in complex social and rhetorical frameworks.
Once we recognize this, once we acknowledge that the FYW
course, like any activity system, is “not a container for actions or
texts” but “an ongoing accomplishment” (Russell 1997, 513),
we are on our way to treating the FYW course as a complex and
dynamic scene of writing, one in which students can not only
learn how to write, but, as we will discuss in the next chapter,
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can also learn what it means to write: what writing does and how
it positions writers within systems of activity. Participating in the
textual dynamics of the FYW course is as “real” a form of social
action and interaction as any other textual practice.
As we have observed throughout the last two chapters in such
genres as the PMHF, the social workers’ assessment report, the
résumé, the course journal, the “king’s speech,” the greeting
card, the syllabus, the writing prompt, and the student essay,
genres position their users to perform certain situated activities
by generating and organizing certain desires and subjectivities.
These desires and subjectivities are embedded within and
prompted by genres, which elicit the various, sometimes conﬂicting, intentions we perform within and between situations.
To assume that the writer is the primary locus of invention, then,
is to overlook the constitutive power of genre in shaping and
enabling how writers recognize and participate in sites of action.
Rather than being deﬁned as the agency of the writer, invention is more a way that writers locate themselves, via genres,
within various positions and activities. Invention is thus a process
in which writers act as they are acted upon. The Patient Medical
History Form is a case in point. So are the examples of George
Washington and the ﬁrst state of the union address, the example
of the social workers’ assessment report, and the example of the
student essay in relation to the assignment prompt. All these
examples point to the fact that there is more at work in prompting discourse than simply the writer’s private intentions or even,
for that matter, the demands of the writer’s immediate exigencies. After all, George Washington responded to the exigencies
of an unprecedented rhetorical situation not by inventing something new, but by turning to an antecedent genre, the “king’s
speech,” which carried with it a rhetorical form of social action
very much at odds with his more immediate exigencies. The
available genre, rhetorically embodying social motives so powerful as to override the inspired democratic moment at hand, not
only shaped the way Washington recognized and acted within
his rhetorical situation, but the way Congress did too.
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We notice a similar phenomenon at work in the example of
the writing prompt. The writing prompt does not merely provide students with a set of instructions. Rather, it organizes and
generates the discursive and ideological conditions which students take up and recontextualize as they write their essays. As
such, it habituates students into the subjectivities they are asked
to assume as well as enact—the subjectivities required to
explore their subjects. By expanding the sphere of agency in
which the writer participates, we in composition studies can
offer both a richer view of the writer as well as a more comprehensive account of how and why writers makes the choices they
do. As I will argue in the next chapter, teaching invention as a
process in which writers access and locate themselves critically
within genres not only can enrich the teaching of writing, but
can also better justify the place and purpose of FYW courses in
postsecondary education.

6
RE-PLACING INVENTION IN
COMPOSITION
Reﬂections and Implications
It is strange that in institutions where every other
department represents the well-garnered scholarship
of the ages, in this department alone it should so often
be thought enough to put a pen into the student’s
hand and say, as the angel said to John, “Write.” . . . It
is strange indeed if we, as teachers of rhetoric, have
nothing higher to do than to correct bad spelling and
clean up slovenly sentences.
J O H N G E N U N G , “The Study of Rhetoric in the
College Course”
An educational process in an important sense is a
process of initiation: an initiation, that is, into the ways
of working, or of behaving, or of thinking . . . particular
to one’s cultural traditions. . . . Learning the genres of
one’s culture is both part of entering into it with understanding, and part of developing the necessary ability
to change it.
F R A N C E S C H R I S T I E , “Genres as Choice”

So far, I have argued that genres maintain the desires they
help writers to fulﬁll, and I have analyzed how, through genres,
writers position themselves within, negotiate, and articulate
these desires as recognizable, meaningful, consequential
actions. Because they situate writers within such positions of
articulation, genres, when analyzed, contribute to our understanding of how and why writers invent—how, that is, writers participate in and become agents of the agency at work on them
when they write. In previous chapters, I have examined genres
in this way, as sites of invention. In this chapter, I speculate on
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what it would mean to apply this view of genre and invention to
writing instruction, especially ﬁrst-year writing courses. In particular, I argue that teachers can and should teach students how to
identify and analyze genred positions of articulation so that students can locate themselves and begin to participate within
these positions more meaningfully, critically, and dexterously.
Genre analysis can make visible to students the desires embedded within genres; and by giving students access to these desires,
we enable them to interrogate, enact, and reﬂect on the relations, subjectivities, and practices these desires underwrite. In
what follows, I will describe what such a genre-based writing pedagogy might look like and how, by practicing it, we can re-imagine and justify the function and place of ﬁrst-year writing
instruction in the university.
F I R S T- Y E A R W R I T I N G A N D T H E P L A C E O F C O M P O S I T I O N

John Genung wrote the words I cite in the above epigraph in
1887 (reprinted in Brereton 1995). The department to which
he was referring was the newly founded Department of English
and the course is what we now commonly recognize as ﬁrst-year
composition or ﬁrst-year writing (FYW). I cite these words not
to reﬂect on their antiquatedness, but to acknowledge the
extent to which today, nearly a hundred and ﬁfty years after its
inception, scholars and teachers in composition studies can still
look at the FYW course with the same bewilderment Genung
did in 1887. We may not be as devoted today to correcting bad
spelling and cleaning up slovenly sentences, but we are as much
at a loss in articulating the goals of the FYW course as were its
ﬁrst teachers. As I was ﬁrst drafting this chapter, in fact, administrators, teachers, and scholars of writing were heatedly debating on the Writing Program Administrators discussion list
(WPA-L) the recommendations outlined in the most recent
outcomes statement for FYW courses. As this listserv discussion
and countless other exchanges at our conferences and in our
journals suggest, those involved in the teaching and administration of the FYW course still struggle to agree on what the course
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outcomes ought to be and how best to achieve them. The
course continues to have little to no disciplinary identity: its
goals undeﬁned, its place in the English department marginal
at best, and its relationship to writing in the disciplines (WID)
programs uncertain. Yet the course remains the most frequently
taught in U.S. colleges and universities, and one of the few that
carries a universal requirement. And despite the fact that some
universities are beginning to consider making the course an
elective rather than a requirement, and some composition programs have begun to separate from English departments to
form departments of their own, the FYW course is not likely to
disappear anytime soon.
Among the various and often contradictory rationales its advocates have advanced over the years for justifying the composition
requirement, Sharon Crowley lists the following: to develop taste
in students, to improve their formal and mechanical correctness,
to provide them with a liberal education, to prepare them for
their professions, to develop their personalities and “personal
voices,” to help them participate as able democratic citizens, to
teach them textual analysis, to encourage them to become more
critical thinkers, to introduce them to the composing process, to
introduce them to academic disciplines and discourses, and,
more recently, to encourage them to critique dominant cultural
ideologies and to resist systems of oppression (1998, 6). Clearly,
the course can try to do everything and end up, as its critics
argue, doing very little. If there is, however, one goal upon which
most writing teachers, university faculty, administrators, and the
public can agree today, it continues to be that the course ought
to teach students how to “master grammar, usage, and formal ﬂuency” (Crowley 1998, 7). We ought to wonder, though, along with
John Genung, why we cannot aspire to a higher goal.
Due in part to its undeﬁned goals, the universally required
FYW course, a mainstay of English departments and a tenuous
part of their identity for a little more than a hundred years, has
recently come under more scrutiny than ever before by those,
especially within composition studies, who question its place and
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its purpose. Victor Vitanza (1999) and Susan Miller (1997) have
questioned the “cultural studies” turn the course has taken at
many universities, claiming that such a turn shifts the course’s
emphasis from the production of texts to their interpretation, a
hermeneutic search for cultural and textual meanings more beﬁtting the work of literary studies than composition. Rhetoric, these
critics argue, is not a spectator sport. Even more recently, Sharon
Crowley (2000; see also 1995) and others have begun to question
why the course should remain a universal requirement in most
U.S. colleges and universities, arguing in part that the course’s
requirement has not only stiﬂed WID initiatives, but has also contributed to the exploitation of lecturers, graduate teaching assistants, and other part-time instructors who regularly teach it.
Perhaps the most serious challenges to the FYW course, however, have been those that question its place in the teaching of
writing. Linda Bergmann (1996), Charles Hill and Lauren
Resnick (1995), Carl Lovitt and Art Young (1997), Elaine
Maimon (1983), David Russell (1991), and others argue, for
instance, that the course does not prepare students for the disciplinary writing skills they need in their majors and careers, suggesting that “what students learn about writing in composition
courses . . . is how to write in composition courses” (Bacon 2000,
590). Carl Lovitt and Art Young describe how, as more and more
colleges and universities require writing-intensive courses across
the curriculum and in the disciplines, English departments face
increasing pressure to justify the FYW course, especially since the
“overly restrictive conceptions of ﬁrst-year composition courses
have, in many instances, undermined the ability of such courses
to contribute to the goals of university-wide writing programs”
(1997, 113). Critics of the required writing course question
whether a course housed in the English department and taught
and administered mainly by English department faculty, parttime instructors, and graduate students can truly meet the discipline-speciﬁc rhetorical needs of the university and the
professions. These critics wonder if writing skills are as transferable as we once thought they were—indeed, whether we can
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even talk about “good writing” outside of its social and rhetorical
contexts. They also question the course’s accountability, in particular, whose interests are being served by the universal requirement. These critics may have reason to be suspicious. As Linda
Bergmann explains, once we in English departments “have the
students safely registered in our classes, we teach them, deliberately or not, consciously or not, the things we really consider
important: the standards, values, and conventions of our own disciplinary discourse” (1996, 58; Bergmann’s emphasis). Such criticism, as well as recent movements to relocate writing programs
outside of English departments, suggests that the FYW course
has reached a critical impasse in its history. In response, we who
study, teach, and administer it must address the course’s responsibility to the university, especially its relationship to WID, as well
as its location within the Department of English if we are to justify its continued existence.
In this chapter, I offer a genre-based approach to FYW
instruction as a way to address the course’s responsibility to
WID and to justify its location within English. Such an
approach, as I will argue, requires us to re-place invention from
the writer to the genred sites of action in which the writer participates. This move calls for a rhetorical view of invention, one
that builds on and adds to the work of Richard Young, Janice
Lauer, and those who have followed them over the last forty
years (see chapter 3). But despite such work, rhetoric (and an
understanding of invention based on it) remains marginalized
in writing instruction. This is not surprising given the history of
FYW instruction. After all, the FYW course emerged at about
the same time as the English department did, which was also at
about the same time that rhetoric, a cross-disciplinary course of
study, began to lose its stature in the new American university.
The complicated history of the required writing course and its
relationship to English studies and the new university has
already been told at length by historians such as James Berlin
(1987), John Brereton (1995), Robert Connors (1997), Sharon
Crowley (1998), Susan Miller (1991), and Thomas Miller
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(1997), and I do not pretend to retell it here. In what follows, I
only wish to highlight how the displacement of rhetoric by composition within English departments may have contributed to
the present impasse in FYW instruction and to describe how a
genre-based understanding of invention might help us work
through this impasse. As I argued in earlier chapters, by locating invention within genred sites of action, we treat invention
rhetorically, as a way of being and acting in the world in relation
to others within certain circumstances. And when we teach
invention in this way, we teach students how to locate themselves within and participate in the textured worlds that surround them, within and beyond the academic disciplines. This
genre-based approach to invention can connect FYW courses
with WID in productive ways, ways that can help justify the function of FYW and its place within English departments.
RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION?

It is common for us today to refer to “rhet-comp” as an academic discipline, but this label might actually hide some of the
tensions between rhetoric and composition, tensions that ﬁrst
emerged about the time when the FYW course was established
in American universities in the late nineteenth century.
Historians have described various factors that accounted for the
emergence of what came to be known as freshman English in
the period between 1870 and 1900, among them, a gradual shift
from orality to literacy; a concomitant interest in belletristic
writing, especially written in the vernacular; a dramatic increase
in the number of students as a result of the Morrill Act of 1862,
which introduced masses of new students to the newly created
state universities; the ﬁrst American literacy crises in the late
1880s; and the inﬂuence of the German university system,
which served as a model for the specialized, elective-based,
research-oriented, and disciplinary nature of the new American
university (Berlin 1987; Brereton 1995; Connors 1997). All
these factors conspired to create the conditions for the FYW
course. As Robert Connors explains, rhetoric, which had
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enjoyed nearly two thousand ﬁve hundred years of power and
prestige as an academic ﬁeld of study, could not survive under
the conditions that saw the new American universities displace
the traditional colleges. For one thing, the German universities,
which trained so many of the Ph.D.’s who eventually returned
to establish the new American universities, did not offer
advanced degrees in rhetoric. Those who studied in Germany
returned social scientists, chemists, psychologists, mathematicians, and philologists, but not rhetoricians (Connors 1997,
178–80). The advanced, research-based rhetorical training
needed to sustain rhetoric as a discipline in the new American
universities was not available. In addition, the German model
was detail-oriented and empirical. Rhetoric, however, is more
an art than a science, so it fared badly, eventually becoming displaced by philology—which involved more empirical analysis of
the development and structure of languages—as the main
research focus of English studies (Connors 1997, 178). It was
philology, not rhetoric, that provided the theoretical and pedagogical underpinnings for the creation of the English department within which “freshman composition” developed.
In writing instruction, the shift in focus from production to
product, from invention to arrangement, mirrored the displacement of rhetoric by philology within English studies. The
English department built its research program around textual
interpretation, not production, thereby marginalizing the teaching of how and why texts come to be and privileging the ﬁnished
product as a timeless, ﬁxed, even spiritual entity full of meanings
to be scrutinized and deciphered (S. Miller 1991, 21–22). With
the displacement of invention and the turn toward interpretation within English studies, rhetoric slowly lost its place within
the English department. Aided by the inﬂuence of Hugh Blair’s
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (ﬁrst published in 1783),
newly minted English scholars transformed rhetoric into criticism (T. Miller 1997, 227), a transformation we recognize to this
day. In this context, rhetoric as a four-year course of study was
displaced by composition as a required, freshman-level, two
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semester course (Brereton 1995, 13), so that between 1865 and
1900 the new American university transformed from “an
intensely rhetorical world” (Connors 1997, 9) with rhetorical
study not only a part of the curriculum but also a part of students’ extracurricular activities to a “diverse, large, fragmented
university organized by academic disciplines” (Brereton 1995,
3–4). Within this new university culture, rhetoric, interdisciplinary by nature, could not be sustained as a central activity. As
Connors explains, “it had no real place in the new universities,
and its fall correlates exactly with their rise” (1997, 178).
The move from rhetoric to composition was marked not only
by a shift from speaking to writing, but also by a shift from a civic
to an interiorized subjectivity (Connors 1997, 44). In writing
courses, this move from “objective, centripetal writing tasks to
subjective, centrifugal tasks” (Connors 1997, 296), what Thomas
Miller has described as a move toward “a tasteful self-restraint
and a disinterested perspective on experience” (1997, 43), was
reﬂected in the “essay of manners and taste,” which became the
genred site for the formation and enactment of a bourgeois subjectivity characterized “by the disinterested perspective of the critical commentator whose personal character is revealed in a
polished style, restrained sense of polite decorum, and critical
attention to how gestures and expressions reveal individuals’ sensibility” (T. Miller 1997, 47). Against the backdrop of this interiorized perspective, informed by romantic theories of genius and
originality as well as the “philological and exegetical traditions
that emphasized the autonomous writer and the text as individually held intellectual property” (Lunsford and Ede 1994, 420),
the writer’s subjectivity became and, as I argued in chapter 3,
largely continues to be the subject of writing instruction.
What remains constant over the nearly 150-year history of the
FYW course, a time during which composition displaced
rhetoric as the guiding principle, is that writing came more and
more to describe a process of learning (about oneself, one’s
experiences, one’s subject, one’s world) rather than a process of
being and acting in the world.1 This move from writing as
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rhetoric to writing as composition—what Thomas Cole describes
as the rise of the “expressionistic notion of the uniquely adequate verbalization of a unique idea” (1991, 21)—has had a
great deal to do with the modern decline of rhetoric. It has also,
as I have suggested above, had a great deal to do with the ascent
of the writer, so much so that we could proﬁtably argue that the
composition course as we know it today exists ﬁrst and foremost
not to introduce students to the ways of academic discourse
(which is how some teachers and administrators of the course
advertise its mission) but to develop and articulate the writing
self, what Francis Christie has described as “the concern for the
individual, and for the development of that individual, conﬁdent of opinion, capable of independence of action and of self
expression” that has so long occupied the responsibility of
English teachers (1988, 23).
And so, as Susan Miller describes, the FYW course and the
process movement that largely informs it continue to “focus on
the author/writer, not on the results of authorship or of writing”
(1991, 98). That is, many teachers of the course continue to
ignore the social and rhetorical effects of writing, not only on its
audience but on its writers as well. As I have been arguing,
though, writers are always affected by and affect the conditions in
which they write, especially as these conditions are discursively
embodied by genres—acting as they are acted upon by the genres they write. Within genre, the writer rhetorically acquires certain desires and subjectivities, relates to others in certain ways,
and enacts certain actions. Genres, in short, rhetorically place
their writers in speciﬁc conditions of production. It is within
these conditions of production, within genres, that invention
takes place. By redirecting the trajectory of the writer’s inquiry
from the self to the rhetorical conditions within which the self is
constituted, this view of invention challenges us to rethink why
and how we teach FYW. Essentially, it asks us to take more of a
rhetorical than a process-based approach in FYW, one in which
students are encouraged to look outward, at how already existing
discursive and ideological formations such as genres coordinate
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ways of thinking and acting in different disciplinary contexts,
ways that student writers can interrogate, adopt, and eventually
learn to enact and/or resist when they write. The primary goal of
such a FYW course would be to teach students how to locate
themselves and their activities meaningfully and critically within
these genred positions of articulation. Such a rhetorical view of
invention, I argue, allows us to justify FYW as a site in which students can begin to learn how to navigate disciplinary contexts
rhetorically, thus forging real links to WID rather than consciously or unconsciously serving mainly the aspirations of
English departments. By teaching students that invention is as
much a public as it is a private act (an act of [re]positioning as
much as of expressing oneself), we teach them how to make visible for themselves and to practice in their writing the rhetorical
habits that inform the disciplinary and professional habitats
within which they will function. It is in this ability to teach students how to locate and invent themselves rhetorically within various sites of action (a rhetorical, metacognitive literacy)—an
ability to heighten awareness of disciplinarity and rhetoric—that
the future of FYW is most promising and justiﬁed.
RETHINKING WRITING INSTRUCTION: AN ARGUMENT
FOR A GENRE-BASED APPROACH TO FYW

The WID movement for years has been promoting and developing discipline-speciﬁc writing research and instruction,
research and instruction rooted in the ideological and discursive
contexts of various disciplines within the university. This movement, reﬂecting research into the social bases of writing, suggests
that we need to teach writing in its disciplinary and professional
contexts, where writing is not only a means of communication—
the acquisition of certain communicative skills—but also a means
of socialization into disciplinary values, assumptions, relations,
and practices. Such research raises questions about the efﬁcacy
of FYW and its focus on general writing skills. Yet rather than considering this move toward disciplinary writing as a threat to the
existence of FYW, I think we as scholars, administrators, and
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teachers of the course ought to embrace this movement as an
opportunity for us not only to justify FYW, but also to rethink its
purpose and its place. FYW does not need to stand as an alternative to or in opposition to WID. As Charles Hill and Lauren
Resnick rightfully maintain, it is nearly impossible to re-create
disciplinary conditions in the FYW course, but this should not
mean, as Hill and Resnick go on to suggest, that the course “can
do little to prepare students for writing within the various professional contexts they will be entering after graduation” (1995,
146). The fact that the FYW course cannot re-create the various
ideological and discursive formations that underwrite disciplinary and professional contexts does not mean that the FYW
course cannot prepare students for writing within these contexts.
It can. By functioning as a kind of rhetorical promontory from
which we teach students how to read and negotiate the boundaries of various disciplinary and professional contexts, the FYW
course can become the site in which students learn how to access,
interrogate, and (re)position themselves as writers within these
disciplinary and professional contexts. In this way, FYW can function as a complement, perhaps even as a prerequisite, to WID, a
site within the structure of the university that enables students to
reﬂect critically on and at the same time to write about the university’s disciplinary structures.2 Genres, I argue, can serve as the
“passports” for accessing, analyzing, navigating, and participating
in these disciplinary structures.
At the end of Textual Carnivals, Susan Miller suggests that as
teachers and scholars of writing, we need to be “disclosing connections between speciﬁc social and textual superstructures and
highlighting how writing situations construct their participant
writers before, during, and after they undertake any piece of writing” (1991, 198). I agree that this should be a primary goal of
FYW, and a genre-based writing pedagogy can help us achieve it.
As discursive and ideological formations, genres allow teachers
and students to examine the connections between social and textual superstructures. At the same time, genres also enable teachers and students to observe how individuals situate themselves in
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positions of articulation within such superstructures. As such, a
genre approach enables us to teach students that writing is more
than just a communicative tool, a means of conveying ideas from
writer to reader. Writing is not only a skill; it is also a way of being
and acting in the world at a particular time, in a particular situation, for the achievement of particular desires. Rather than
teaching students some vague and perhaps questionable notion
of what “good” writing is, a notion that most likely cannot stand
up to disciplinary standards or scrutiny, we gain more by teaching students how to adapt as writers, socially and rhetorically,
from one genred site of action to the next. Such repositioning is
a critical part of learning to write successfully, as we saw in chapter 5, where students negotiate between the writing prompt and
the essay as they learn to write in FYW courses. We ought to promote the idea that good writers adapt well from one genred site
of action to the next. The rhetorical art of adaptation or repositioning should become central to our teaching of writing, especially our teaching of invention, which would then become the
art of analyzing genres and positioning oneself within them. In
what follows, I will describe an approach to writing instruction in
FYW that combines genre analysis and invention in such a way as
to help student writers begin to access, identify, and participate
within genred sites of action.
Genre analysis encourages students to identify and examine
the situated desires, subjectivities, relations, and practices that
are rhetorically embedded in disciplinary and professional genres. Using genre analysis, we can ask students, for instance, why
scientiﬁc genres such as lab reports typically use passive sentence constructions, especially when such a rhetorical construction is typically discouraged in humanities, especially in English
courses. What does this typiﬁed rhetorical feature of the genre
reveal about those who use it and their disciplinary (dis)positions, relations, and practices? What position of articulation
does the lab report, through the use of this rhetorical feature,
maintain for its users? By asking such questions, rather than dismissing outright the passive voice as an undesirable rhetorical
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strategy or treating it as an arbitrary convention, we locate the
passive voice within the discursive and ideological sites of its
use—within the scientiﬁc genres in which this linguistic construction helps organize and generate scientiﬁc practices. Of
course, the passive voice alone does not reveal the complex textured sites of scientiﬁc activities; to examine these sites, genre
analysis, as I will describe momentarily, would need to include
identifying a wide array of textual patterns. But early in the
course, we can start by making an analysis of the passive voice
the occasion for a writing assignment, in which, for instance, we
invite students to interview faculty in the sciences, collect samples of lab reports (and other scientiﬁc genres), and then analyze and write about what desires, relations, positions, and
practices the passive voice generates and organizes in the sciences. In my courses, for example, students have discovered
that the passive voice actually serves a crucial disciplinary function in scientiﬁc inquiry, reinforcing the scientiﬁc imperative
that the material world exists objectively, independent of
human interaction. They have learned that a scientist assumes
the position of one who observes and records what happens,
and the passive voice rhetorically enables and reﬂects this position. Indeed, the passive voice suggests that actions occur
largely through their own accord, and the scientist simply
describes them. By extracting the actor’s role from the action in
a sentence such as “Twelve samples were introduced,” scientists
retain the necessary, even if ﬁctive, objectivity they need to conduct their activities—indeed an objectivity that is critical to a scientist’s disciplinary identity. Through their research and our
discussions, students learn that the lab report, then, is not
merely a means of communicating experimental results; it is
also a means by which scientists reproduce and enact scientiﬁc
subjectivities, desires, and practices—the way they function in
the world as scientists. Working as a class, students begin to recognize that the lab report, like any other genre, is a site of
action within which users rhetorically acquire, negotiate, and
articulate situated desires, subjectivities, and practices. Students
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in FYW courses can, and I think should, be taught and encouraged to recognize genre as such a site. And they can and should
be taught how to use this genre knowledge to develop a rhetorical awareness and agility that will help them navigate disciplinary and professional boundaries as writers long after they
leave the FYW course.
In my writing courses, I often begin with a collective genre
analysis exercise even before I have explained to students what
genre analysis involves. I bring in samples of a genre such as the
lab report or the obituary or the greeting card, and I pose the
question: what does this kind of text tell us about our culture? In
fact, much of what I have learned and describe about the obituary (in chapter 2) and the greeting card (in chapter 4) builds on
and adds to these early class discussions. I want students to begin
to understand how genre analysis makes sites of activity and the
positions of articulation they frame rhetorically visible and accessible to inquiry. Such analysis involves doing a sort of textual
archeology, what John Swales has described as “textography”
(1998), in which students identify and analyze genres’ contexts
of use through their rhetorical features. As one FYW student elegantly describes it in the introduction of her genre analysis
paper, “the study of genre is not limited to what is clearly seen or
presented, such as format, structure, or word choice used in the
genre, but extends to the analysis of underlying meanings and
social function that can be inferred from the speciﬁc features.”
In simplest terms, genre analysis involves four steps: collecting samples of the genre, identifying and describing the context
of its use, describing its textual patterns, and analyzing what
these patterns reveal about the context in which the genre is
used. The following heuristic, which I reprint with slight modiﬁcation from Amy J. Devitt, Anis Bawarshi, and Mary Jo Reiff’s
Scenes of Writing: Genre Acts (in progress), describes these steps.3
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Guidelines for Analyzing Genres
1. Collect Samples of the Genre
If you are studying a genre that is fairly public, such as the
wedding announcement, you can just look at samples from various
newspapers. If you are studying a less public genre, such as the
Patient Medical History Form, you might have to visit different
doctors’ ofﬁces to collect samples. If you are unsure where to ﬁnd
samples, ask a user of that genre for assistance. Try to gather samples
from more than one place (for example, wedding announcements
from different newspapers, medical history forms from different
doctors’ ofﬁces) so that you get a more accurate picture of the complexity of the genre. The more samples of the genre you collect, the
more you will be able to notice patterns within the genre.
2. Study the Situation of the Genre
Seek answers to questions such as the ones below.
Setting: Where does the genre appear? Where are texts of this genre
typically located? What medium, context? With what other
genres does this genre interact?
Subject: What topics is this genre involved with? What issues, ideas,
questions, etc. does the genre address? When people use this
genre, what is it that they are interacting about?
Participants: Who uses the genre?
Writers: Who writes the texts in this genre? Are multiple writers
possible? How do we know who the writers are? What roles do
they perform? What characteristics must writers of this genre
possess? Under what circumstances do writers write the genre
(e.g., in teams, on a computer, in a rush)?
Readers: Who reads the texts in this genre? Is there more than
one type of reader for this genre? What roles do they perform? What characteristics must readers of this genre possess?
Under what circumstances do readers read the genre (e.g., at
their leisure, on the run, in waiting rooms)?
Motives: When is the genre used? For what occasions? Why is the
genre used? Why do writers write this genre and why do readers
read it? What purposes does the genre fulﬁll for the people who
use it?
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3. Identify and Describe Patterns in the Genre’s Features
What recurrent features do the samples share? For example:
What content is typically included? What is excluded? How is the
content treated? What sorts of examples are used? What
counts as evidence (personal testimony, facts, etc.)?
What rhetorical appeals are used? What appeals to logos, pathos,
and ethos appear?
How are texts in the genres structured? What are their parts, and
how are they organized?
In what format are texts of this genre presented? What layout or
appearance is common? How long is a typical text in this genre?
What types of sentences do texts in the genre typically use? How
long are they? Are they simple or complex, passive or active?
Are the sentences varied? Do they share a certain style?
What diction is most common? What types of words are most
frequent? Is a type of jargon used? Is slang used? How would
you describe the writer’s voice?
4. Analyze What These Patterns Reveal about the Situation
What do these rhetorical patterns reveal about the genre and the
situation in which it is used? Why are these patterns signiﬁcant?
What can you learn about the actions being performed through the
genre by observing its language patterns? What arguments can you
make about these patterns? As you consider these questions, focus
on the following:
What do participants have to know or believe to understand or
appreciate the genre?
Who is invited into the genre, and who is excluded?
What roles for writers and readers does it encourage or
discourage?
What values, beliefs, goals, and assumptions are revealed through
the genre’s patterns?
How is the subject of the genre treated? What content is considered
most important? What content (topics or details) is ignored?
What actions does the genre help make possible? What actions
does the genre make difﬁcult?
What attitude toward readers is implied in the genre? What attitude
toward the world is implied in it?
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Notice how the heuristic guides students from the situation
to the genre and then back to the situation. First, it asks students to identify the situation from which the genre emerges.
Students do this through interviews and observation, trying to
identify where and when the genre is used, by whom, and why.
After that, students are asked to analyze what the genre tells us
about the situation. Such analysis involves describing the
genre’s rhetorical patterns, from its content down to its diction,
and then making an argument about what these patterns reveal
about the desires, assumptions, subjectivities, relations, and
actions embedded in the genre. In short, students are invited to
revisit the situation through the genre that reﬂects, organizes,
and maintains it. As the heuristic suggests, genre analysis
enables students and teachers to open a temporary analytical
space between the genre and its situation, a space in which students can access and inquire into the interplay between rhetorical and social actions as well as the desires, subjectivities, and
relations enacted there. Genre analysis allows teachers to create
this analytical space within FYW.
Below are a couple of brief examples of student genre analyses, the ﬁrst from a FYW course I taught a few years ago and the
second from a FYW course I observed last year taught by an
advanced graduate student. In the ﬁrst example, the student
elected to study the genres used by nurses in a hospital. After
conducting interviews and observing the situations in which the
genres are used, the student decided to perform a comparative
genre analysis of the screening forms used by registered nurses
and nurse practitioners. She examined the different rhetorical
patterns of the two genres and then, building on what she had
learned from her interviews, analyzed and demonstrated how
the genres, in their different rhetorical patterns, reﬂect, on the
one hand, different attitudes about what nurse practitioners
and registered nurses do and cannot do, and, on the other, the
different positions nurse practitioners and registered nurses
occupy within the hospital, including their relation to each
other and their patients.
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In the second, more recent, example, a student studied the
Medical Incident Report that paramedics routinely write after
responding to a medical call. Through interviews, the student
learned that the report records the time of the call, who
responded, the amount of time spent at the scene, as well as
pertinent medical information about the patient and the treatment. In addition, the report serves to record the paramedic’s
performance in the case of potential lawsuits. The student also
learned that paramedics dread writing these reports, going so
far as to trade the responsibility for chores. After moving from
the situation to the text, the student then returned to the situation through the text. She described and analyzed the report’s
features, including its use of trauma codes and abbreviations, its
compact textual spaces for recording information, and its short
and terse sentences. These features, she argues, invite an impersonal, seemingly unbiased description of the event. Remarkably,
the student concludes that the presence of this genre reminds
the paramedics of what is expected of them. It is one of several
genres that frame how paramedics experience their work. The
student describes this intertextuality as follows:
When the call goes out, the ﬁreﬁghter and paramedics receive the
minimum amount of information over the scanner. On the way to
the scene, the paramedics are already formulating what they may
ﬁnd, based on what they heard over the scanner. This “seeing”
comes from words. Once on the scene . . . the [paramedic] must
either continue with the preexisting plan, or throw it out based on
what they can see. When writing the[report], the paramedics know
that they are doing so in order that others not present at the incident will be able to “see” what happened and therefore make judgments on the patient’s behavior, treatment, and how well the
paramedics responded.

Through genre analysis, the student in this case has used the
genre of the Medical Incident Report to gain access into the complex, multitextured world of paramedics, and to describe how this
textured world frames the way paramedics see and are seen.
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Once students and I establish that genres can tell us things
about those who use them, and after students have had a
chance to analyze a genre of their choosing, I have then
instructed students to form semester-long groups, each adopting a speciﬁc academic discipline (for example, an economics
group, a chemistry group, a psychology group, and so on).
Working in groups, students study the discipline through its
genres. They interview faculty and students in the discipline to
ﬁnd out what sorts of texts they write and what function writing
serves. They then collect sample genres from the discipline,
and, working individually, each student analyzes one of the genres following procedures I have described above. Based on that
analysis, students then establish a claim about what the genre
reveals and then write an argument essay that presents and
develops that claim with evidence from the analysis.4
Genre analysis gives rhetoric a central focus in FYW courses.
Rather than having students write about topics such as race,
gender, gay rights, the environment, animal rights, ﬂag burning,
the death penalty, the media, and so on (important topics all), we
can encourage students instead to write about how different
genres position writers to write about these topics—to write, that
is, about writing: how genres affect writers’ rhetorical choices,
what genred desires might be motivating these rhetorical choices,
what attitudes are embedded in writers’ rhetorical choices, how
rhetorical choices affect meaning, and so on. Students still write
arguments, but these arguments are about writing, about the
rhetorical choices writers make and how their genred positions of
articulation organize and elicit these choices. Indeed, which
genre my students choose to study is not as relevant as what they
learn about invention by analyzing and writing about it.
Invention, as I have deﬁned it, takes place within and grows out of
such a rhetorical awareness. We can make the teaching of invention a great deal less mysterious if we base it in a process of genre
analysis that allows students to inquire into and position themselves within the discursive and ideological frameworks of genres.
This is how I propose we teach invention in FYW courses.
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Through genre analysis, we can teach FYW students to recognize how rhetorical habits are dynamically connected to disciplinary habitats.5 As advocates of WID argue, this recognition
should go a long way in dispelling some of the guesswork and
mystery that students so often experience while writing. In my
classes, students learn that when they write in a certain genre,
they are participating in a textured site of action, which means
they are engaging in certain desires which underwrite certain
commitments, subjectivities, relations, and practices. If they are
able to begin identifying what these desires are—that is, if they
are able to analyze how these desires are rhetorically constituted—then they will be able to invent themselves and participate in the genred sites of action more meaningfully and
critically as writers, as we saw in the examples of the social work
student learning to write an assessment report in chapter 4, and
the FYW students navigating between the textured worlds of the
writing prompt and student essay in chapter 5. An explicit
knowledge of genres can lead students to make more effective
rhetorical decisions because they will have a better sense of
what purposes their rhetorical choices are serving. That is,
rather than guessing, they will be more likely to predict the
effects of their rhetorical strategies, including the position they
will need to assume in order to produce these strategies.
Through genre analysis, then, we not only make students aware
of different rhetorical conventions and what they reveal, but we
also make students aware of how these different conventions
position them as writers, the kinds of positions they need to
assume as they reproduce these conventions. Such analysis
allows students, to borrow a phrase from Victor Villanueva, to
achieve a kind of critical cultural literacy (1993) in which they
learn the rules of the genre game and participate in it at the
same time. This can be empowering for students.
Because writing is not only a communicative but also a social
act, involving communicants in social relations and actions, it
necessarily involves a process of repositioning. Individuals, for
example, become social workers, patients, and students in part
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by learning how to position themselves rhetorically within such
genres as the assessment report, the PMHF, and the syllabus.
Invention is the process through which writers locate themselves
within these genred positions of articulation. Invention and
repositioning go hand in hand. For this reason, some critics of
the explicit teaching of genre argue that it is impossible to study
and teach genres outside of their disciplinary habitats, since to
write genres effectively requires not just formal knowledge of
their rhetorical features but also social knowledge of their disciplinary assumptions (see Giltrow and Valiquette 1994). In addition, they argue, since we learn to write genres tacitly as part of
being and acting in a certain discipline, teachers cannot expect
students to learn genres in the artiﬁcial context of the classroom
(see Freedman 1993a; 1993b). Certainly, as FYW teachers we
cannot possibly initiate our students into the various disciplinary
genres of the university, let alone the various professional genres
they will encounter outside the university. We have neither the
time nor the expertise to do so. What we can do, however, is
teach our students how to become more rhetorically astute and
agile, how, in other words, to use genre analysis as a way to
become more effective and critical “readers” of the sites of
action within which writing takes place. Such an analytical skill is
transferable and does not require immersion in disciplinary cultures. In many ways, it is a skill our students already possess,
since to survive as social beings we must all possess at least a
modicum of rhetorical awareness. When they enter a room,
especially an unfamiliar room, for example, most students ﬁrst
survey or “scope out” the scene. They ﬁrst analyze who is in the
room, how different people are dressed, how the room is structured, who is talking to whom, in what way, on what subject, and
so on. Such an analysis of the scene enables them to position
themselves and participate within it more effectively. Students
are already rhetorically perceptive and adjust at times with
uncanny ease from one discursive and ideological context to the
next—from their dorm lives to their classroom lives to their
family lives and so on. As teachers of writing, we can build upon
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these skills by teaching students that genre analysis (the process
of “reading” a site of action as it is rhetorically embedded in its
genres), invention (the process of positioning oneself within
these genred sites), and social activities (the choices a writer
makes and their effects within these genred sites) are connected
in the act of writing.
Unfortunately, most students have not been taught to understand writing as “one of the activities by which we locate ourselves in the enmeshed systems that make up the social world”
(Cooper and Holzman 1989, 13). They do not see writing, particularly academic writing, as being as socially embedded as the
rest of their discursive lives, and so do not bring their rich social
and rhetorical skills to bear on their writing. This is due in part,
I think, to the way that invention continues to be taught largely
as a private act in many FYW courses. However, if we can teach
students to recognize and write about how “the enmeshed systems that make up the social world” are rhetorically embedded
within genres—if, that is, we can help students recognize that
genres are very much like rhetorical and social spaces (or
topoi) they locate themselves and participate within—then we
can go a long way towards helping students more effectively and
critically to invent themselves and participate as writers within
the various disciplinary scenes of the university. Such a recognition grounds writing instruction not only in the processes of
textual production, but also in what texts do in the world—their
function and effects. This kind of rhetorical approach teaches
students how to write by ﬁrst teaching them how to place themselves within the different enmeshed systems that are reﬂected
and maintained textually in different genres.
At the same time as it helps connect FYW and WID, a genrebased writing pedagogy also justiﬁes the place of FYW in
English. We do not need to be social workers or scientists or
doctors to know how to inquire into assessment reports, lab
reports, or Patient Medical History Forms. As scholars and
teachers of English, we are, more than anything else, experts in
language use: what language does, how it does it, to what ends,
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where, when, and why. As a result, we are uniquely qualiﬁed to
teach students how to inquire into various disciplinary and professional genres, in some ways perhaps even more so than those
who use them on a daily basis (see C. Miller 1999; Maimon
1983). As Richard Coe has written, “genres embody attitudes,”
but since “those attitudes are built into generic structures, they
are sometimes danced without conscious awareness or intent
on the part of the individual using the genre” (1994a, 183). By
moving a genre from its context of use to the analytical space of
the FYW course, genre analysis enables teachers and students to
temporarily make conscious, scrutinize, and practice the
unconscious attitudes that are embedded within genres.
My goal in using genre analysis in FYW is not the acquisition
of disciplinary knowledge per se. My goal, rather, is to encourage students to understand invention as rhetorically grounded,
so that invention involves a process in which writers (re)position
themselves and participate within discursive and ideological formations.6 In short, I use genre analysis as an invention technique, a heuristic which does not so much ask students to
imagine themselves as the starting point of writing as it encourages them to write by inquiring into and then situating themselves within genred positions of articulation. As situated topoi,
genres thus serve as the loci of invention, the habits as well as
the habitats for acting in language. In fact, I am continuously
surprised at how astute students are in recognizing the positions
of articulation embedded in the genres they study. One student,
whom I cited in chapter 4, revealed how the PMHF constructs
the patient as an embodied object; others analyzed how wedding
invitations rhetorically position the bride as property, how different genres within a hospital locate registered nurses and nurse
practitioners into different positions, how different grade
reporting genres (from traditional report cards to the more
recent grade continuums) position students as different kinds of
learners, and so on. Most importantly, students recognize how
these positions are constructed rhetorically within the genres
they study. They may never become doctors or social workers or
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teachers or brides, but they have learned something valuable, I
think, about how writing works to make these positions possible.
This knowledge can travel with them to any genred space they
encounter. I consider such knowledge of genre as central to a
knowledge of invention, the ﬁrst step in helping writers learn
how to position themselves and participate meaningfully and
critically within different genred sites of action.
Once students are done practicing genre analysis, I have at
times asked them to write some of these genres, thereby moving
from analysis to production of texts. Again, I confess I am less
concerned with what genres students write, and more concerned with how they rationalize their rhetorical choices when
they write these genres. For this reason, I require students to
submit a rationale along with their written genres. In this rationale, students essentially make an argument on behalf of their
rhetorical choices as these are informed by what they have
come to know about the desires, subjectivities, relations, and
practices embedded in the genre. This rationale becomes especially signiﬁcant in those cases where students choose to resist
and or transform a genre based on what they have learned
about it. In such cases, students can explain which genre features they have chosen to resist and why, thereby speculating on
the effects and consequences of their changes. This sort of
metarhetorical skill can help students navigate what Lovitt and
Young have described as “the rhetorical and social realities of
either academic or nonacademic writing” (1997, 116). Indeed,
this is the sort of skill that I think Frances Christie refers to
when she writes, “Learning the genres of one’s culture is both
part of entering into it with understanding, and part of developing the necessary ability to change it” (1988, 30). Such a
metarhetorical awareness of genre can serve students beyond
the FYW course and into the various writing situations they will
encounter in the university and beyond.
There persists a frustrating assumption that FYW is a contentless course, that it has no inherent subject. In this chapter, I have
tried to demonstrate that FYW does have a subject; it is writing.
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Writing is the subject of FYW. Not just the process of writing, but
writing itself—what writing does, how it works, and why—should
be the subject of FYW. In other words, FYW should become a
course in rhetoric, a course that uses genres to teach students
how to recognize and navigate discursive and ideological formations. We can do more to help our students write in and beyond
the disciplines by teaching them how to position themselves
rhetorically within genres so that they can more effectively meet
(and potentially change) the desires and practices embedded
there. Such a pedagogy challenges us to locate invention at the
intersection between the acquisition and articulation of desire
where writers and writing take place. By locating the FYW course
at this nexus, we stand a better chance of justifying both the
course’s relationship to WID and its very existence within the
English department and the university.
CONCLUSION

Since beginnings are continuations, the end of this book is
destined to become the beginning of another. So in that spirit,
let me conclude by returning to the subject of beginnings with
which this book began. In Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad
describes what amounts to be such a return, a journey toward
beginnings—the heart of darkness. The narrator, Marlow,
describes his journey up the Congo in this way: “Going up that
river was like traveling back to the earliest beginnings of the
world, when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees
were kings” (1988, 35; my emphasis). In some ways, this is a colonialist fantasy that imagines the colonized space as site of origin
for the colonizers’ self-(re)production. But beginnings are a
problem in this novel. First is the question of where or when the
story begins. Does it begin on board the Nellie, the moored sailing vessel on which Marlow begins his narrative? Or does it
begin earlier, with the frame-narrator’s narrative of Marlow’s
narrative? Better yet, does the story begin even earlier than that,
prior to the Nellie and the frame- narrator, with Marlow’s ﬁctitious experiences in the Congo? Or does it begin earlier even, in
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Conrad’s “Congo Diary,” which he kept while he served as a captain of a steamboat on the Congo? Or does it begin with the
colonialism that brought Conrad to the Congo in the ﬁrst place
and shaped his experiences there? These questions suggest the
extent to which beginnings always take place in relation to other
beginnings—in the midst of other beginnings.
Heart of Darkness does not only problematize its own beginnings, however; it also questions the very nature of beginnings
as unpreceded origins, as what Edward Said terms “divine”
beginnings. Marlow journeys up the Congo in search of Kurtz,
who signiﬁes an essence of something buried deep in the
“heart” of darkness. Marlow’s is a search for beginnings, for
what Derrida calls a “transcendental signiﬁed” (1992, 1118)
represented by Kurtz. But what Marlow actually discovers when
he ﬁnally locates Kurtz is that such a transcendent, uniﬁed, selfgenerated beginning does not exist. What he realizes instead is
that Kurtz is a sign or “word,” so that the scene of beginnings
becomes a scene of interpretation. Beginnings exist as
moments of interpretation, not origination, just like signs only
mean as they are interpreted. Kurtz only means as Marlow interprets him, so that each beginning is an interpretation and a
continuation of another beginning, a series of secular, dialogical beginnings functioning in relation to one another in much
the same way that Bakhtin describes utterances as “ﬁlled with
echoes and reverberations of other utterances” (1986, 91).
In the same way, I have argued that writers and writing begin
in relation to genres, the discursive and ideological conditions
that writers have to position themselves within and interpret in
order to write. By encouraging student writers to recognize
beginnings as genred positions of articulation, and by teaching
students how to inquire into these positions, we enable them to
locate themselves more critically and effectively as writers within
these beginnings. That is, we teach them how to begin their own
writing in relation to these already existing beginnings.

NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1.

2.

Composition textbooks such as Bazerman’s Involved, Hatch’s
Arguing in Communities, Klooster and Bloem’s The Writer’s
Community, and Trimbur’s Call to Write, to name a few, increasingly acknowledge and present writing and invention as thoroughly situational and cooperative activities. Trimbur’s book,
in particular, applies current theories of genre to teach students how to write different texts, and has enjoyed some success. And an increasing number of textbooks use
ethnographic techniques to teach students how to identify and
examine scenes of writing.
For a more detailed account of the conditions that helped
construct this view of the autonomous author, including the
role of the printing press and the emergence of copyright law,
which designated the text as the property of its author, see M.
Rose 1993 and Woodmansee and Jaszi 1994.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1.

2.

In describing genres as sites of action, we must acknowledge
that genres do not only help us make certain activities happen;
they also help prevent other activities from happening. As
such, genres function as sites of articulation and silence. What
cannot be articulated is as signiﬁcant as what can be, and any
theorization of genre needs to account for the power and politics of genre. For more on the relation between genre and the
politics of articulation, see Paré (2002) and Schryer (2002).
In literary studies, scholarship in cultural studies is a notable
and more recent exception. Scholars in cultural studies recognize and treat all texts, literary or otherwise, as cultural artifacts, which reﬂect and reproduce cultural contexts and
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everyday social practices. For cultural studies work that examines theories of the everyday, see Michel de Certeau’s The
Practice of Everyday Life (1984).
As I am describing it, the genre function is akin to what Pierre
Bourdieu calls habitus, which he deﬁnes in The Logic of Practice
as “the system of structured, structuring dispositions” (1990,
52) and in Practical Reason as a kind of “practical sense for what
is to be done in a given situation—what is called in sport a
‘feel’ for the game, that is, the art of anticipating the future of
the game, which is inscribed in the present state of play”
(1998, 25). As Bourdieu is careful to note, the habitus is not
only a symbolic structure, but is rather “constituted in practice
and is always oriented towards practical functions” (1990, 52).
For those who, like Benedetto Croce (1968) and Maurice
Blanchot (1959), perceive literary texts as being indeterminate,
an expression of unbounded imagination, genre is an institutional threat to literary texts and authors. Echoing in part the
formalist and new critical dream of a free-standing text made
up of its own internal relations and subject to its own structural
integrity, Blanchot perceives genre as a threat to the text’s
autonomy. He writes: “The book alone is important, as it is, far
from genre, outside rubrics . . . under which it refuses to be
arranged and to which it denies the power to ﬁx its place and to
determine its form” (qtd. in Perloff 1989). Even poststructuralist critiques of formalism subordinate genres. Questioning the
stability of structures and exposing the contradictions and
ﬁssures within what appears to be a self-contained and coherent text, poststructuralist theorists have highlighted the instability and arbitrariness of meaning. In relation to such textual
indeterminacy, genre exists tenuously. For example, Jacques
Derrida, who in his “Law of Genre” acknowledges that “every
text participates in one or several genres; there is no genre-less
text” (1980, 65), insists that the “law” of genre, as with any other
kind of law, is an arbitrary and conservative attempt to impose
order on what is ultimately indeterminate.
Even scholars such as Cohen (1989), Hirsch (1967),
Perloff (1989), and Rosmarin (1985) who recognize the
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heuristic function of genre nonetheless subordinate it to an
ad hoc status, one that not only classiﬁes but also explains
texts. These critics are careful to note, however, that even
though genre may exercise some explanatory power over literary texts, it does not interfere with their autonomy. Literary
texts are produced and exist independently of genres; genres
function only as critical apparatuses. Genre is, therefore, the
critic’s tool or heuristic, a lens the critic uses to interpret literary texts. The same text can be subject to different genrelenses without compromising its imagined integrity.
Carolyn Miller takes up this idea of genre as chronotope when
she explains, “genres impose structure on a given action in
space-time” (1994a, 75). For more on genre and the way it
shapes and regulates space-time, see Bakhtin (1981), Bazerman
(1994b), Schryer (2002), and Yates and Orlikowski (2002). Of
course, the idea that genres constitute certain space-time conﬁgurations is not as recent or novel as it may seem. The classical
triad of lyric, epic, and dramatic, which can be traced back to
Plato and Aristotle and which Genette calls “archigenres,” has
received considerable attention in literary studies (see, for
example, Frye 1957; Genette 1992; Scholes 1975; Welleck and
Warren 1942). The triad has served as the basis for a great deal
of literary generic categorizations, and has often been associated with space-time conﬁgurations, especially with spatial presence and temporal perspective. Lyric, for instance, is often
deﬁned as subjective, dramatic as objective, and epic as subjective-objective (Genette 1992, 38), so that in each formation we
have a different notion of presence—each, that is, articulates a
different spatial dimension in which action takes place. Within
lyric, the writer exists in spatial proximity to his or her text,
being in the text, so to speak, whereas in the dramatic, the
action takes place in its own spatial context that determines the
interaction between two independent actors. Spatially, we
equate objectivity with distance and subjectivity with proximity
and intimacy. Temporally, lyric is often associated with the present, dramatic with the future, and epic with the past (Genette
1992, 47-49), so that each archigenre represents a particular
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way of conceiving of literary temporality that, needless to say,
will affect literary actions within that temporality. So the lyric,
dramatic, and epic archigenres orient the way that time, space,
and the activities that occur within them are conﬁgured and
enacted in different literary texts.
This is particularly the case for scholars working in cultural
studies. Stephen Greenblatt, for example, introduces the special issue of the journal Genre dealing with the power of form
in the construction of Renaissance culture by claiming that
“the study of genre is an exploration of the poetics of culture” (1982, 6). Similarly, Terry Threadgold argues that
genre “cannot be treated in isolation from the social realities
and processes which it contributes to maintaining (and could
be used to subvert)” (1989, 103).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the difﬁculties associated with the concept of discourse community and how
scholars in genre theory respond to these difﬁculties, see
Bawarshi, Devitt, and Reiff’s “Materiality and Genre in the
Study of Discourse Community.”
Thomas O. Beebee, deﬁning genre as the “use-value” of texts,
in part applies what Bakhtin claims for speech genres to written genres. For Beebee, “primarily, genre is the precondition
for the creation and the reading of texts” (1994, 250),
because genre provides the ideological context in which a
text and its participants function and attain cultural value:
“Genre gives us not understanding in the abstract and passive
sense but use in the pragmatic and active sense” (14). The
kind of use-value a genre represents depends on who its users
are, on what practices it makes possible, and on its relation to
other genres within a sphere of speech communication. It is
within this social and rhetorical economy that a genre attains
its use-value, making genre one of the bearers, articulators,
and reproducers of culture—in short, ideological. In turn,
genres are what make texts ideological, endowing them with
a social use-value. As ideological-discursive formations, then,
genres delimit all language—not just poetic language—into
what Beebee calls the “possibilities of its usage.”
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In raising genre to the level of register, I follow J.R. Martin
(1992, 1997) who deﬁnes genres as textured relations of
ﬁeld, mode, and tenor. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest
that genre constitutes or accounts for the entire social sphere
that we call culture, or, for that matter, that genre accounts
for the social sphere of the university or even a classroom
within the university. Each of these social spheres, in addition
to other social and material forces at work within them, contains multiple, sometimes competing genres that, grouped
together, allow us to map these spheres rhetorically. Indeed,
the genre function itself is a function of these larger social
spheres, at once reﬂecting, reproducing, and potentially
transforming them. By claiming that genres function as registers, then, I am only referring to the ways in which genres
maintain and articulate speciﬁc relations of ﬁeld, tenor, and
mode within these social spheres.
Others working in genre studies have also considered the
impact of Giddens’s theory of structuration on theories of
genre. Carol Berkenkotter and Thomas Huckin were among
the ﬁrst to do so in their “Rethinking Genre From a
Sociocognitive Perspective” (1993), positing that genre is
both constitutive of social structure and generative of social
practice (495). See also Yates and Orlikowski (1992) and
Giltrow and Valiquette (1994).
Not all scholars working in rhetorical genre studies are willing
to make such a claim for genre. For instance, John Swales,
whose Genre Analysis has contributed so much to rhetorical
genre studies, locates genre as one of six characteristics
shared by members of a discourse community in order to
achieve their goals. As Swales puts it, “genres are communicative vehicles for the achievement of goals” (1990, 46). Yet
Swales overlooks what his own analysis seems to reveal: the
functional as well as epistemological nature of genres. For
example, he concludes that the research article (RA) is a
“quite different genre to the laboratory report and has its own
quite separate conventions, its own processes of literary reasoning and its own standards of arguments” (1990, 118-19).
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He then delineates these conventions in order to teach students how to write RAs. Yet he does not consider or explain
what these differences reveal about the way each genre sets up
its own social and rhetorical representation of science or, for
that matter, how the different processes of reasoning that
each genre allows affect how its writers recognize and experience their subject matter or themselves as subjects. All we are
left with is Swales’ suggestive claim that the RA is a “remarkable phenomenon, so cunningly engineered by rhetorical
machining that it somehow still gives an impression of being
but a simple description of relatively untransmitted raw material” (1990, 125). We are left to wonder about how the RA
actually represents a particular space-time conﬁguration of
laboratory practice as well as about how the “impression” that
the genre creates actually shapes its users’ versions of laboratory practice in certain RA-mediated ways.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1.

2.

3.

As Rebecca Moore Howard points out, autonomy and agency
are not synonymous: “The issue of autonomy is an issue of
whether the writer acts alone, whereas the issue of agency is
one of whether the writer acts or is in action” (1999, 46).
Following Howard, I do not think we deny the agency of the
writer by denying its autonomy.
It is tempting to think about “freewriting” as a genre that
denies its status and function as a genre, a free and unmediated space for the exploration of ideas. Perceived as such,
freewriting might be understood as a genre that invites its
users to fantasize about its non-existence, which only makes it
a more extreme case of the fantasy that all genres desire their
users to maintain. As Edward Said suggests, “In a human life
. . . it might appear possible to believe in the freedom of
one’s initiative or of one’s action; at the same time, when
such freedom is viewed from a more accurate perspective,
the same activity is seen to be unfree” (1975, 133).
Even more recent incarnations of process theory, which
problematize the notion of the writer as stable and coherent,
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still deﬁne writing in terms of its writer. For example, in her
“Places to Stand: The Reﬂective Writer-Teacher-Writer in
Composition” (1999), Wendy Bishop describes the role of
what she calls the writer who teaches and the teacher who
writes. Implicit in her deﬁnitions of “writer” and “writing”
throughout the essay is a focus on the ﬁgure of the writer present in the writing. According to Bishop, teachers who write
are distinguished by their interest “in the act of writing from
a writer’s perspective” (1999, 14).
This modern epistemology, based in empiricism, was heavily
inﬂuenced by John Locke. In his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, published in 1690, Locke argued that individuals, born with no innate ideas, gain knowledge through accumulated experiences. Through sensory impressions, the mind
stores simple ideas and then, with the help of the understanding or reason, associates and categorizes them into more complex, abstract ideas. If the logical faculties of the mind are
functioning accurately—that is, if there is no interference from
such “illogical” faculties as the emotions or imagination—then
an individual’s accumulated knowledge and understanding of
the world should reﬂect and be conﬁrmed by other individuals’
knowledge and understanding. Because words are how individuals label and communicate ideas, Locke fears rhetoric’s inﬂuence. Rhetoric, what Locke calls “that powerful instrument of
error and deceit” (1992, 268), is a threat to such an empirical
epistemology, for “if we would speak of things as they are, we
must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness,
all the artiﬁcial and ﬁgurative application of words eloquence
hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong
ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment,
and so indeed are perfect cheats” (Locke 268; my emphasis).
In Locke’s formulation of rhetoric, a formulation that was to
inﬂuence later eighteenth and nineteenth century views of
rhetorical invention, rhetoric was no longer a generative art but
a regulative skill involving order and clearness.
In his now classic deﬁnition, Richard Young describes some key
characteristics of current-traditional rhetoric: “The emphasis
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on the composed product rather than the composing process;
the analysis of discourse in words, sentences, and paragraphs;
the classiﬁcation of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax,
spelling, punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the informal essay and the
research paper; and so on” (1978, 31). Sharon Crowley adds:
“Current-traditional rhetoric occults the mentalism that underlies its introspective theory of invention,” assuming that ideas
and subjects exist prior to their representation in discourse,
which becomes a graphic embodiment of the invention process
(1990, 13). For an overview of current-traditional rhetoric and
its impact on the teaching of writing, see James Berlin (1987),
Sharon Crowley (1990), and Robert Connors (1997).
Of course, it was well before the 1950s that scholars began
exploring the cognitive and creative workings of the mind. By
1790, for instance, Immanuel Kant was arguing that we are
born with apriori cognitive categories which help us conceptualize what we experience through our sense impressions, so
that our understanding is not necessarily a reﬂection of the
natural world as Descartes had assumed. In addition, only
twenty years after Locke published his Essay, Joseph Addison
was already wondering if the imagination was indeed as dangerous and distorting as Locke had suggested. While he
acknowledges, following Locke, that our ideas are derived
from external impressions imposed on our senses, he also
suggests that we gain a great deal of pleasure when our minds
extend and transform these impressions through the imagination. In so doing, Addison endowed the imagination with a
creative power. So did Edward Young, who, in Conjectures on
Original Composition (1759), presages the romantic movement
by arguing that some individuals are endowed with innate
genius that allows them not only to imitate but also to originate (1992, 332-33). To counter the passivity of imitation,
Young concludes by advising individuals (in terms strikingly
similar to those Rohman uses a little more than two hundred
years later) to “therefore dive deep into thy bosom; learn the
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depth, extent, bias, and full forte of thy mind; contract full
intimacy with the stranger within thee” (336).
Recent work in creativity theory also acknowledges such formations. For instance, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues
have described what they call the Domain Individual Field
Interaction (DIFI) model to offset the tendency in creativity
research to locate creativity in a person (Feldman et al 1994,
24). In order to function creatively within a ﬁeld, an individual
must be familiar with its organized body of knowledge or
domain, including its “representational techniques,” “symbol
systems,” “special terms,” and “technologies” (Feldman et al.,
22). The “locus of creativity,” Csikszentmihalyi claims, is the
dynamic interaction between the domain, the individual, and
the ﬁeld (Feldman et al., 21). For other examples, see Kuhn
(1970), Beaugrande (1979), and Weisberg (1993).
In describing genres as situated topoi, I am expanding the
classical deﬁnition of topoi not only to include general sets of
questions through which a rhetor can explore any given subject (topoi as analytical tools) but also, as the name suggests,
to include locales within which such exploration takes place.
By comparing genres to topoi, I am suggesting that genres
represent situated sites of inquiry and action, habits as well as
habitats for recognizing, exploring, and enacting arguments,
situations, and identities. I do not intend the comparison to
be literal, only to suggest that, like the topoi, genres are situated social and rhetorical sites in which invention takes place.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1.

My main concern in this and the following chapter is to
describe and analyze how genres shape and enable writers as
social actors who rhetorically enact certain subjectivities, relations, and practices as they write. The question of degree, of
how much genres inﬂuence writers, may be impossible to
quantify. As we will shortly see, genres, both conceptually and
textually, maintain social conventions for how we recognize
and act in various situations. How much we as social actors
are inﬂuenced by these conventions depends on factors such
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as our past experiences (especially with other genres); our
social positioning, including our gender, class, race, and ethnicity; our immediate circumstances; and other psychological
and biological X-factors. All these factors shape how we interpret generic conventions, but the fact of these conventions
remains as a necessary condition within and against which we
enact our intentions and subjectivities.
What becomes apparent in such places as Florida is that even
those contexts that seem outside of our rhetorical range are
nonetheless rhetorically bounded. The difference between
so-called “wild” and “not-wild” environments is as much
rhetorical as it is geographical. We recognize a place as wild
mainly because we designate it as such, and we act in such a
place according to accepted social norms. These norms are
rhetorically rehearsed for us in such places as National Parks’
visitors centers which not only narrate the nature of the
wilderness we are about to enter—and how, subsequently, we
should behave in this environment—but also place us conceptually within this narrative/environment. In short, even
in places that seem outside of rhetoric, places we call “wilderness” or “nature,” we cannot escape the power of rhetoric in
shaping how we socially deﬁne, recognize, and experience
our environments and ourselves in relation to them.
I am indebted to Teresa Tran, a pre-med student enrolled in
a genre-based writing course I taught in the Spring of 1997 at
the University of Kansas, for prompting my interest in the
patient medical history form and for her insights into how
such forms reﬂect and support medical assumptions. For
related work in doctor patient interaction and subject formation, see Berkenkotter (2001).
The sketchbooks serve a similar function to what Janet
Giltrow calls a “meta-genre,” which she deﬁnes as an “atmosphere of wordings and activities, demonstrated precedents or
sequestered expectations—atmospheres surrounding genres” (2002, 195). But in addition to being atmospheres, the
sketchbooks are themselves genres, so it might be more accurate to call them alpha genres instead.
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As I take Giddens to mean, and as I conceive of it, reproduction is not the same as duplication. When we reproduce something, we are not producing an exact copy of it because any
reproduction necessarily involves some variation. This is the
case biologically, linguistically, and rhetorically. For instance,
biological ecosystems are not static because they change as the
organisims living within them reproduce and evolve. The
same is true for genres. In helping reproduce rhetorical environments, genres also help communicants change rhetorical
environments because on some level writing genres always
involves some interpretation, which involves some variation.
As an example of how unique circumstances can over-ride situational motives, we can imagine that the patient who writes
the allegory may be friends with the physician, and so the
physician will recognize the allegory as more of a friendly,
playful gesture, a way of signaling intimacy, rather than an act
of resistance. But the effect of this genre transgression
nonetheless remains a function of the genre.
For a related example, see Thomas Pfau’s study of lyric
poetry and authorship, “The Pragmatics of Genre: Moral
Theory and Lyric Authority in Hegel and Wordsworth,” in
which he argues that lyric poetry is not, as popularly
assumed, merely a vehicle for expressing private consciousness. For example, Wordsworth’s “Ode to Duty,” Pfau argues,
“does not ‘express’ a newly discovered spiritual conviction
but, instead, realigns (and thereby empowers as a cultural
‘authority’) the self with a historically proven social value,
here present as an ‘iterable’ genre” (1994,154-5).
Anthony Paré (2002) provides a good example of how genres
can create tensions that might lead to resistance and transformation. He describes the struggles northern Canadian Inuit
social workers encounter as they use social work genres developed in southern, urban Canada. This use forced the Inuit
workers “into a position between cultures and into the role of
professional representatives of the colonial power” (63).
Genres naturalize desires and ideologies, making the actions
they elicit seem common sensible, but when these desires
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and ideologies encounter conﬂicting desires and ideologies,
their illusion of common sense is fractured. This tension,
however, does not necessarily lead to genre change in part
because southern, urban social work genres represent dominant ideologies and desires. For examples of how genres
change over time because of changes in technology, ideology,
and context, see Bazerman (1988), Freedman and Smart
(1997), and Popken (1999).
Of course, there are some positions that Michael cannot
occupy without obtaining a certain social status, even if he
had access to the appropriate genres. For example, he would
not “become” a doctor simply because he knew how to write a
prescription note, and he would not become a lawyer simply
because he knew how to write a legal brief. There are roles
we earn through education, election, and practice (all of
which certainly involve a range of genres) that work in conjunction with the subject positions we occupy. Genres and
roles are mixed in with one another, so that, for instance, a
judge is someone who is shaped and enabled by both her status and her genres. Both necessarily interact.
I should note here that sub-genres are not the same as textual
variations within a genre. Such variations are a mark of all
genres. More accurately, sub-genres are typiﬁed variations
within a genre that nonetheless still share signiﬁcant social
and rhetorical motives with that genre. Sub-genres typify
their own more speciﬁc situations within the larger sociorhetorical situations of the genre. John Swales refers to the
various sub-genres that constitute a genre such as the GC as
“multi-genres” (1990, 38-61).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1.

It is worth noting here that the word “ethos” in Greek means
“a habitual gathering place” (Campbell 1989, 122). Just like
rhetorical strategy, then, the persona a rhetor assumes takes
place within a place, a habitation or topoi, so that when
rhetors invent, they are not only formulating the available
means of persuasion, but also the rhetorical persona they
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need to carry out that rhetorical strategy. As LeFevre
explains, “ethos . . . appears in that socially created space, in
the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or
writer and listener or reader” (1987, 46). Considered as situated topoi, genres not only shape and enable how communicants recognize and enact social situations; genres also shape
and enable how communicants recognize and enact their
ethos or subjectivities within these situations.
With the increased use of computer technology in education,
especially networked classes and distance learning, this claim
becomes less generalizable. If anything, though, the emergence of the “virtual classroom” only strengthens my claims
about genre and the classroom that follow.
It is worth noting that the FYW classroom is no more artiﬁcial
than Epcot is “artiﬁcial” when compared to the “real”
Florida. As I discussed in chapter 4, Epcot is as complex a
rhetorical ecosystem as any wilderness-designated area. Both
are rhetorical constructions, ways we deﬁne, conceptualize,
and behave in our environments.
For this analysis, I randomly collected ﬁfteen syllabi from colleagues at a research university and from published teaching
guides. All the syllabi are from FYW courses, and reﬂect a balance between experienced and new teachers.
The examples I analyze in this section are culled from my examination of ﬁfteen randomly collected writing prompts from
experienced and new teachers of FYW at a research university.
I reprint this and the following student excerpts as they
appear in the students’ essays, errors and all.

NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX

1.

Certainly, a great deal has happened to mark the return of
rhetoric since the FYW course was ﬁrst developed at Harvard
in 1874. Fred Newton Scott at the University of Michigan
fought and was successful for years during the early part of
the twentieth century in maintaining a program in rhetoric,
producing some of the country’s only Ph.Ds in rhetoric. And
the 1960s witnessed what James Berlin (1987) and others have
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referred to as a renaissance of rhetoric—what Ken Macrorie,
then editor of College Composition and Communication, dubbed
the “new rhetoric” in 1964. In fact, at the 1963 Conference on
College Composition and Communication, the “Rhetoric in
Freshman English” workshop, led in part by Wayne Booth,
Virginia Burke, Francis Christensen, Edward P.J. Corbett, and
Richard Young, passed the following two resolutions:
“Resolved, that rhetoric, generally conceived as effective adaptation of writing skills to particular ends and/or audiences, be
accepted as an integral part of the freshman course” and
“Rhetorical principles should be the organizational principle
of the freshman English course and the evaluating criteria for
grading student papers” (qtd. in Connors 1997, 206). Yet,
while the rhetorical turn has had a signiﬁcant effect on the
increased interest in rhetorical theory in literary and nonliterary studies as well as the sciences over the last forty or so years,
and while it has played a major role in helping establish composition studies as an academic, not just a teaching, subject, it
did not have as great an impact on writing instruction. As
David Fleming has recently argued, the revival of rhetoric
remains a scholarly phenomenon, one marked by “relative
failure at the level of undergraduate education” (1998, 169).
I am aware of what post-structuralist theories have taught us,
that we cannot escape structure even when we try to observe
or even critique structure. There is no structure-free stance,
and I do not presume such a stance for FYW. I do argue, however, that its position within English departments (which
share, if anything, a focus on critical language study) affords
the course the kind of rhetorical vantage that can position it
within a structure while allowing it to observe what Derrida
has called the structurality of that structure (1992).
Amy J. Devitt, Mary Jo Reiff, and I describe and develop these
steps in much greater detail in a composition textbook we are
currently completing tentatively called Scenes of Writing: Genre
Acts (forthcoming, Longman), a book that teaches students to
read and write their way into different scenes of writing—
academic, public, and workplace—through their genres.
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Before students write their argument essays, I lead the class
in a collective genre analysis of the argument essay, in which
we use the guidelines for analyzing genres to identify and
interrogate the goals, values, and assumptions embedded in
this FYW genre and the position it invites them to assume in
relation to the subject matter. This allows the students and
me to examine what it means to make academic arguments.
For more arguments on behalf of the explicit teaching of
genre in writing courses, which involves exposing the formal
and rhetorical features of genres and articulating their
underlying social motives and assumptions, see, for example,
Christie (1988); Fahnestock (1993); Lovitt and Young
(1997); Maimon (1983); and Williams and Colomb (1993).
I want to emphasize here that my pedagogy does not aim for
assimilation into genred sites of action; it aims, rather, for a
critical understanding and participation. I have discovered
that as students begin to uncover the desires, subjectivities,
and activities embedded in a genre’s rhetorical conventions,
they not only develop the ability to reproduce the genre
more effectively; they also develop the desire to change it.
Teresa Tran, for example, who studied the PMHF in my
course, recognized something empowering in genre analysis
when she used it to uncover how doctors rhetorically and
materially treat patients as embodied objects. She insisted
that when she became a doctor, she would lobby the
American Medical Association to change the PMHF under
the assumption that a change in the genre’s rhetorical features would result in a change in the social practices these
feature make possible. Indeed, genre literacy and critical literacy go hand-in-hand.
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